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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
John Dahlgren is among the most famous officers in the 
history of the United States Navy. One of the first 
officers to hold the rank of admiral, which was first 
established during the Civil War, Dahlgren's career is 
prominent in almost every written account of the 
nineteenth-century American navy. But unlike most famous 
naval figures who are usually recognized for their 
achievements in battle, Dahlgren is best known as an 
ordnance specialist. When he is mentioned in naval 
histories, it is almost always in connection with the large 
cannon that he designed in the decade or so prior to the 
Civil War. Shaped like a giant soda-bottle, wide at the 
breech and tapered narrow at the muzzle, the distinctive 
Dahlgren gun was the navy's primary weapon on its ships 
during the Civil War, and the main source of Dahlgren's 
prominence.
I was initially interested in John Dahlgren for two 
reasons, neither of which had anything to do with his 
ordnance career. I was intrigued by his friendship with 
President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. I also knew 
that Dahlgren had kept a personal Journal, which I had seen 
printed excerpts of in numerous places, especially in 
Dahlgren's Memoirs. and in various volumes of The Official 
Bggflrds of the Uni_on_artd__Confederate Navies of the War of 
the Rebel 1 ion. It was my hope that his Journal would
v
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provide fresh insights into the workings of the Lincoln 
administration.
Not knowing what to expect when I arrived at the 
Syracuse University library where the complete manuscript 
copy of Dahlgren's journal is located, I was nearly 
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the document. Having 
started it in 1824, at the age of fifteen, the Journal is in 
fifteen volumes, containing a total of more than two 
thousand pages. Dahlgren was especially prolific in his 
journal writing during the Civil War. For those four years, 
the journal encompasses seven volumes and more than thirteen 
hundred pages. Despite periodic revelations about Lincoln 
and his administration, however, I discovered that 
Dahlgren's journal lacked the overall depth of information 
contained in other important Civil War diaries, like the one 
kept by Lincoln's secretary of the navy, Gideon Welles.
Although I was disappointed that Dahlgren's journal did 
not provide the type of information that I had hoped to
find, as 1 read Dahlgren's personal account of his life and
career, I became increasingly intrigued by the man. I 
quickly realized that Dahlgren's career merited attention on 
its own.
First and foremost, this dissertation is an account 
of John Dahlgren's long naval career. Beginning with his 
appointment to the navy in 1826, as an anonymous sixteen
year old midshipman, it details his climb from obscurity to
v i
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the relative fame and recognition that he enjoyed by the end 
of his life as one of only a handful of officers who reached 
the rank of admiral during the Civil War. His career 
demonstrates how many military men clawed their way up 
through the ranks, through whatever means they could. 
Dahlgren's Civil War career is also extremely revealing, 
especially his Involvement with the Union's military 
campaign against Charleston. This campaign demonstrates the 
absolute obsession that the North, especially the Navy 
Department, had with trying to destroy this city. 
Additionally, Dahlgren's Civil War career shows the Navy 
Department in an entirely different light than the one in 
which it is usually seen. Compared to the War Department, 
the Navy Department has generally been viewed as being 
relatively flawless during the war, and its few failings 
have been portrayed as innocent and well meaning mistakes. 
The circumstances surrounding Dahlgren's assignment to, and 
subsequent command of, the South Atlantic Blockading 
Squadron shows that this was not the case, as Dahlgren was 
primarily a pawn in the Navy Department's and the Lincoln 
administration's battles with their Congressional enemies.
This dissertation is also the story of Dahlgren the 
man. It details the private side of his obsessive quest for 
personal glory and analyzes the ways in which he struggled 
to reconcile his Insatiable ambition with the realities of 
his career. While he enjoyed the outward trappings of
vi 1
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success, a reputation as a brilliant ordnance expert and the 
highest rank in the navy, Dahlgren died a bitter and 
disappointed man; that was because he never experienced 
victory in battle, which was the ultimate measure of 
greatness for a naval hero. Thus, Dahlgren's lifelong quest 
for glory was never completely fulfilled.
Before I began this project, whenever I read the 
acknowledgements section of a book I often wondered how an 
author seemingly engaged in a solitary pursuit could owe so 
much to so many. Now I know.
My first and greatest thanks belong to my wife and best 
friend, Judy Ridner. Quite simply, if it was not for her, I 
never would have completed this dissertation. By the time I 
reached the end of my last chapter, I am sure that she came 
to dread hearing the question, Can you read this? But 
despite working on and completing her own dissertation in 
history, she always managed to find the time to read and 
comment on my work, as well as to offer countless words of 
encouragement. While I would not recommend that any couple 
try to complete two Ph.D.s at the same time, I wi 11 forever 
cherish receiving our degrees at the same graduation 
ceremony.
I will also always owe a debt of gratitude to 
Professor Ludwel1 Johnson. I came to William and Mary a 
Yankee hoping to learn about the Civil War from the other 
side. Despite my northern heritage, which he graciously
vl 1 i
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suggested was no fault of my own, he willingly accepted me 
as a student. I am indeed fortunate. Time after time he 
has taught me to consider things from as many perspectives 
as possible, and while we may disagree on some things, we 
certainly agree on much more. As an advisor for this 
dissertation, he has been simply marvelous, always helpful, 
and even more Importantly, always patient.
I also offer my thanks to three other William and Mary 
historians. Professors Richard Sherman, Ed Crapol, and Phil 
Funlglello agreed to the onerous task of serving as readers. 
Thanks to all three for their prompt attention to my needs 
in the midst of everything else that they had to do.
The history graduate student community at William and 
Mary is indeed a special one. My Ph.D. classmates, Julie 
Richter, Wade Shaffer, Ann Smart Martin, Chris Hendricks, 
and Mary Ferrari, by finishing their degrees, provided me 
with extra incentive to keep on going during my most trying 
moments. Mark Fernandez, John Barrington, Todd Pfannestiel, 
and Mary Carrol 1 Johansen are Just a few of many others who 
made my stay in Williamsburg one of the happiest in my life. 
How can I ever forget having a room named in my honor? or, 
winning the "Bubba Smith" award? I hope that the spirit of 
comraderie and cooperation which has characterized the 
program for the entire time that I have been here will 
cont1nue.
I had the good fortune to enjoy a one-year stay with
ix
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another group of historians. Judy allowed me to tag along 
while she was a fellow at the Philadelphia Center for Early 
American Studies. Special thanks go to Director Richard 
Dunn, Rose Beller, Donna Rilling, Jim Williams, John 
Majewski, Anne Verplanck, John Hart, Roderick McDonald,
Thane Bryant, and Wayne Bodle for always making me feel like
a part of the group. Most of al 1, I would like to thank
Allen Guelzo. From the moment that I met him, Allen treated 
me as an equal colleague. Our long lunctime discussions 
about the "War" were not only a welcome relief during my 
second stay in a bastion of colonial American studies, but 
also valuable in helping to sharpen my own thinking about 
many complex and controversial issues. Further thanks are 
necessary for his agreeing to serve as the outside reader
for this work. His inclteful comments can only serve to
improve the quality of it. I only hope that someday I wl 11 
be able to read as fast as Allen seems to write.
Of course, this project could never have been completed 
without the assistance of many librarians, historians, 
researchers, and archivists. I want to thank the staffs at 
the Earl Gregg Swem Library at William and Mary, the George 
Arents Research Library at Syracuse University, the New York 
Historical Society, the New York Public Library, the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the Duke University 
Library, the Army War College, and the National Archives. I 
owe special thanks to the research specialists, archivists,
x
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and librarians at the Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division, especially Mike Klein, Fred Bauman, and Chuck 
Kelly. While they were not able to make my six months of 
camping on the outskirts of Washington enjoyable, the daily 
comraderie they offered certainly made the experience more 
bearable.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, especially my 
parents, Helen and George Legg. Their love and support, in 
all of its many forms, was always unconditional. What more 
could any child ever hope to receive? And Mom, I finally 
have the answer to the question you asked me again and 
again: The "paper" is finished.
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is, first and foremost, an account of 
John Dahlgren's long and often controversial naval career. 
Beginning with his appointment to the navy in 1826, it 
details his climb from obscurity to the relati’-^  fame and 
recognition that he enjoyed by the end of his life: first as 
the noted designer of the distinctive, bottle-shaped 
Dahlgren gun, which was the navy's primary cannon during the 
Civil War, and, second, as one of only a few officers to 
attain the rank of admiral during the Civil War.
Dahlgren's career, both as an ordnance specialist and 
as a line officer, demonstrates how many officers scrambled 
up the military ladder. Using whatever means they could, 
including developing and utilizing political connections as 
well as conducting personal public relations campaigns, 
success often had little to do with true professional merit.
Dahlgren's Civil War career is also extremely 
important. His involvement with the Union's military 
campaign against Charleston reveals the absolute obsession 
that the North, especially the Union navy, had with trying 
to destroy this city. Additionally, Dahlgren's war career 
shows the Navy Department in an entirely different light 
than the one in which it is usually seen. Compared to the 
War Department, the Navy Department has generally been 
viewed as being relatively flawless during the war, and its 
few failings have been portrayed as innocent and well 
meaning mistakes. The circumstances surrounding Dahlgren's 
appointment to, and subsequent command of, the South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron shows that this was not the 
case, as Dahlgren was primarily a pawn in both the Navy 
Department's and the Lincoln administration's battles 
against their Congressional enemies.
This dissertation is also the story of Dahlgren the 
man. It details the private side of his obsessive quest for 
personal glory and analyzes the ways in which he struggled 
to reconcile his insatiable ambition with the realities of 
his career. While he enjoyed the outward trappings of 
success, a reputation as a brilliant ordnance expert and the 
highest rank in the navy, Dahlgren died a bitter and 
disappointed man. Because he never experienced victory in 
battle, which was the ultimate measure of greatness for a 
naval hero, Dahlgren's lifelong quest for glory was never 
completely fulfilled.
xi i
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CHAPTER I 
Before the War
"I have long since dear Mary given up 
hope of being a great man myself."
John Dahlgren's navy career began out of necessity.
Born in Philadelphia on November 13, 1809, he was the oldest 
child of Bernard Ulrich Dahlgren and Martha Rowan Dahlgren. 
As a young boy he received the benefits of a classical 
education, as had his father, who was a graduate of Uppsala 
University in Sweden. But in 1824 his father died suddenly, 
ending the youngster's formal education. Fortunately, John 
Dahlgren was not, as one of his father's business associates 
told the secretary of the navy, left "to establish his own 
fortunes," and the political influence of family friends won 
him a difficult-to-secure midshipman's appointment, which he 
accepted on February 1, 1826.1
Because the Navy Academy did not exist at this time, a 
midshipman's education came from serving on board ship under 
the watchful eyes of experienced officers. Dahlgren served 
his first two cruises aboard the U.S. Frigate Macedon1 an of 
the Brazil Squadron and the U.S. Sloop Ontario of the 
Mediterranean Squadron. Shortly after returning to the
2
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3United States In early 1832, he took the midshipman's 
qualifying exam along with the rest of the 1826 appointees. 
The results confirmed the rigorous nature of the exam; only 
31 of the 70 who took it passed, with Dahlgren ranking ninth 
overal1.2
After a brief tour of duty aboard the receiving ship 
Sea Gu11 located at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Dahlgren 
received orders to report to the United States Coast Survey. 
This appointment changed his career. The idea of a general 
and comprehensive survey of the country's coastline had 
originated with the members of the American Philosophical 
Society who recognized the needs of the nation's burgeoning 
commercial interests. First recommended to President Thomas 
Jefferson, the survey had experienced a number of false 
starts but was firmly established by the early 1830s.3
Assigning navy officers to the "Survey," as it was 
commonly called, served a dual purpose. First, in an era of 
an extremely small peacetime navy, it provided duty for some 
of the navy's excess officers. Second, it provided them 
with scientific, mathematlc, and survey training. The 
superintendent of the Survey in the 1830s was Ferdinand 
Rudolph Hassler, a world renowned mathematician and geodist. 
He insisted, according to A. Hunter DuPree, "that the Survey 
be a true contribution to science and not just a compiled 
map." He also believed and made it known to everyone that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4as a scientist he should not be subject to interference of 
any kind.4
Dahlgren worked closely with the brilliant but 
tempermental Swiss scientist while he received training in 
proper surveying techniques. Hassler's skill at political 
maneuvering in Washington was not lost on the junior navy 
officer. Typically, navy officers assigned to duty on the 
Survey served a two year tour, afterward returning to the 
navy for regular duty. Moreover, while assigned to the 
Survey, officers continued to receive the standard pay for 
their rank. Hassler and Dahlgren fought a long-running 
battle to exempt Dahlgren from both practices. Hassler 
appealed all the way to President Martin Van Buren, who in 
March 1837, approved a pay raise for Dahlgren from his 
midshipman's salary of $750 to the rather princely sum of 
$3,000 "aggregate annual compensation." Dahlgren also 
stayed on the Survey past the usual two years.5
Along with the gigantic pay raise, Dahlgren received a 
promotion to the rank of lieutenant. Within months, 
however, neither seemed very important. Long hours of 
tedious, eye-straining work had apparently taken a toll on 
his vision. The problem apparently became so severe that in 
the spring of 1837, Dahlgren requested a medical leave of 
absence from the Survey.6
Through the summer of 1837, Dahlgren and Hassler kept 
in close contact. Hassler told Dahlgren that his condition
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"is very painful to me" and if Dahlgren could "come upon 
some idea by which I can do something to assist yout,] I 
should be glad to do it." Dahlgren did have something in 
mind. He asked Hassler to intervene on his behalf to secure 
approval for a trip to Paris where he could seek medical 
advice and to continue his $3,000 annual salary, based on 
the claim that his condition had been caused by his work on 
the Coast Survey. Hassler agreed to Dahlgren's proposal and 
arranged Treasury Department approval. Officially, however, 
Dahlgren was going to Paris to purchase surveying equipment 
not available in the United States.7
The trip to Paris failed to cure Dahlgren. Moreover, 
he also failed to purchase any survey equipment, the 
ostensible purpose for the trip. When Hassler learned of 
this he flew into a rage. He told Dahlgren, "It puts me in 
a bad predicament." What was he to say if anyone "asked me 
what you did for the C.Coastl S.Curvey] in Paris?" Although 
Dahlgren apparently proposed to return the salary he 
received while in Europe, Hassler warned him, "You must not 
say a word about giving up your compensation, it is all 
over, provided nothing is said, otherwise it may have very 
disagreeable consequences."8
The advice came too late. The first thing that 
Dahlgren had done on his return from Europe was to report to 
the Navy Department, which was normal procedure. The 
meeting with Secretary of the Navy Mahlon Dickerson quickly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6became the center of controversy. According to Dickerson, 
Dahlgren requested a seven day leave in order to visit his 
home in Philadelphia. Because Dahlgren asserted that his 
eyesight had not improved enough to resume regular duty, 
Dickerson gave him a medical leave of absence effective at 
the end of his seven day leave. This removed him from the 
Coast Survey and his $3,000 salary. More than likely 
Dahlgren also admitted to Dickerson that he had not 
purchased any survey equipment while in Paris, because the 
secretary of the navy spoke to his counterpart in the 
Treasury Department who immediately wrote to Dahlgren 
questioning whether he was entitled to any pay for his trip 
to Europe.9
Afterward, Dahlgren told Hassler of his predicament and 
the head of the Coast Survey went to see Dickerson. After 
hearing Dickerson's version of events it was apparent to 
Hassler that Dahlgren had not followed his advice. He told 
Dahlgren that he should not have done "so much talking" to 
the Secretary "as he thinks you unfit." Fortunately,
Hassler told Dahlgren, Dickerson had said that Dahlgren 
could reapply for the Coast Survey "and he will grant it." 
Dahlgren, however, disagreed with Hassler's assessment of 
events and apparently told Hassler so. At this Hassler 
seemed to lose all confidence in Dahlgren, telling him that 
he was "almost rather inclined" not to do "anything else." 
Despite his inclination Hassler did plead Dahlgren's case,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7again going to President Van Buren; but this time the 
President sided with the Secretary of the Navy. Dahlgren 
was put on a leave of absence and told to report for duty in 
January 1839.10
A new secretary of the navy, James K. Paulding, was 
appointed during Dahlgren's medical leave. When Dahlgren 
reported for his next assignment as ordered he told the 
secretary that his eyesight still prevented him from 
returning to active duty. Paulding asked Dahlgren to 
request a furlough, the attraction of this for the secretary 
of the navy was that Dahlgren's pay would be cut in half to 
$600. This suggestion initiated a lengthy and acrimonious 
exchange between Dahlgren and Paulding, with the navy 
secretary finally admitting that while he could not force 
Dahlgren to go on furlough, it would be becoming to him as 
an officer to request it. Dahlgren refused, as was his 
right. His refusal created a stalemate, although Paulding 
told Dahlgren that any requests for leave in the future must 
be accompanied by a navy surgeon's certificate attesting to 
his disabi1ity.11
Dahlgren was not sitting still. Just prior to 
requesting another leave he had married Mary Bunker, and he 
wrote to Hassler that he was not about "to live, or rather, 
starve on $1,200 a year." Could Hassler, Dahlgren asked, 
assist him in securing a government pension, and "if 
granted," he told Hassler, he would resign his commission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8Again Hassler intervened on his behalf. Hassler "went to 
the Capitol" and convinced Congressman Seargent Smith 
Prentiss of Mississippi to present a claim for Dahlgren.
But because It was so late in the session Prentiss d i d  not 
have time to lobby for support and the proposal f a i l e d . 12
Dahlgren tried everything he could to get the secretary 
of the navy to relent; ultimately he was successful. On May 
31, 1839, Paulding wrote to Dahlgren demanding to know if he 
had gone to President Van Buren again. Dahlgren responded 
that he had told some people of his plight, but only in 
passing conversation. He had not asked anyone, Dahlgren 
claimed, to Intervene on his behalf. If anyone had, he 
stated innocently, they had done so without his knowledge or 
author izat i on.13
Someone had indeed gone to President Van Buren. On May 
25, John A. Quitman wrote to the President that his "young 
friend" Dahlgren had told him of his problems and being well 
acquainted with his "most respectable family" he hoped the 
President could do something for him. Quitman, the former 
governor of Mississippi, lived in Natchez, the home of 
Charles Dahlgren, John Dahlgren's younger brother. Quitman 
obviously had influence with the President as Van Buren told 
Secretary of the Navy Paulding, "Mr. Quitman's 
representations are entitled to full confidence." While 
furious, Paulding also realized that Dahlgren had out 
maneuvered him and as a result he continued to grant him
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9leaves of absence at regular three month intervals until he 
left office in March 1841.14
It is hard to say with any degree of certainty how 
badly Dahlgren/s eyesight had deteriorated. Certainly 
Hassler's comments and behavior suggest that he believed 
Dahlgren was experiencing some kind of eye problems. But 
Dahlgren certainly never lost his vision entirely and there 
are a number of indications that Dahlgren may have 
exaggerated his condition. During his trip to Paris he 
became acquainted with the ordnance experiments of General 
Henri Joseph Paixhans and shortly after returning to the 
United States, Dahlgren published an English translation of 
Paixhans's treatise on naval ordnance. Also, during the 
entire time while on medical leave he maintained his 
professional correspondence with the Navy Department and 
others as he tried to continue his leave and to secure a 
government pension. During this time he also continued 
writing in his private journal and he successfully ran a 
small farm.15
There are a number of possible explanations why 
Dahlgren might have exaggerated his vision problems. He 
clearly enjoyed the technical work of the Coast Survey. It 
is possible that he thought that he might keep working on 
the Coast Survey as long as he could not perform regular 
navy duties. His experience on the Ontario provides another 
possible explanation for his refusing to leave the Survey.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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During his second naval cruise his ship was almost lost at 
sea. Dahlgren wrote repeatedly about this close brush with 
death. Could the near disaster have soured him on a life at 
sea? In addition, by this time he was courting Mary Bunker 
and the two of them were married on January 8, 1839.
Staying with the Coast Survey would have allowed him to 
remain with his wife. His devotion to her would be the 
major reason for his seeking shore duty later in his career. 
Finally, after being awarded the pay Increase to $3,000, he 
was receiving more than twice the salary for a lieutenant on 
regular duty. Any, or all of these factors could account 
for Dahlgren exaggerating his condition.16
Whether he exaggerated his condition or not, his 
fondest memories of this period in his life had nothing to 
do with his victory over Paulding. After marrying Mary 
Bunker, the daughter of a Philadelphia businessman, the 
newlyweds purchased a small farm in Bucks County, Just 
outside Philadelphia. There, he and his wife began life as 
a small independent farm family. The farm kept Dahlgren 
busy and in his Journal entries he expressed the concerns of 
every farmer, the weather, his quest to find inexpensive and 
dependable help, the price of supplies, and the price being 
paid for crops became his daily concerns. The great joy of 
these years were the births of his first three children, 
Charles, Elizabeth, and Ulric, whom he affectionately called 
Charley, Lizzie, and Ully. He did not record a word about
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the navy in his journal; it was almost as if that part of 
his life was over.17
Dahlgren continued to receive three month leave 
extensions through March 1841. In June the situation 
changed. On June 23, he informed the Navy Department, "Cm3y 
prospects of being able once more to return to duty are 
happily confirmed by the Improvement which my sight has 
received." What had happened? Had he suddenly regained his 
eyesight? Did the replacement of Secretary of the Navy 
Paulding in March have anything to do with this change? 
Whatever occurred, one thing was sure, Dahlgren was not 
willing to go back to active duty, not yet, lest, as he told 
the new secretary of the navy, George E. Badger, his vision, 
still susceptible to deterioration, would once again be 
impaired. Thus he requested yet another leave, cautioning 
if he did not receive it he might become "an invalid for 
1 ife."18
Dahlgren's request was granted and he remained on leave 
status until the spring of 1842. Finally, almost a year 
after admitting that his vision had improved, he returned to 
active duty. Amazingly he did not have to go back to sea; 
instead he was again assigned to the receiving ship in the 
Philadelphia Navy Yard. Back on active duty, Dahlgren sold 
the farm and he and his family moved to Wilmington,
Delaware. From there he made a difficult daily trip to 
Philadelphia, out of the house at 5:30 a.m. not to return
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until 7:00 p.m. Dahlgren, knowing better than anyone the 
difficulty in keeping duty on shore, continued this routine 
for more than a year without complaint. It was also not 
possible, he knew, to stay at the Philadelphia Navy Yard 
forever. In the summer of 1843 he began to angle for the 
best billet he could get. He requested duty as flag 
lieutenant on the Missouri. but perhaps because of all the 
years of being out of the normal duty rotation, his request 
was denied. Although "exceedingly disappointed," later that 
summer he received orders for service afloat aboard the U.S. 
Frigate Cumber 1 and, assigned to the Mediterranean 
Squadron.19
The Cumber 1 and cruise was his first as a married man, 
and when he left his home on September 26, 1843, he left 
behind his pregnant wife and three young children. Both 
husband and wife felt the separation intensely. On the day 
he left, Mary Dahlgren started writing entries in her 
husband/s Journal and continued doing so until his return 
more than two years later. "My dear husband left at noon 
today for Boston, to join the ship. The very heavens seem 
to Join me in the general sorrow & it is indeed a most 
melancholy day— surely the saddest one of my life. Alas!
But partings should ever come!" John Dahlgren was just as 
heartbroken about leaving home and he wrote often to his 
wife to explain why he was forced to go to sea. "In meeting 
this great evil I am satisfied that I am only discharging a
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duty to you and to our little ones, and this must be done to 
the best of my abl1ities."20
Leaving behind his wife and children weighed heavily on 
him. In his letters home he continually bemoaned his 
absence and called himself the “weary wanderer." As the 
cruise lengthened his letters took an increasing tone of 
despondency concerning his ability to take care of his 
family. As early as January 1844, he began to mention 
possible ways of avoiding sea duty in the future. Perhaps 
this was Just the normal talk of a sailor away from home, 
but in the spring his planning became more than just mere 
rhetoric. On May 23, 1844, he received word that his son 
John, born on November 19, 1843, the same day the Cumber 1 and 
sailed from Boston, had died. He became sullen and bemoaned 
his past and the prospects for the future. "I have long 
since dear Mary given up hope of being a great man 
myself— there was some vague shadowing of the kind before 
25— but that you know is past some time since, and now if I 
can put my little ones in the way of being useful to their 
fellow beings as James Watt, it will do." Clearly his 
comment about "being a great man" referred to his time as 
Hassler's assistant, but now his only concern was getting 
home and being with his family. As the Cumber 1and's return 
to the United States became less and less certain because of 
the growing possiblity of war with Mexico he grew even more 
despondent. At one point he considered asking his
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commanding officer, Commodore Joseph Smith, to send him home 
on an outgoing stores ship, but then thought better of it.21 
The Cumber1 and cruise marked a turning point in 
Dahlgren's career. It convinced him he needed to find a way 
to stay close to his family; at the same time he recognized 
that he only had the navy to depend on for a career. But 
then he hit upon the perfect solution and he detailed his 
idea to his wife. "When I do return, as it is now clear 
that there is to be nothing but the Navy pay, it will not do 
to attempt renting a farm, for I should soon be ordered to 
sea and must go, as the furlough pay of $600 would not 
support us. Now there is a comfortable place in the 
Ordnance line which I could have. It is in Springfield, 
Mass. about 100 miles west of Boston on the R.Iaill Road to 
Albany. And if you could make up your mind to settle there, 
I could keep clear of salt water for five years." He 
admitted to his wife that this scenario would be improved if 
he could secure a post in Philadelphia, as he had done in 
1842, but they had to choose from the "least of e v i l  s . "22
While it would be more than nine months before Dahlgren 
would return to the United States, he had decided to try to 
secure a position in the ordnance department. Shortly after 
arriving back home, Dahlgren received a letter from his 
former commander informing him that he had recommended him 
for ordnance duty. While nothing materialized from this, 
later that year Smith again asked Dahlgren if he wanted him
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to try to secure an appointment in ordnance for him. A few 
months later Dahlgren received orders to report to the 
Washington Navy Yard for special duty connected with 
ordnance research.23
While personal factors were the overriding motive 
behind Dahlgren's decision to seek a position In the Navy's 
Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, he also had professional 
reasons for doing so. Through the early nineteenth-century, 
neither naval guns nor battle tactics had changed much for 
centuries. Until this time the standard ship battery 
consisted of a combination of different size smoothbore 
cannon which primarily fired solid-shot; the basic formula 
for a vessel's strength was the number of guns it carried 
and the total weight of metal it fired in a single 
broadside. In this era of wooden ships and solid-shot, 
captains attempted to maneuver their vessels across the 
enemy's bow or stern where there were few guns, and tried to 
overwhelm their opponents with the weight of their 
broadside. Because the guns fired solid-shot few ships were 
actually sunk. Rather, victories were achieved by the 
destruction of masts and rigging, making the vessel 
unmaneuverable, and by killing and wounding the crew of the 
enemy vessel. The employment of these tactics thus led to 
the construction of increasingly larger vessels carrying 
more and larger g u n s . 24
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Under these conditions, the British Navy, with its 
great advantage in both the number of large ships and guns, 
was the world's leading naval power. But in the aftermath 
of France's defeat in the Napoleonic Wars, French General 
Henri Paixhans argued that France could contest Britain by 
revamping its fleet. Paixhans's plan had many components, 
but his greatest influence was in ordnance, especially in 
pioneering the use of shell-guns on naval v e s s e l s . 25
Explosive shells had been experimented with and used on 
a sporadic basis from at least as early as the 
fourteenth-century but they had never been widely adopted 
for naval use. While the advantages of using explosive 
shells in lieu of solid-shot appear obvious enough, a number 
of factors, including the difficulty of safely storing 
shells on board ship, and their propensity not to explode, 
or even worse, to explode prematurely thus threatening the 
ship which fired them as much as the vessel which the shells 
were intended to destroy, kept navies from adopting 
shell-guns. All of these problems were largely a 
consequence of poor fuze design. Paixhans helped to correct 
the problems with explosive shells and after demonstrating 
the destructive capabi1i t K j of the weapon against some old 
hulks, France began to employ some shell-guns on its 
ships.26
Both Britain and the United States eventually followed 
the French lead. The United States adopted new ordnance
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regulations In 1841 and 1845 which placed 8-inch shell-guns 
on American vessels and simplified ship ordnance by making 
the 32-pounder the only solid-shot gun used. Like France 
and Britain, however, the United States only used shell-guns 
on a limited basis, and the guns were strictly considered an 
auxiliary weapon to the primary system of solid-shot 
32-pounders. Thus, in 1845, an American first-class frigate 
carried a battery of eight shell-guns of 8-inch bore and 
forty-two solid-shot 32-pounder cannon.27
Dahlgren first became acquainted with Palxhans's work 
while in France in the late 1830s. He was so impressed with 
his ideas that he translated Palxhans's treatise on 
shell-guns into English. Like Paixhans, Dahlgren was very 
concerned with his navy's strength compared to Britain. 
Dahlgren believed that by taking Palxhans's ideas one step 
further, and employing an all shell-gun battery, the United 
States would better be able to challenge its larger and more 
powerful rival. From the moment that he stepped foot in the 
Washington Navy Yard, Dahlgren began what turned out to be a 
seven and a half year effort to get the navy to abandon its 
system of armament which relied primarily on solid-shot guns 
and only a few shell-guns and to replace it with a system 
which exclusively utilized shell-guns.28
When Dahlgren first Joined the ordnance department in 
January 1847, his goal was to replace the navy's solid-shot 
32-pounders with the existing 8-inch shell-guns. Dahlgren
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quite rightly argued that the larger explosive projectile 
from the shell-gun was superior to the smaller solid-shot 
projectiles fired from the 32-pounders. But even though 
most of the problems associated with explosive shells had 
been solved by the late 1840s, he still faced opposition. 
This had less to do with technical matters and instead was 
more a consequence of the long held fears about shell-guns 
held by many of the navy's older officers, who, as one naval 
historian recently noted, "opposed progressive reform and 
technological innovation because they held very traditional 
ideas about the Navy and its r o l e . "29
Not long after he joined the ordnance department, 
however, Dahlgren's goal changed from simply wanting to do 
away with the navy's shot-guns to replacing all of the 
navy's guns with a gun of his own design. The Dahlgren gun, 
as his gun quickly came to be called, offered a number of 
advantages over the navy's other guns, both 32-pounder 
shot-guns and 8-inch shell-guns. Because of principles of 
ballistics the low velocity Dahlgren guns offered slightly 
improved accuracy over the higher velocity shot-guns. While 
the navy's existing 8-lnch shell-guns also offered this 
advantage, Dahlgren's guns were of nine-inch and eleven-inch 
bore, giving them greater striking power. It was another 
feature of his guns altogether, however, and one which he 
did not even mention when he first proposed them, that most 
distinguished them from other guns. In the mid-1840s, army
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ordnance specialist Colonel George Bomford discovered that 
the pressure inside the barrel of a gun when fired was much 
higher than previously believed and rather than declining at 
a steady rate as the projectile moved down the barrel, the 
pressure fell off rapidly as soon as the projectile moved. 
Dahlgren designed his guns to conform to Bomford''s 
discovery. His guns thus had a unique soda-bottle shape, 
the advantage of which was that it concentrated the metal in 
the gun to correspond with the interior pressures. This 
made the gun less susceptible to bursting, a relatively 
common occurrence in the nineteenth-century. The unique 
shape of the Dahlgren gun had another benefit. It gave it a 
more favorable weight-of-gun to weight-of-projectile ratio 
than the navy's other large guns. The importance of this 
fact was that replacing the existing batteries with a 
battery of Dahlgren guns of the same total weight resulted 
in a heavier weight of metal fired in a broadside.30
Dahlgren exhibited the same resourcefulness in 
overcoming opposition to shell-guns, including his own, as 
he did in his earlier struggles with the Navy Department.
He used his proximity to government leaders in Washington to 
great advantage. Soon after Joining the ordnance department 
he made it a regular practice to invite anyone who might be 
in a position to help him down to the Washington Navy Yard 
to witness the test firing of the various naval guns. The 
list of people who visited Dahlgren was a veritable who's
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who of prominent leaders. President after president, 
cabinet members, members of both houses of Congress, foreign 
dignitaries, and Journalists, all came down to the yard 
during Dahlgren's tenure. The ability to present his ideas 
in private to these influential leaders without other 
ordnance specialists to offer contrary opinions was probably 
the greatest advantage he had in getting his plans 
implemented. Dahlgren and his strange looking gun became 
the talk of Washington, proving what so many military 
officers already realized, that one tour of duty in 
Washington was worth much more than many successful tours 
anywhere else.^1
Dahlgren's most valuable political contact in the early 
1850s was Congressman Frederick P. Stanton of Tennessee, 
Chairman of the House of Respresentatives Committee on Naval 
Affairs. Dahlgren secured an introduction to Stanton 
through his navy colleague Matthew Fontaine Maury, 
Superintendent of the Naval Observatory. Dahlgren sought to 
meet Stanton for more than the obvious reason that he was 
the chairman of an influential committee. Stanton had been 
engaged in a long standing effort to reduce naval 
expenditures under the Congressional buzzword, "efficiency." 
As Dahlgren pointed out often, since his guns were so much 
larger than the navy's other guns, ships would carry fewer 
of them, thus fewer men would be needed to work a vessel's 
armament, resulting in a decreased payroll. Dahlgren's
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first meeting with Stanton showed Dahlgren at his lobbying 
best. Stanton, along with Congressman Hugh White from New 
York who was also a member of the Naval Affairs Committee, 
visited Dahlgren at the Washington Navy Yard eight days 
after Dahlgren asked Maury to Introduce him to the 
Congressman. Dahlgren did all that was humanly possible to 
impress his influential guests. He took them down to the 
"Experimental Battery," which was what Dahlgren, ever with 
an eye toward image, called the firing range that he had 
laid out at the yard. There he allowed both Congressmen, 
neither of whom had ever seen a shell-gun fired before, to 
fire a IX-inch Dahlgren gun at a target set out in the 
river. Of course Dahlgren conveniently had the target only 
550 yards from the gun, which made it improbable that 
Stanton and White would miss. Firing the massive weapon and 
seeing the shells strike the target had the desired effect, 
because not long afterward Stanton sponsored legislation for 
appropriations to arm the navy's ships with Dahlgren guns.
Of course while Stanton praised the guns for their technical 
merits, he reserved his strongest and warmest comments for 
the economic benefits, which according to his calculations 
would amount to savings "annually something like two 
millions of dollars."32
Although Stanton's bill did not pass, Dahlgren's 
lobbying efforts eventually paid off. In April 1854, when 
Congress finally approved appropriations for the
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construction of six all-new auxiliary steam frigates, the 
proposed batteries consisted entirely of shell-guns.
Dahlgren had succeeded In completely changing the thinking 
about arming vessel s.33
Dahlgren's success was not as complete as he desired or 
thought it should be. While all of the advantages of the 
Dahlgren gun and armament plan for navy vessels had merit, 
not all of his navy colleagues thought that they added up to 
as great an advantage as Dahlgren suggested. Like the guns 
it was designed to replace the Dahlgren gun was a cast-iron, 
muzz 1e-1oadlng smoothbore cannon. Therefore the Dahlgren 
gun had a relatively short range, and while indeed more 
accurate than the navy's existing guns, it was only 
marginally so. Also, in an era when human muscle supplied 
all of the power to load large weapons, the one hundred and 
thirty-six pound shell Dahlgren's Xl-lnch gun used, along 
with the gun's weight of 15,700 pounds, greatly slowed the 
loading, positioning, and firing process. Additionally, 
because of the size of the guns, ships could carry far fewer 
of them than other guns. While the smaller number of guns 
was a distinct advantage when speaking to budget-minded 
congressman, critics pointed out that the ability to carry 
many more of the smaller guns, combined with the ease and 
much shorter time needed to load and fire the smaller 
pieces, offset some, if not all, of the purported advantages 
of the XI-inch Dahlgren gun.34
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The main opponent of using the Xl-inch gun at sea was 
Commodore Charles Morris, who was named the Chief of the 
Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography in November 1851. Until 
this time Dahlgren served under Lewis Warrington. While 
Warrington was among the navy's most respected officers (he 
was a naval hero from the War of 1812 and two time secretary 
of the navy on an ad interim basis), he was not an ordnance 
specialist. Warrington deferred to Dahlgren on most 
technical matters and he had not made him conduct many tests 
to demonstrate that his guns and armament plan were as 
greatly superior as he claimed. This led to an astounding 
situation. In August 1852, as Congressman Stanton tried for 
the second time to win Congressional approval to reorganize 
the navy's ordnance on Dahlgren's plans, Dahlgren's entire 
experience with his shell-guns rested on the casting of two 
guns, one IX-inch gun which had been test fired a total of 
218 times and one Xl-inch gun which had only received its 
proof tests.
Morris, like Warrington, was among the navy's most 
respected officers. Captain John Rodgers, perhaps the most 
distinguished American navy officer of the 
nineteeth-century, described Morris as "a man of 'strong 
discriminating mind, of considerable science, ... [who] 
unites perhaps as much, if not more, theoretical and 
practical knowledge than any man of his age in the 
service.'" Morris was also an ordnance specialist and early
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on and he ordered extensive trials to test Dahlgren's 
IX-inch gun. The first of these were conducted by David G. 
Farragut. He praised the strength of the gun, but he 
expressed concern about handling the gun at sea. Farragut's 
reports on the difficulty of handling the sizeable IX-inch 
gun spelled doom for the even larger Xl-inch gun. Although 
Morris was instrumental in getting the navy to adopt an all 
shell-gun battery for the new frigates, in 1854, when the 
navy announced the batteries for the new frigates, instead 
of the batteries of IX-inch and Xl-inch guns as Dahlgren 
wanted, the navy equipped them primarily with the older 
8-inch shell-guns and Dahlgren's IX-inch guns as Morris 
recommended.
There was one exception to this. The navy decided to 
build one of the six frigates on a different pattern. As an 
experiment to test the applicabli1ity of adapting features 
used in commercial clipper ships the navy asked George 
Steers, famous for the yacht-schooner Amer1ca . to design one 
of the six vessels. Steers's main priority in designing his 
vessel, the Niagara, was speed. Thus he did not want to 
utilize the two deck armament system of a traditional 
frigate because its overall weight would compromise the 
vessel's speed. Dahlgren convinced Secretary of the Navy 
Dobbin to allow him to work with Steers to arrange the 
Niagara's armament, but as with the other frigates he was 
only partially successful. Steers agreed to place twelve of
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Dahlgren's Xl-lnch guns on the spar deck but despite all of 
Dahlgren's lobbying Steers would not consent to the 
placement of any guns on the main deck or more of the 
Xl-inch guns on the spar d e c k . 36
The debate over arming the frigates brought out the 
worst in Dahlgren. He viewed and subsequently portrayed the 
decision against adopting his complete plan for the frigates 
as a consequence of the same traditionalism which delayed 
Initial acceptance of shell-guns and he ignored Morris's 
legitimate concerns with the Xl-inch gun. Dahlgren became 
bitter that none of the ships were based on his complete 
plan and he complained in his private Journal, "So after all 
that is the result that the Bureau takes my place for the 
Gun deck— and Steers takes the spar deck— they dividing me 
between them."37
After the navy refused to arm the frigates exactly as 
he wanted, Dahlgren campaigned successfully to have a vessel 
armed with both IX-inch and Xl-inch guns for tests at sea. 
This resulted in his securing the Navy Academy's training 
ship PIvmouth. Armed with the first Xl-inch Dahlgren gun to 
go to sea, as well as IX-inch Dahlgren guns, Dahlgren sailed 
the PIvmouth to Europe and back in the summer and fal 1 of 
1857. In a carefully worded report of the sea trials of the 
Dahlgren guns, he argued, he had proven that the criticism 
of the guns, especially the Xl-inch gun, were without merit 
because he had been able to exercise the Xl-inch gun at sea.
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He declared, "there should be no objection to restoring that 
part of my plan of armament which assigned a tier of 
el even-inch guns to the spar decks of screw frigates." Even 
as carefully worded as his report was, however, Dahlgren 
conceded that neither of his guns could be fired as rapidly 
as the navy's smaller guns; and though he tried to make the 
difference in firing time seem insignificant, Dahlgren's 
PIvmouth cruise was not enough to get his Xl-inch guns on 
the spar deck of all of the navy's frigates.38
Dahlgren's bitterness did not decrease with time; if 
anything it increased. Because the Niagara's first years in 
service were spent in non-tradltional roles— its initial 
assignment was to assist in the first attempt to lay the 
trans-Atlantic cable, followed by a cruise to Liberia to 
return 280 Africans freed when the slave ship Echo was 
captured— it did not receive its battery of Xl-inch guns 
until 1859. On that occasion Dahlgren renewed his protests 
over the armament of all of the steam frigates. His plan 
had been "mutilated," and therefore none of the vessels were 
as strong as they could have or should have been, he 
complained. He was filled with the most "Inexpressible 
mortification" for fear that the frigates should meet up 
with any of Britain's frigates. But as much as he was 
worried about the fate of the ships he was also concerned 
about his own reputation. "I only wish," he concluded, "now 
that the Niagara is about to be brought before the service
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as a regular cruiser, with a battery which I am to be held 
resposlble for,— to state what I am responsible for."39
Despite failing to get the frigates armed the way he 
desired, Dahlgren's public reputation soared by the late 
1850s. One reason for the acclaim that he received was the 
success a number of Dahlgren guns had in tests designed to 
check their endurance. Dahlgren repeatedly bragged of the 
first Xl-inch gun cast, which endured 1,958 rounds before 
falling. This was indeed remarkable considering that the 
normal service life for large cannon was 1,000 rounds. Of 
course Dahlgren did not often publicly mention that the 
first lot of Dahlgren guns which were cast for the new steam 
frigates, fai1ed miserably during their initial proof tests 
and that most of the guns had to be rejected.40
Bragging about the durability of his first Xl-inch gun 
comprised just one part of a wel1-designed public relations 
campaign that Dahlgren engaged in to promote himself and his 
guns. Dahlgren also took his case to the public. By 
writing and publishing a series of books on naval ordnance 
at his own expense, Dahlgren became widely known to the 
general population. These works, the most Important of 
which was his Shells and Shell-Guns, were not, as one might 
well expect, critical assessments of the field of naval 
ordnance, but rather highly subjective works supporting his 
own opinions about the subject.41
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Dahlgren did not devote his considerable promotional 
abilities solely to getting his guns and his other plans for 
reorganizing the navy's ordnance department adopted.
Between the time that he Joined the Bureau of Ordnance and 
Hydrography and the outbreak of the Civil War he 
successfully engineered three pay raises for himself so that 
he was paid well above what other officers of his rank 
received. The first of these came in early 1848, when he 
petitioned for an additional yearly salary of $500 claiming 
that he and his family could not afford to live in 
Washington on the regular pay of a lieutenant. Dahlgren's 
bid for additional pay was not unprecedented. In 1845, 
Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury, who was named 
superintendent of the Naval Observatory, received a housing 
subsidy of $350 until the navy completed construction of the 
superintedent's house. But Dahlgren's request was indeed 
bold; not only did he ask for more money than Maury 
received, but Dahlgren was equating his position as a newly 
appointed assistant inspector of ordnance to that of Maury, 
who because of his scientific mapping of the ocean's wind 
and water currents was perhaps the most internationally 
renowned officer in the United States Navy.42
Approval of Dahlgren's request only brought a monetary 
increase. In time this proved Inadequate for Dahlgren's 
driving personal ambition. In late 1850 he began to push to 
have his position officially equated with Maury's. Again,
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however, he had to content himself with a monetary reward.
On the same day that Congressman Stanton first introduced 
legislation to have a vessel built and armed along the plans 
of Dahlgren's proposing, another bill was introduced before 
the House, which stated in part, "That the officer charged 
with experiments in gunnery at the navy yard at Washington, 
shall hereafter receive the compensation of a commander at 
sea." When this bill failed to pass, a provision along the 
same lines was inserted into the annual navy appropriation 
bill; and on March 3, 1851, passage of the bill provided 
that Dahlgren receive an annual salary of $2,500, the pay of 
a commander at sea rather than the regular salary of $1,500 
for a lieutenant on duty.43
Dahlgren continued to receive the pay of a commander at 
sea for the rest of the 1850s— Dahlgren had been promoted to 
commander in 1855. In 1860 his cherished pay status was 
threatened. The new Navy Pay Bill being discussed in 
Congress had a provision in it which ended the practice of 
paying any officer a salary above what other officers his 
rank received. Dahlgren put all of his lobbying skills and 
political contacts to use to defeat this provision.
Dahlgren wrote to the numerous senators and representatives 
who had been influential in the naval buildup of the 1850s 
and whose efforts he had supported with his frequent 
testimony before Congress. Dahlgren asked them if there had 
been any shortcomings in his service since 1851 when he had
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first received pay not commensurate with his rank. If it 
had been acceptable to Congress to pay him $1000 above his 
rank in 1851, he asked, "why damage me so seriously now?"
He again equated his services with those of Maury. Since 
Maury continued to live at the Naval Observatory for free, 
why not, Dahlgren asked, pay him a cash amount equivalent to 
Maury's housing? Dahlgren also claimed near impoverishment 
as another reason to continue his higher salary. "Nor is it 
asked upon slight consideration," he told F. H. Morse, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, "For after 
being 34 years in the Service, I am about one month's pay 
richer than when I entered: from which fact literally true, 
your Committee may be assured that the compensation granted 
from the first has been barely equal to the demands of a 
strictly economical mode of living." While Dahlgren may 
have indeed been only one month's pay richer than when he 
joined the service, his assertion that he had followed the 
most "economical mode of living" contrasts sharply with his 
reputation of being an active Washington socialite.44
Dahlgren's efforts paid off, and an amendment proposed 
by Senator Rice was added to the pay bill calling for the 
continuation of the practice of paying Dahlgren at the rate 
of the next highest rank. With the support of Chairman of 
the Senate Naval Affairs Committee Stephen Mallory, and all 
of the other prominent Democratic Senators who had led the 
effort to build up the navy, the amendment passed. On July
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
2, 1860, Dahlgren happily noted that he received his first 
check under his new pay rate of $4,200 a year, which was 
that of a captain at sea, then the highest rank In the 
navy.45
As with his attempt to arm all United States Navy 
vessels only with his guns, Dahlgren's efforts at personal 
aggrandizement also fell short of his goal. Since 1841, the 
Navy Department had been administered by a system of five 
bureaus, under the overall direction of the secretary of the 
navy. One of these was the Bureau of Ordnance and 
Hydrography which Dahlgren was assigned to as an inspector 
of ordnance. In late January 1856, the chief of the bureau, 
Charles Morris, died and Dahlgren tried to secure the 
position for himself. At first glance Dahlgren appeared a 
logical candidate. While not everyone agreed with all of 
his ordnance ideas, he more than anyone else was responsible 
for the navy's adoption of the more powerful shell-gun 
battery for the new steam frigates. He also certainly had 
ability in the technical side of ordnance design. Morris, 
while he opposed using the Xl-inch shell-gun at sea, 
recognized Dahlgren's value to the ordnance department, and 
one of the first things he did after being named head of the 
bureau in late 1851 was to make Dahlgren's appointment to 
ordnance permanent. Dahlgren, however, was not eligible for 
Morris's position because by law the post had to be held by 
a captain and he was only a commander. According to
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Dahlgren, Secretary of the Navy Dobbin "did not know a 
Capt.CainD that he could prefer to me." Since it was 
impossible to make Dahlgren a captain because promotion in 
the navy was strictly a function of seniority until midway 
through the Civil War, Dahlgren, in his classic style, 
proposed another solution. Why not separate the Bureau of 
Ordnance and Hydrography into two parts. Then attach the 
latter to the Naval Observatory and make Maury the head of 
it, and make himself the chief of the now separate Bureau of 
Ordnance. The obvious reason for this proposal was that by 
reducing the overall responsibilities of each position 
Dahlgren hoped that the the posts would be opened to 
commanders as well as captains, thereby making himself 
eligible. But whatever administrative benefits there may 
have been in separating ordnance from hydrography, there 
would be no reorganization of the bureau system at this 
time.46
Dahlgren was as bitter at failing to secure the command 
of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography as he was at not 
seeing the frigates armed the way he desired. He again 
tried to secure the post for himself in late 1859 by once 
again proposing the separation of the bureau; but as in 
1856, he was unsuccessful. A colleague consoled him that 
while he had not received the promotion that he had pushed 
so hard for, "you have with money at least," referring to 
Dahlgren's pay raise in the spring of 1860, "received a
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certificate that you deserve it." But Dahlgren had never 
been content with partial victories and he was far from 
satisfied. Events a few months later only Increased his 
dissatisfaction. In September 1860, Captain Duncan Ingraham 
who had served as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and 
Hydrography since Morris's death in 1856, stepped down. 
Again, Dahlgren had to watch as someone from the list of 
captains was chosen to fill the position.'!7
Thus on the eve of the Civil War, Commander John A. 
Dahlgren was among the most prominent and influential 
officers in the United States Navy and simultaneously among 
the least happy and least satisfied. Widely hailed for 
reorganizing the navy's ordnance and designing the unique 
bottle-shaped cannon that bore his name, he was generally 
viewed as the United States Navy's leading authority on 
ordnance. Besides seeing the navy's newest and most 
powerful vessels armed entirely with shell-guns, Dahlgren 
also chalked up a creditable list of other accomplishments 
during his tenure at the Washington Navy Yard. These 
included laying out a firing range on the Anacostla River, 
the design of a series of small bronze howitzers which could 
be converted from use on board small vessels and ship 
launches to use on land as conventional field pieces, and 
the construction of the navy's first gun factory. He was 
also well established in Washington's highest social circles 
and he enjoyed the company of the some of the nation's
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leading political figures. At the same time, however, 
Dahlgren's successes were tempered by the knowledge that not 
all of his plans for ordnance had been implemented and 
because of the organization of the Navy Department, he was 
not eligible for the position of Chief of the Bureau of 
Ordnance and Hydrography. Not only would have the 
appointment allowed him to implement all of his ordnance 
plans it also would have given him the official recognition 
he so badly wanted and thought he deserved.48
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CHAPTER II
Loyalty Rewarded
"Congress has by law authorized the President to give 
[Navy] Yards to Commanders....[the law] originating 
entirely from reasons personal to myself."
Early in his adult life John Dahlgren began to keep a 
private Journal. While primarily an account of his daily 
activities, on every New Year's Day he generally devoted at 
least a few lines to reflect about the events of the old 
year and the prospects for the new. In this respect, his 
January 1, 1861, entry was no different from any other New 
Year's Day entry he had ever written. The events of the 
previous few months, however, made this New Year's Day entry 
anything but typical.
A memorable New Year's day,— for one of the Stars 
has dropped from the Constitutional firmament, and 
the process of further dissolution is going on.
The public mind begins to be impressed by the 
nature of the crisis, but by no means to the 
extent required to avert the evil. In fact the 
Federal Gov.[ernment] proves to be a shadow in 
presence of State power, and there is apparent 
everywhere an utter want of loyalty to the 
National Union.1
Fourteen years of duty at the Washington Navy Yard 
combined with the numerous political contacts that he had
44
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developed while lobbying to implement his ordnance program 
gave Dahlgren an ideal vantage point for viewing the 
heightening sectional struggle between the North and South. 
He had ties to "men from all sections" of the country, he 
boasted to one of his sons. Moreover, "Most of the 
prominent men I know Intimately." On a recent day, he 
continued, he had met with a Republican Senator, who 
displayed "no misgiving" at all about the crisis. "[Hie & 
his friends behold the coming tempest with firm hearts."
Then afterwards he met with "Jeff Davis & c.," and "I am," 
he told his son, "perhaps the only outsider they speak [to] 
freely."2
In a better position to watch events than most people, 
like many Americans he had conflicting feelings about what 
the dispute between the North and South meant for the United 
States. Although a northerner by birth, Dahlgren's 
sympathies rested with the South. In late 1859, he had 
written to a navy colleague who had inquired about his 
feelings: "The mere form of Union may not disappear at this 
time, but it is certain that the good feeling which is in 
reality the Union has been sadly shocked." And while "It 
has always been my earnest wish never to live so long as to 
witness" the breakup of the Union, he told his colleague, 
"there seems more danger of civil strife by keeping together 
than by [severing! the ties at once." Of course it was 
"painful" for him "to entertain such a sentiment— But
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madness rules the hour and fanaticism stalks unrebuked in 
the North— hand in hand with blasphemy— God help them!" In 
another letter, to his son, he wrote, while "In the North 
there is no personal servitude, ... there is Slavery of the 
classes." Moreover, Southerners had a "duty to the Negro," 
and by "what right," he asked, did the "Northern man ... 
infringe on his [Southern slaveholders] admitted duty." 
Instead, "Let him [Northerners] see to the starving laborers 
in Kansas and elsewhere."3
Perhaps it was Dahlgren's pro-Southern sympathies which 
led his closest friend in the navy, Andrew Hull Foote, to 
write to him in early 1861 and ask, "I know your opinions 
are no less than fixed than mine, and a little more so on 
many subjects. I wish however that you would give me your 
views in full, and what you think is to be the result of the 
crisis, as you are in Intercourse with leading statesmen of 
all sections of the country." Dahlgren's answer, like the 
letters he sent to his son Ulric, showed that he embraced 
the most prevalent pro-slavery arguments of the day. First, 
he pointed to biblical evidence for supporting the 
institution of slavery. "[A]nd I cannot believe it would 
have escaped our Saviour's denunciation," he told Foote, "if 
a tithe were true that is now urged against it." Moreover, 
the slavery spoken of in the Bible included the enslavement 
of white men by white men, "whereas with us it is the 
Slavery of an inferior race, developing resources of rich
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soils, which white men cannot work," There were certainly 
problems with slavery, Dahlgren admitted, but "ttihe abuses 
of a system are no argument against the system Itself." The 
main concern of the moment, however, was not "to enquire who 
is to blame for the present troubles— But to endeavor to 
allay them in such a manner as to preserve the rights of all 
sections, under the Constitution." And, he concluded, when 
it came to preserving the rights of each section of the 
country, "it is not to be forgotten that the North can yield 
more than the South, because the latter are exposed to a 
perilous liability in case their Negroes become excited.'"4
Despite his northern birthright and upbringing, it was 
not at all surprising that Dahlgren had such strong 
pro-Southern sympathies. During his years of campaigning 
for the reorganization of the United States Navy's ordnance, 
most of his support had come from Southern Democrats who led 
the charge for the naval buildup which occurred in the 
1850s, and he had developed personal relationships with many 
of his supporters. But he had other reasons as wel1. His 
younger brother Charles had moved to Natchez, Mississippi, 
after their father's death in 1824. There, Charles Dahlgren 
worked himself into the ranks of the Mississippi planter 
aristocracy. In 1860, Charles Dahlgren's plantation boasted 
a harvest of 1,000 bales of cotton, a substantial sum even 
for the extremely wealthy and large plantations of the 
Mississippi Valley. Additionally, fol1 owing Mary Dahlgren's
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death In 1855, Charles Dahlgren had helped to take care of 
John Dahlgren's children, which included supporting Ulric 
Dahlgren as he read to become a lawyer. In the late 1850s, 
Ulric, who was unquestionably John Dahlgren's favorite 
child, lived in Natchez with his uncle. When Ulric came to 
the North to visit his father in early 1860, John Dahlgren 
noted that his son, "shows the Southern climate in lack of 
color: But prefers it and the prospects there to al1 I can 
hold out elsewhere; So I shall not cross what seems to be 
his fixed inclination." Was it any wonder then that John 
Dahlgren felt the way that he did?5
While Dahlgren embraced Southern arguments, he 
fervently wanted to avoid war. That was why in late 1859 he
had suggested the separation of the North and South, 
believing that keeping the two sections of the country 
together offered a greater potential of "civil strife." The
problem was, as he told his son, there were "Southern 
extremlstCsl," like "Tombs [sic]," and "old fogies" like 
Charles Sumner in the North who "argue [about] the abstract 
right of secession." "No American with the feelings of a 
man can fail to regard the present crisis with the deepest 
solicitude." But rather than resorting to war, the crisis 
must "be avoided peaceably." As late as the last month of 
1860, he still believed that there were "practical men [who] 
will deal with facts."6
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Dahlgren's optimism about the ability of Northern and 
Southern politicians being able to find a peacable solution 
began to fade during the first weeks of January 1861. 
Following South Carolina's secession, rumors began 
circulating that a band of secessionists from the 
surrounding slave states of Maryland and Virginia were 
plotting to attack Washington. On January 8, 1861, Franklin 
Buchanan, Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, informed 
Dahlgren that he had Just learned that these secessionists 
had plans for "securing the arms and ammunition now in the 
Armory and Magazine to be used in preventing the 
inauguration of Mr. Lincoln." Buchanan told Dahlgren, "you 
will ... prepare for the defense of the Yard all the 
Howitzers now available in the Ordnance Department with as 
much secrecy as possible." Furthermore, he told Dahlgren, 
"This yard shal1 not be surrendered to any person or persons 
except by an order from the Hon.Corable] Secretary of the 
Navy, and in the event of an attack, I shall require all 
officers and others to defend it to the last extremity...."7
Dahlgren, along with just about everyone else in the 
capital, took the talk of these secret plots very seriously. 
The day after receiving Buchanan's "Strictly Confidential" 
orders, Dahlgren wrote to a friend in his hometown of 
Philadelphia. "The apprehension gains ground that this 
place is likely to be the scene of a row," and although "the 
Gov.[ernment3 is making preparations against such a
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contingency," the threat seemed genuine. "A number of 
ugly-looklng customers are to be seen about the streets," 
and although "no one knows whence they came or on what 
errand, ... like the stormy petrels they are generally seen 
in advance of trouble." Providing details of events In 
Washington was not his purpose in writing, however; taking 
care of his finances in the event of war was. He thus asked 
his friend to open a bank account for him, with the money 
"to be had In specie If necessary," and "above all," he 
wrote, make sure the account was "perfectly secure."®
There were other reasons for his concern. On the same 
day that he was seeing to his financial affairs, Mississippi 
followed South Carolina's lead and passed an ordinance of 
secession. Five other Southern states, Florida, Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, quickly did the same, so that 
by February 1, seven states in all had seceded. Then, in 
the first weeks of February, representatives from the 
seceded states met in Montgomery, Alabama, where they 
rapidly adopted a provisional contitutlon, elected a 
provisional president and vice president, converted the 
constitutional convention Into a provisional legislature, 
all of which transformed the seven seceded states Into 
Confederate States of America.9
Dahlgren gave little indication of how he felt about 
the formation of the Confederacy. On February 11, he noted 
simply in his Journal, "The Union has lost the Cotton
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
States, who have Just confederated and elected Mr. 
Jeff.tersonD Davis President." In fact, In the weeks 
immediately following this, he gave few clues about how he 
felt about anything. On March 4 ,  he attended Abraham 
Lincoln's inauguration. He made only a brief notation In 
his Journal: "Witnessed the Inauguration of President 
Lincoln, which went off quietly enough in spite of ominous 
forebodings."10
Within days of Lincoln's Inauguration Dahlgren's 
Intentions finally became clear. On March 13, Lieutenant 
Badger, a Junior officer who had served under him on the 
Plymouth. wrote and asked about the possibility of once 
again serving with Dahlgren in the event of war. Dahlgren 
immediately wrote back and his answer showed not a hint of 
equivocation. "You are altogether right," he stated 
assuredly, "I am for maintaining the integrity of the old 
flag under which we have so long served and I feel that it 
will be maintained; At all counts," he continued, "I shall 
... do my duty as I have from the first— and as for any 
bias," he said in sharp contrast with what he had been 
saying to family members and to his closest friends, 1 that 
is naturally to the North, because I am a Northern man by 
birth, habit 8. residence when ashore."1^
Just as it was not surprising that Dahlgren held such 
strong Southern sympathies, it is also not surprising that 
he ultimately cast his lot with the North. He was indeed,
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as he told his navy colleague, "a Northern man by birth ... 
[and] residence." But perhaps even more Important, 
Dahlgren's strongest ties were to the United States Navy.
As he told his wife Mary Dahlgren in the 1840s, they only 
had the navy on which to depend. During the decade and a 
half prior to the outbreak of the Civil War he had 
ceaselessly struggled to make his fortune in the navy, and 
by early 1861 Dahlgren enjoyed prominence and influence 
matched by few of his peers. To have made any decision 
other than stay with the United States Navy would have meant 
giving up everything which he had striven so hard to attain. 
This was a choice that Dahlgren could never seriously 
contemplate.12
Even after he clearly stated his intentions to Badger, 
Dahlgren remained uncharacteristically quiet about the 
important events taking place all around him. After noting 
President Lincoln's inauguration, the next entry in his 
Journal came on March 31, when William Howard Russell, the 
famous London Times war correspondent, visited him. Russell 
had only recently arrived in the United States to report on 
the war which seemed likely to erupt between the North and 
South at any moment. His trademark reporting style was to 
meet and talk with all the prominent political and military 
leaders. His visit to the Washington Navy Yard gives some 
indication of the level of prominence that Dahlgren had 
risen to by 1861; and realizing this, Dahlgren was quite
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pleased with Russell's visit. He wrote, "Mr. Russell the 
celebrated correspondent of the London Times visited me and 
remained two hours or more. He is very clever."13
Russell's comments about Dahlgren were similarly 
positive for the most part. "In a modest office, surrounded 
by books, papers, drawings, and models, ... we found 
Capt.Iainl [sic] Dahlgren....A11 inventors, or even adaptors 
of systems, must be earnest, self-reliant persons, full of 
confidence; Captain [sic] Dahlgren has certainly most of 
these characteristics." But Dahlgren also exhibited another 
of his personality traits. As he showed Russell around the 
navy yard, Dahlgren, according to Russell, lashed out at 
"the navy department, ... the army, ... [navy] boards, ... 
[navy] commissioners," as he recounted the acrimonious 
battle he had waged with his superiors throughout the 1850s 
to get his guns and other ordnance plans adopted, or as he 
would have termed it, as he tried to establish the proper 
organization of the navy's ordnance. When Russell's diary 
was published in 1863, Dahlgren reacted angrily. "He 
[Russell] relates all he sees & hears!,] not omitting 
private conversations— I am brought out in five or six 
places, whenever he met me and what I say is given without 
scruple."14
The Washington Navy Yard had an even more Important 
visitor a few days later. On April 2, in an unannounced 
visit, President Lincoln came to the yard. The President
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had apparently heard much about Dahlgren and his big guns 
and he reportedly had come hoping both to meet the famous 
ordnance expert and to see a demonstration of his equally 
famous guns in action. Unfortunately, as Dahlgren recorded, 
"It was 3 1/2 PM and I had left half an hour before."15
Besides wanting to see Dahlgren give a demonstration of 
his guns, the President may have had an ulterior motive for 
visiting. The following day Dahlgren attended the wedding 
of Captain Franklin Buchanan's daughter. The President was 
also invited to the wedding and while he arrived too late to 
give away the bride, as had been arranged, he did come to 
the reception afterwards. The President's presence at the 
wedding quite probably had more significance than simply 
adding to the "very brilliant party" that Dahlgren described 
the event as being. When Russell received an invitation to 
the wedding, he noted in his diary: "The superintendent of 
the Washington Navy Yard is supposed to be very little 
disposed in favour of this present Government; in fact,
Capt.... Buchanan may be called a secessionist." One Lincoln 
scholar has suggested that Lincoln may have agreed to "give 
away the bride" as a means of trying to keep Buchanan loyal 
to the Union. Of course, if this were true, it also might 
have meant that President Lincoln had similar motives for 
seeking to meet Dahlgren the day before. Dahlgren had quite 
openly announced his sympathies for the South to his fellow 
officers. Additionally, the Washington Navy Yard was
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generally viewed as being a center of pro-Southern 
sentiment, and by virtue of being stationed there Dahlgren's 
loyalty had to be at least somewhat suspect, as was 
everyone's who worked there.16
Whether or not the President had ulterior motives for 
his visits, the wedding provided an opportunity for Dahlgren 
to meet the President; and when introduced, according to 
Dahlgren, Lincoln "took my hand in both of his— spoke 
freely,— conversed for half an hour." Circumstances brought 
Dahlgren and Lincoln together again the following day, April 
4, but this time there meeting was purely business. Earlier 
that day, Dahlgren received a telegram from his friend 
Andrew Foote, who was then the executive officer at the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard, asking him to send ten boat howitzers 
with ammunition to New York. Rather than telling Dahlgren 
what the guns were for, Foote told him, "Refer to the 
President." Dahlgren immediately "posted to the White 
House;" but the President told him, "'I know nothing about 
it,'" and suggested that Dahlgren go and see Secretary of 
the Navy Gideon Welles. But like the President, the 
secretary of the navy did not know anything about Foote's 
request and he asked Dahlgren to return "early to-morrow" 
while he tried to find out what Foote's telegram was all 
about.17
What was going on was that President Lincoln had 
decided during the last days of March to try and maintain
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control of the few federal properties which federal forces 
still held in what was now the Confederate States of 
America. At the moment this amounted to a handful of forts, 
the most Important of which were Fort Sumter in Charleston, 
South Carolina, and Fort Pickens in Pensacola, Florida. But 
in incredible behind the scenes bungling which was taking 
place in the Lincoln administration, Secretary of State 
William Henry Seward diverted some of the ships, weapons, 
and men, originally Intended for Charleston to Pensacola, as 
he tried personally to control the federal government's 
policy at this crucial point. As requested, Dahlgren 
reported to the Navy Department early on April 5. When he 
arrived, Secretary Welles was meeting with Commodore Silas 
Stringham whom Welles had recently named as his assistant in 
charge of the important responsibility of detailing the duty 
of officers. When Stringham left Welles's office he stopped 
to speak to Dahlgren and stated, 11'You had better see the 
Secretary about those Howitzers, I have explained it to 
him.'" Dahlgren then "went in,— the Sec.tretary] said five 
or six [howitzers] would do, and addedt,] 'I tell you in 
confidence that these are to go to Charleston in the 
Powhatan.'" Dahlgren asked when will the Powhatan sail? 
Welles responded, "Sunday morning," April 7.1®
The Powhatan's diversion from Charleston to Pensacola 
did not matter. The Lincoln administration's decision to 
try and relieve the federal garrisons became readily
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apparent to Confederate leaders as the relief expedition was 
being outfitted in New York. If that was not enough, and It 
was, on April 6, Lincoln directed Robert S. Chew, a State 
Department clerk, to deliver the following message to 
Governor Francis Pickens of South Carolina:
I am directed by the President of the United 
States to notify you to expect an attempt will be 
made to supply Fort-Sumpter [sic] with provisions 
only; and that, if such attempt be not resisted, 
no effort to throw In men, arms, or ammunition, 
will be made, without further notice, or in case 
of an attack upon the Fort.
Chew delivered his message on Monday, April 8. Rather 
than waiting for the expedition to arrive, which would at 
the very least delay the evacuation of Fort Sumter, 
Confederate authorities gave the order to open fire, which 
occurred in the early morning hours, April 12, 1861.19
News of the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter 
reached Washington by telegraph the same day It began. 
Dahlgren's first thoughts were about the ability of the 
federal garrison to withstand the attack and he was anything 
but optimistic. Even "If the Fort were fully manned and 
armed It would be reducible by proper means. But the 
garrison is so feeble ... that every disability counts." As 
for the relief effort that had been sent, even not knowing 
that Seward's Interference had diverted the Powhatan to 
Pensacola, Dahlgren held out little hope of success. "[TDhe 
large [ships] ... could not enter and those that can would
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not pass the fire of the batteries, If they were efficiently 
served,— and a proper parole [patrol] of armed steamers 
would prevent any attempt by boats to Introduce men or 
stores."20
Dahlgren's feelings about the fate of Major Robert 
Anderson and his tiny garrison were correct. After enduring 
a fierce bombardment for approximately thirty hours,
Anderson ordered his colors be taken down and he 
surrendered. By the evening, April 13, word reached 
Washington of Anderson's surrender. As news of the loss of 
Fort Sumter spread in the capital, there was a mixture of 
emotions. On one hand, as Dahlgren noted, there was "Great 
excitement." At the same time "people [were] almost stunned 
by the news."21
President Lincoln moved quickly after the fall of Fort 
Sumter. After meeting with his Cabinet on Sunday, April 14, 
he issued a Proclamation calling for 75,000 militia, whose 
"service," the President declared, "will probably be to 
re-possess the forts, places, and property which have been 
seized from the Union." Lincoln also announced a special 
session of Congress, to convene on the most patriotic of 
American holidays, July 4. Telegrams from Northern 
politicians and citizens poured into the capital announcing 
support for the proclamation. Offers of troops far 
outstripped both the President's request and the 
government's ability to outfit them.22
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While public reaction in the North exhibited widespread 
support for Lincoln's actions, public feeling in the South, 
in marked contrast, was almost universally against the 
President's request for troops. Two days after the 
President's proclamation, the Virginia legislature responded 
by passing an ordinance of secession, reversing an earlier 
vote against secession; and other Southern slave states 
which had not yet seceded took actions which made it seem 
likely that they would quickly follow suit. In addition, 
the Virginia militia seized the federal arsenal at Harper's 
Ferry made so famous by John Brown little more than a year 
earlier, and seemed poised to do the same with the navy's 
Gosport Navy Yard in Norfolk, the navy's largest and most 
Important base. To prevent this, on April 19, Welles sent 
all of the available ships and troops In Washington to 
Norfolk.23
Up to this point Commander Dahlgren had primarily been 
an observer; but Just as the uncertainty surrounding the 
fate of the Norfolk expedition reached a climax, he suddenly 
found himself called into action. On the morning of April 
22, Dahlgren was as usual busy doing his ordnance work in 
his office located at the Washington Navy Yard. Suddenly, 
one of Secretary Welles's sons rushed in. Undoubtedly out 
of breath and exhibiting a great deal of excitement, young 
Welles told Dahlgren, "there was something going on in the 
Yard," and he had orders for him from his father. "You will
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assume temporary command of the Washington Navy Yard," the 
orders read? furthermore, "Discharge all suspected persons 
upon satisfactory evidence of their disloyalty to the 
Government, and place the yard in the best possible state of 
defence Esic] . 1,24
Dahlgren did not have to wait long to find out what was 
"going on." Shortly afterward, the commandant of the yard, 
Captain Franklin Buchanan, sent for him. Buchanan, one of 
the navy's most respected officers, as bespoke his selection 
as the United States Naval Academy's first superintendent, 
was a Marylander by birth and an ardent supporter of states 
rights. He believed Maryland would follow Virginia's lead 
and also secede and being unwilling to take up arms against 
his native state, Buchanan had agonizingly decided to resign 
the commission that he had held ever since the last days of 
the War of 1812. Dahlgren, by virtue of being the highest 
ranking officer assigned to the yard after Buchanan received 
command of the post . 2 5
By this time, Washington had been Isolated. The city 
was in a state of panic as rumors flew all around that the 
capital would be attacked at any moment. Despite the 
numerous promises from Northern governors that troops were 
on the way, none had yet arrived and President Lincoln 
agonized aloud, "Why don't they come? Why don't they come?" 
Almost as quickly as the panic arose, however, it ended.
The day after Dahlgren took command, elements of the
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expedition to Norfolk began returning. Although they failed 
to save the Gosport Yard, the 700 marines and 400 sailors 
made a welcome addition to Washington's defenses. On April 
25, the Seventh New York Regiment finally arrived in 
Washington via Annapolis, Maryland; they were followed two 
days later by the Seventy-First New York Regiment. By 
nightfall of April 27, about 10,000 troops in all had 
arrived and more were arriving every day.26
Dahlgren had never exhibited any bashful ness about 
using political influence to promote his own career and he 
was not about to start now. Even though he had only met 
President Lincoln on a few occasions— first at Nannie 
Buchanan's wedding on April 3, and briefly again each of the 
next two days while trying to make sense of Andrew Foote's 
request for howitzers— on Sunday, April 28, Dahlgren 
traveled the two miles or so from the Washington Navy Yard 
up to the White House and boldly asked to see the President. 
If his past lobbying efforts provide any clues to his 
behavior, Dahlgren was undoubtedly prepared with a 
well-orchestrated presentation. Despite few similarities 
either in its strategic Importance or the danger it was 
really in, Dahlgren probably compared the Washington Navy 
Yard and his actions to "save it" with the events at the 
Gosport Navy Yard. Dahlgren told the President that because 
of his actions since April 22 he was entitled to both 
Franklin Buchanan's post and to his commission.27
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It is not certain how the President initially felt 
about Dahlgren's bold request because the only account of 
the meeting comes from Dahlgren's personal papers.
According to Dahlgren, the President "received" his 
"claims...very favorably." But if actions speak louder than 
words, the President may not have been nearly as favorable 
as Dahlgren suggested, because neither of his requests were 
honored, at least not then. In reality Dahlgren had not 
done very much. Although he had remained loyal while many 
other officers were resigning their commissions, this hardly 
warranted a promotion. Moreover, the Washington Navy Yard 
had never been physically threatened— in contrast, at the 
Gosport Navy Yard a body of the Virginia militia was 
actually present outside the yard and at one point General 
William B. Taliaferro, who commanded the Virginia troops, 
demanded the yard's surrender— and all Dahlgren did was to 
take command after Buchanan resigned.28
Even though he was only the temporary commander of the 
yard, Dahlgren performed his work with industry and vigor; 
and the job was an Important one in the early days of the 
war. With the secession of all of the coastal states from 
Virginia south, the yard was the southernmost navy base 
securely in federal hands, and it was quickly transformed 
from a relatively quiet and unimportant installation that 
to a center of the Union war effort. In the first days 
after the fall of Fort Sumter, when many people in the
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capital believed Washington would be overrun at any moment, 
the War Department seized four private steamers which plied 
the local waters and sent them to the navy yard where 
Dahlgren outfitted them with ordnance and crews. These 
vessels, along with the few navy vessels In home waters at 
the outbreak of the war, were designated as the Potomac 
Flotilla, whose assignment was to prevent any movement of 
enemy troops from the Virginia side of the Potomac and to 
make sure that navigation of that river remained open.
While he did not command the Potomac Flotilla himself, as 
commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, Dahlgren's job was 
to make sure that the vessels were supplied and equipped 
with whatever they required. Furthermore, to better 
facilitate communications between the Navy Department and 
the Potomac Flotilla, as well as with blockading vessels 
along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, a telegraph line was 
established linking the Navy Department and the Washington 
Navy Yard. In this way, Dahlgren's office became the 
central communications center between Washington and vessels 
at sea. Besides these tasks, Dahlgren remained In charge of 
the ordnance production facilities at the yard. With the 
outbreak of war the demands for guns and ammunition rapidly 
exhausted reserves, especially with the loss of so many navy 
bases and federal arsenals located throughout the South. 
Dahlgren quickly put the yard's ordnance factory on a 
wartime production schedule, with work beginning early every
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morning and carrying on well Into the night, Sundays 
Included. This last decision of Dahlgren's led someone to 
complain to President Lincoln, to which Dahlgren could only 
respond:
[131 has been my wish to have no work executed on 
Sunday that could be avoided,...[with the work 
being done] chiefly embracing the manufacture of 
cannon and the repairs of Vessels of the [Potomac] 
Flotilla, or the equipment of others fitting for 
sea....I am sure no man can regret more than 
myself that a necessity exists for putting the 
sabbath to other uses than those for which it is 
designed.29
All was not work for Dahlgren during those first few 
weeks he commanded the Washington Navy Yard, however. On 
May 9, Lincoln again visited the Navy Yard, this time at 
the invitation of the commander of the Seventy-First New 
York Regiment, whose troops were temporarily being housed 
there, to a hear a concert performed in the President's 
honor. While Dahlgren may not have invited the President, 
he certainly knew how to take advantage of his presence.
After the concert he took the President and his entourage
aboard the U.S.S. Pensacola so that they could witness the 
firing of one of his Xl-inch guns. According to John Hay, 
one of Lincoln's secretaries, the display was "'novel and 
pleasant'" and the "'Prest. was delighted.'"30
A few days later Lincoln was back, this time to take a
short voyage down the Potomac with Secretary of State Seward
and his powerful ally from New York, Thurlow Weed. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 5
cruise was probably Intended to assuage Seward and Weed, 
both of whom felt that the President had been Ignoring the 
powerful New York State party boss. Less than a week later 
Lincoln and Seward were back again, now to Inspect the 
ordnance facilities at the yard.31
Through the late spring and early summer, for one 
reason or another, the President's visits to the yard became 
more and more frequent. The Washington Navy Yard became a 
refuge for the President, a place for him to escape the 
pressures of the presidency and the constant work that 
confronted him at the White House. He seemed to enjoy 
nothing better than making short excursions up and down the 
Potomac River. While almost all of the President's early 
visits to the navy yard had something to do other than 
specifically to see Dahlgren, after a time this began to 
change. As historian Robert Bruce argued persuasively, 
Lincoln, who has generally been characterized as the 
ral1-splitting pioneer, In temperament also had much In 
common with the "englneerCsD or scientistCsD" who were 
bringing mid-nineteenth-century America Into the "Machine 
Age." From early in his life he exhibited a fascination 
with the technical and mechanical advancements of the day. 
With the outbreak of the Civil War this translated into a 
deep personal Interest in weapons. Dahlgren represented the 
very embodiment of the spirit which so characterized the 
Lincoln that Bruce described; and thus in Dahlgren,
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according to Bruce, "Lincoln had found his chief advisor on 
the tools of w a r ,"32
But if the President had found something in Dahlgren, 
the reverse was also true. Dahlgren continued to hold the 
temporary command of the Washington Navy Yard through the 
early summer. Officially, however, Dahlgren was not 
eligible for the position because by law it required the 
rank of captain, Just like the Bureau of Ordnance and 
Hydrography. Sometime that summer a number of captains who 
apparently wanted the position for themselves pointed this 
out. By the time this occurred, the President had 
befriended Dahlgren, and when Lincoln learned of the other 
officers/s desires, he reportedly stated, "The Yard shall 
not be taken from [Dahlgren] ... he held it when no one else 
would, and now he shall keep it as long as he pleases."33
While the President may have wanted Dahlgren to keep 
the post, the legality of this still remained. To solve 
this, on July 26, Charles B. Sedgewlck who chaired the House 
of Representatives Naval Affairs Committee, and who was 
known for his cooperation with the Navy Department, 
Introduced a bill to amend the law which stipulated that the 
Washington Navy Yard could only be commanded by captains. 
With the chairman's support and influence the bill sailed 
through the House.3,4
It was a different story in the Senate. The bill was 
introduced to the Senate on July 30. But when it was
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forwarded to Naval Affairs Committee, the bill was shelved 
with the understanding that it would not be considered until 
the next regular Congressional session, scheduled to begin 
In December. This created a flurry of behind the scenes 
activity that became obvious the next day. When the Senate 
reconvened the following morning, two senators arose 
simultaneously to ask that the bill be reconsidered for open 
debate before the full Senate. Although he was the second 
one to propose the motion, Senator James Dixon of 
Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy Welles/s home state and 
an ally of Welles and the Navy Department, he was the first 
senator to explain his reasons for wanting debate reopened. 
Recalling the events surrounding Dahlgren's temporary 
appointment to the position, Dixon made an emotional appeal 
for reconsideration of the measure, saying to do otherwise 
would In effect be a censure of Commander Dahlgren, who "was 
almost the only officer who remained faithful to his duty." 
The Senate agreed to reconsider the bill. Two amendments 
were immediately Introduced. The first, offered by Senator 
John Sherman of Ohio, proposed that the command of all navy 
yards be opened to commanders as well as captains. Senator 
James Grimes of Iowa, another staunch supporter of the Navy 
Department, followed with his own amendment, proposing that 
the measure to open command of navy yards to commanders also 
be extended to Include commands of navy bureaus, such as the 
Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography. This proposal,
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according to Grimes, resulted from his being "approached by 
those who were very intimately connected with the Navy, and 
who have expressed the opinion that the public interests 
would be more promoted by having commander Dahlgren at the 
head of the Bureau of Ordnance than in any other position in 
the Government." Suddenly at debate was the very position 
that Dahlgren had coveted ever since Commodore Morris's 
death In 1856. But not everyone agreed with what was taking 
place. After Grimes had proposed his amendment, Senator 
John Hale of New Hampshire, who chaired the Senate Committee 
on Naval Affairs, addressed the Senate. Hale, a longtime 
member of Congress, had achieved notoriety for himself with 
his early opposition to the spread of slavery into the 
Mexican Cession, which won him the nomination of the Liberty 
Party as a presidential candidate in 1848. During the Civil 
War, however, he would constantly oppose Welles. Hale had 
been the first person to propose that the original bill be 
reconsidered. That morning, he now startlngly revealed to 
the Senate, he had a visit from none other than Commander 
Dahlgren, who wanted to talk to him about the shelved bill. 
That visit was why he proposed that the bill be 
reconsidered; but unlike Dixon it was not to pass it, but to 
defeat it. In an obvious attempt to make the bill so 
outrageous that it would be rejected, he asked, why not open 
the yards and bureaus to lieutenants? But why did Hale want 
the measure defeated? Ever since he had been a member of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 9
the Senate, Hale explained, "the Navy Department have had a 
set of pets,,,.who, some by law and some without law and 
against law, have been paid extravagant salaries, altogether 
beyond what belonged to them by the rule which their 
fel low-off leers were paid, and Commander Dahlgren has been 
among the men who have been paid these extravagant sums." 
Hale acknowledged that Dahlgren had never received any extra 
pay without the sanction of the law behind It, but that did 
not mean that he believed that Dahlgren came by his extra 
pay Innocently. Hale recalled another and long forgotten 
debate in Congress that occurred In 1851, when then 
Lieutenant Dahlgren successfully lobbied to receive the pay 
of a commander at sea. Hale had argued against that as 
well; but, he remembered, "While I was endeavoring to 
Impress my views on the Senate In open session by as fair 
considerations as 1 could suggest, lobby agents came and 
looked In my eyes and winked, and took out Senators and 
lobbied them, and got them to vote for the proposition which 
I was endeavoring to combat in the Senate. That I have 
seen; and I have seen It In the case of this very Mr. 
Dahlgren." He had witnessed enough of this type of 
behavior, especially in Dahlgren's own case, Hale argued, 
"tilt Is," he concluded, "time to stop this special 
legislation for Commander Dahlgren." And If the Senate was 
concerned about rewarding Dahlgren, Hale assured his 
colleagues, that was "fully met long ago, in the fact that
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you have paid him what you have never paid anyone else— not 
the highest sea-servlce pay of the grade to which he 
belongs, but the highest ... of the grade next above him."35
Hale did not find much support for his proposal. Other 
senators gave emotional appeals on Dahlgren's behalf. The 
most notable one was made by Senator Henry M. Rice, who had 
authored the bill for Dahlgren's pay raise In 1860. Rice 
told the Senate, that as officers all around him were 
leaving, "Commander Dahlgren stood by his flag. Mutiny was 
Inaugurated there [at the Washington Navy Yard], and he met 
it manfully; and for eight or ten days and nights that man 
never took off his clothes. He labored incessantly." Rice 
concluded his appeal by giving overblown significance to 
Dahlgren's actions: "if to any one man more than another we 
owe the safety of the city of Washington, it is to Commander 
Dahl gren."36
Hale seriously miscalculated if he thought he could 
stop the move to reward Dahlgren. Where the day before a 
bill simply asking to make Dahlgren eligible to keep command 
of the Washington Navy Yard was quickly removed from 
consideration, the following day the bill was reintroduced 
and passed with the proviso that Dahlgren also be made 
eligible for the command as a bureau chief. The bill, with 
the Senate amendment, then went back to the House where 
again it did not face any opposition, being approved on
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August 1. The next day, President Lincoln signed the bill 
Into l a w . 3 7
Despite Senator Hale's strong feelings against the 
effort to reward Dahlgren, once the President signed the 
bill it would be hard to argue that It did not make perfect 
sense to appoint Dahlgren to the position of the Chief of 
the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography. On August 3, 
Secretary Welles telegraphed Dahlgren in his office at the 
yard and asked him to "Report to the Department in person as 
early as convenient" to do Just that. Remarkably, Dahlgren 
declined the secretary's offer. While there Is no record of 
Welles's immediate response, it would not be surprising if 
he was dumbfounded. Furthermore, it would not be at all 
surprising to find that Welles was more than a little bit 
angry because he had obviously played a large part in having 
the bill reintroduced and amended so that he could appoint 
Dahlgren to head the ordnance bureau. But Welles, if he had 
lost his composure, obviously regained it and he asked 
Dahlgren to "consider further 8. answer in the morning." 
Dahlgren agreed to reconsider.38
On the face of it, Dahlgren's decision seemed to defy 
all logic. First of all, the appointment was a prestigious 
one and would have provided a ringing endorsement for his 
past ordnance work, which had not engendered the complete 
approval of his colleagues. Furthermore, and maybe even 
important, as head of the Bureau of Ordnance and
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Hydrography, Dahlgren no longer would have been subject to 
interference from above and would have had a more or less 
free rein to determine the direction of American naval 
ordnance in the future. But it must be remembered that 
Dahlgren always did what was in his greatest self interest, 
and this was certainly the case now.
What explains Dahlgren's answer? First of all, by 
declining the bureau, Dahlgren did not stand to lose any 
influence at all regarding ordnance matters. Since late 
April the bureau had been run by Captain Andrew Harwood, who 
had been appointed to fill the vacancy temporarily. Harwood 
was not only a good friend of Dahlgren's, he was also not an 
ordnance specialist. Consequently, since Harwood's 
appointment, Dahlgren had already enjoyed ultimate authority 
in the ordnance department. With Dahlgren's refusal, Welles 
would more than likely simply keep Harwood in place, 
insuring Dahlgren's continued dominance of the ordnance 
department.39
There were other factors which contributed to 
Dahlgren's decision. If he turned down the ordnance post, 
he would not walk away empty-handed because the Washington 
Navy Yard still needed a permanent commandant. While 
certainly less prestigious, command of the yard had benefits 
which more than compensated for any loss in status. The 
position at the yard gave Dahlgren unparalleled prominence. 
As has already been described, the Washington Navy Yard
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quickly became one of President Lincoln's favorite places 
and the President made It a regular routine to take 
excursions upon the local waters. As commander-1n-ch1ef, 
many of Lincoln's trips can be characterized as official 
military voyages as he personally wanted to see the extent 
to which Confederate batteries along the Virginia side of 
the Potomac affected navigation. Besides these more or less 
official military reconnaissances, the President more 
frequently used the navy yard and its vessels to entertain 
and Impress cabinet members, important politicians, visiting 
dlgnataries, and friends. Dahlgren usually went on these 
trips and he was often the center of attention because a 
cruise almost always included a demonstration of the famous 
Dahlgren guns, fired by the famous Inventor himself. 
Underscoring what Dahlgren stood to lose If he accepted the 
ordnance bureau, while he was still considering the offer, 
Secretary of State Seward brought Prince Joseph Charles Paul 
Napoleon to the yard for a tour. If he accepted the bureau 
Dahlgren would have surely missed out on this type of public 
exposure.40
Dahlgren had another reason for turning down the 
ordnance bureau, and this may have been the most important 
one. Since he had been in command of the Washington Navy 
Yard he had been Involved In prosecuting the war. Besides 
his role in "saving Washington" and his serving as 
intermediary between the Navy Department and the Potomac
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Flotilla, which at least gave Dahlgren the opportunity to 
propose operations along the Potomac, Dahlgren had also been 
Involved In the army's first move Into Virginia. After 
Washington proper was secured with the arrival of troops in 
late April, one of the first things that Northern military 
leaders wanted to do was to move troops south across the 
Potomac River in order to protect the capital from being 
bombarded by artillery fire and to keep the Potomac River 
clear. But because Virginia's secession ordinance did not 
become official until May 23, when its citizens voted to 
approve the legislature's action, no troops were moved 
across the river before then. As soon as Virginia 
officially seceded federal troops were ready to move, which 
they did on the night of May 23. Dahlgren personally led 
the small flotilla that transported the First New York 
Zouave Regiment sent to occupy Alexandria, Virginia. This 
operation would have created little notice except for the 
death of Colonel Elmer Ellsworth, a former student in 
Lincoln's Illinois law office. Dahlgren, by virtue of 
having remained off of Alexandria, transported the colonel's 
body back to the Navy Yard. His report of the death of 
Ellsworth, who he said was "deliberately murdered by one of 
the inhabitants" after taking down a Confederate flag which 
was flying over one of the town's buildings, was probably 
the first one to reach President Lincoln, who reportedly
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broke down into tears when he learned of Ellsworth's 
death.41
That was not the only time that the motley assortment 
of vessels that Dahlgren had at his disposal were utilized 
that summer. In early July, Dahlgren helped to ferry some 
of General Irvin McDowell's troops across the Potomac River 
as the main and ill-prepared armies of the North and South 
prepared to meet in the first major battle of the Civil War. 
Like everyone else, Dahlgren awaited word of the outcome, 
and in his Journal he wrote expectantly, "And thus the North 
and South are at last face to face,— with all the armed 
strength each has been able to collect to this time....What 
is the question to be decided!" Writing those words on the 
morning of July 21, Dahlgren's question was quickly 
answered. At about 7 p.m. that evening, Dahlgren received 
an emergency telegram asking him to send any vessels he had 
to Alexandria in order to help stop a possible advance of 
the Confederate army, which seemed all too likely in light 
of the rout of the Union forces earlier that day in the 
Battle of Bull Run, or, as Southerners called it, the Battle 
of Manassas. Fortunately for the North and Washington, 
victory disorganized the Confederate army as much as defeat 
disorganized the Union army; and the only warship that 
Dahlgren had his disposal, the obsolete brig Perrv which he 
had towed to Alexandria, was not needed.42
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As minor and Indirect as his participation may have 
been in all of these military operations, they undoubtedly 
still gave Dahlgren the feeling that he was playing an 
active role in the war; and this, he had to have realized, 
would have completely disappeared if he accepted the post to 
head the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography. Not 
surprisingly then, Dahlgren "Went to the Secretary," he 
noted in his Journal, "and declined fully the Bureau,— he 
had given me Cto] the last minute, as the Senate had but one 
and Ca] half houris] to sit."43
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Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of W ar, pp. 3-21. Bruce 
follows Dahlgren's and Lincoln's relationship from the 
presidential inauguration onward. Bruce contends that from 
the very first meeting of the two men at Nannie Buchanan's 
wedding on April 3, 1861, the President 1 took an immediate 
fancy" to Dahlgren. I disagree with Bruce about the nature 
of the relationship of Dahlgren and Lincoln, at least at its 
very outset, which can be discerned from my description of 
their first meeting earlier in this chapter. While the two 
men did Indeed develop a very close friendship, there is no 
evidence to support Bruce's assertion of Lincoln's feelings 
for Dahlgren until the latter conclusively demonstrated his 
loyalty to the Union.
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33L incoln, quoted in, Dahlgren, August 4, 1861, Journal 
Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU.
3^U.S., Congress, House, H. R. No. 78, An act 
supplemental to the act entltledC.3 "An act providing for a 
naval peace establishment, and for other purposes." Charles 
B. Sedgwick, July 26, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Congress i on a i_ G lobe. Vol. 31, p. 279; Albion, Makers of 
Naval Policy, p. 150.
38Senate debate, July 30, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., 
The Congressional Globe. Vol. 31, p. 332; the debate in the 
Senate can be followed in, July 31, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st 
Sess., The Congressional Globe. Vol. 31, pp. 358-61; for 
Grimes's relationship with the Navy Department, see, Niven, 
Gideon Weiles. p. 376; for Dahlgren's lobbying efforts for 
personal pay raises, see, Chapter I of this dissertation.
36Senate debate, July 31, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., 
The Congressional Globe. Vol. 31, pp. 358-61
37August 1, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., The 
Congressional Globe. Vol 31, pp. 383; August 5, 1861, 37th 
Cong., 1st Sess., The Congressional Globe. Vol. 31, p. 438.
38Welles to Dahlgren, August 3, 1861, Telegram, JADLC; 
Dahlgren, Journal Entry, August 5, 1861, Vol. 7, JADSU.
39Niven, Gideon Weiles. p. 346; West, Mr. Lincoln's 
Navv. p. 49; Bruce, Lincoln .and the Tools of War, pp. 16, 
19-20.
■^Dahlgren was not very Impressed with Prince Napoleon, 
who was the nephew of, as Dahlgren described him, "the 
Napoleon." Dahlgren, August 5, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, 
JADSU, underline in the original; between the time that 
Dahlgren took temporary command of the yard and when he 
turned down the Bureau of Ordnance, President Lincoln, with 
numerous guests in tow, visited the Washington Navy Yard no 
less than fifteen times on the following days, May 9, 12,
18, 21, 24, 30, June 2, 11, 14, 19, 30, July 7, 14, 21, 24, 
1861, see, Miers, ed., Lincoln Day bv Dav. Ill, pp. 41-56.
41Dahlgren's role in the operation is detailed in,
Peck, Round-Shot to Rockets, pp. 123-24; see also, Leech, 
Reveille in Washington, pp. 80-82; Thomas, Abraham Lincoln, 
pp. 269-70; Secretary of the Navy Welles said that Dahlgren 
did his job well, see, Welles to Edgar Welles, May 26, 1861, 
Reel 19, Cont. 19, Welles Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington D. C., hereafter cited as WellesLC; for 
Dahlgren's own view, see, Dahlgren, May 24-25, 1861, Journal
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Entries, Vol. 7, JADSU; Dahlgren to Navy Department, 9:15, 
[May 24, 18613, Telegram, NARG45— Entry 34; Dahlgren quote 
In, Dahlgren to Welles, May 24, 1861, NARG45— Entry 34; 
Ellsworth's death was the cause of one of Lincoln's first 
visits to the Navy Yard. As soon as he learned that 
Ellsworth had been brought to the navy yard, Lincoln, along 
with his wife Mary Todd Lincoln, immediately drove to the 
yard. Ellsworth's body had not yet been prepared for 
viewing, and Dahlgren rode in the President's carriage and 
gave his view of what had occurred.
42Dah1 gren, July 21, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, 
JADSU.
43Dah Igren quote in, Dahlgren, August 6, 1861, Journal 
Entry, Ibid.; the position of bureau chief was a 
presidential appointment and thus required Senate approval. 
By turning down the ordnance bureau Dahlgren was made 
permanent commandant of the Washington Navy Yard; Andrew 
Harwood was retained as the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance 
and Hydrography.
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Chapter III 
Stuck in Washington
"it was perhaps my last chance for a flag"
At first, Dahlgren's routine at the Washington Navy 
Yard did not change after he was named the permanent 
commandant. The yard remained as busy as before. Requests 
for cannon and ammunition continued unabated, keeping the 
ordnance factory working at full bore. And in the immediate 
aftermath of the Battle of Bull Run, concern about keeping 
the Potomac River open also remained of the utmost 
importance, and therefore Dahlgren's responsibility to keep 
the Potomac Flotilla we 11-supp1ied and equipped demanded 
constant attention. "I am occupied incessantly," he noted, 
"but am none the worse for it." This changed quickly, 
however.1
While the first major battle of the Civil War did not 
end the conflict between the North and South, as most people 
either hoped or expected, it did have dramatic impact.
Within four days of the battle. President Lincoln signed two 
bills authorizing the recruiting and enlisting of a total of 
1,000,000 three-year volunteers. The President also 
summoned General George Brinton McClellan to Washington to
84
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train and lead these new t r o o p s . 2
McClellan, who in his own exaggerated words had 
"annihilated two armies" in western Virginia, was an ideal 
person for what was needed; first, to rally the demoralized 
troops already in Washington; and second, to organize the 
thousands of men who were flooding Northern recruiting 
offices in response to the President's call. He quickly 
demonstrated his abilities as a superb organizer and 
administrator, and wlth dramatic flair McClellan took 
Washington by storm. Rather than living with his army in 
the field, McClellan took up residence in Washington. It 
became a common sight around the capital to see the general 
dashing around to and fro in a seemingly mad frenzy, with 
his staff following behind in a struggle to keep up with the 
young and energetic army commander. Within days of his 
arrival in Washington, William Howard Russell who had 
disparaged the rag-tag army that General McDowell led into 
battle, remarked that there had been much "improvement in 
the look of the men." McClellan was also promised something 
that McDowell had not received, time; and he used this time 
to begin organizing the tens of thousands of troops arriving 
monthly into a well-trained and wel1-dlsclpllned army.3
Even though McClellan did not put his army on the 
offensive, the situation in and around Washington changed 
considerably. In late September, Confederate forces 
withdrew from one of the most forward positions they had
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taken after Bull Run. This relieved some of the tension in 
the capital, which had a pronounced effect on Dahlgren's 
schedule. Where only a short time before he was "occupied 
incessantly," military duties no longer occupied so much of 
his time that he had to forgo participating in Washington's 
active social scene. His Journal entries give an indication 
of both the extent of the capital's social life and his 
participation in it. On September 23, Dahlgren was at the 
Brazilian Minister's, who gave a party in the honor of 
Prince de Joinville, who had just arrived from France.
While happy to meet the Prince, Dahlgren noted despondently 
that the party "was an exhibition of the melancholy wreck of 
our social circle,— only a half a dozen ladles could be 
mustered." The following night Dahlgren attended another 
party, this one at Secretary of State Seward's house, 
"where," Dahlgren noted, "we had besides de Joinville, the 
Count of ParisC,] heir to the French thronei,] and the Duke 
de Chartrest,] his brother." Then on September 25, "I 
[Dahlgren] dined at the President's with some of his 
friends,--the only notability there was Mr. Holt, late 
Secretary of War to Buchanan." The following day was "Ctlhe 
fast day proclaimed by the President,— the first day in 
which there has been a suspension of labor in this Yard 
since I took command." While the yard may have been absent 
its workers, Dahlgren was busy at the yard entertaining the 
Duke de Chartres. Later that evening, Dahlgren took a
I
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friend who was visiting him from Philadelphia to Seward's, 
where "we talked with the ladles, and were soon Joined by 
the French Princes and Mr. Seward: then came in the 
President and we had a very chatty evening."4
Dahlgren's account of the Washington social scene in 
the early fall suggests Just how dramatic a transformation 
had occurred in the capital since Bull Run. Still, like 
most people in Washington, Dahlgren quickly focused his 
attention on General McClellan's lack of activity. Early in
September Dahlgren noted in his Journal, "Matters 
progressing with little or no change in the state of 
affairs." A few days later he wrote, "Every thing quiet on 
the river and the lines." If Dahlgren was beginning to 
question McClellan, this changed on October 4 ,  when the
general paid him the honor of an "informal visit." Dahlgren
suddenly only had glowing words for McClellan. "Though 
rather below the average size, he is of martial figure,— the 
countenance open and not impressed with any one 
characteristic, but harmonising much intelligence and 
manllness....You reconlze mind, and firmness and a fine 
disposition, but no one of them too dominant. He is," 
Dahlgren continued, "well educated and bred; without the 
least assumption in manner, but winning in his address." 
Dahlgren also wrote to one of his sons to tell him of 
McClellan's unexpected visit. McClellan, he told Ulric 
Dahlgren, "came in last evening about dark, took tea and
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staid until lloc....We had a cosy time....We parted very 
good friends and I was much pleased with him— he is a fine 
fellow."5
The general's visit made Dahlgren much more optimistic, 
and by mid-October it appeared to him that after months of 
preparation, the Army of the Potomac, as the Union army 
under McClellan was now named, was about to move forward.
On October 13, just as he did before Bull Run, Dahlgren 
wrote expectantly, "So, here we are again, on the verge of a 
decision. Mighty hosts will soon be in collision, to decide 
more than was decided on the 21st of July, though that was 
no small matter." But the following day McClellan 
unexpectedly visited again, and their conversation left 
Dahlgren anything but sanguine. McClellan complained to 
Dahlgren that General-in-Chief Winfield Scott was 
continually interfering with his plans. He further 
explained that the cause of the inactivity of his army the 
past months rested entirely with Scott. "He says," as 
Dahlgren recalled his conversation with McClellan, "Scott 
does not want to fight, but considers delay the policy." 
McClellan further suggested to Dahlgren that he had a very 
different view and that if he was allowed to exercise 
command by himself he would move the army forward 
lmmedlately.6
Dahlgren accepted McClellan's allegations completely, 
and he sided with the young general. "Scott has," Dahlgren
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stated, "tried his plan and nearly lost the
Capital,— McCClellanD should act freely and be assisted."
"I could not but feel apprehensive," Dahlgren concluded, 
"when I found that on the eve of another trial the real 
leader was to be parallzed in this way." "What Madness!"7
McClellan's revelations to Dahlgren were probably not 
some happenstance event. "I am firmly determined," 
McClellan wrote the day before to his wife Mary Ellen 
McClellan, "to force the issue with Genl Scott— a very few 
days will determine whether his policy or mine is to 
prevail." And while Dahlgren never made any mention of 
whether he spoke to Lincoln on McClellan's behalf, on 
November 1, the President, after months of trying to work 
out a compromise between the aging general-ln-chief and the 
ambitious commander of the Army of the Potomac, finally 
accepted Scott's resignation, first tendered on August 9. 
Hearing this news, Dahlgren noted with relief, "Gen.Cerall 
Scott finally retires."8
McClellan's promotion to General-in-Chief of the Army 
did not lead to any sudden offensive operations. But even 
as McClellan and the Army of the Potomac went into 
hibernation for the winter, Dahlgren found plenty to occupy 
his time. Administrative duties at the navy yard took up 
much of his days, and the active Washington social scene 
helped to fill his evenings. Dahlgren also spent much of 
the fall providing informal charter service for Lincoln and
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others. Besides providing the President a chance to escape 
the mounting pressure facing him In Washington, especially 
with General McClellan's inactivity, these Junkets also gave 
Dahlgren numerous opportunities to press his own interests. 
Permanent command of the Washington Navy Yard had not 
satiated Dahlgren's hunger for personal aggrandizement.
Even before he accepted the post he had renewed his request 
to the President to be promoted to captain. To be promoted, 
however, required a vacancy in the ranks above; the result 
of retirement, resignation, or death. Many spots had 
opened since the beginning of the war, but promotions were 
accorded strictly by seniority and Dahlgren was too far down 
the list of commanders to benefit.9
One memorable cruise in mid-November showed that 
Dahlgren had the President's support. This particular trip, 
which included Lincoln, Seward, Welles, Secretary of War 
Simon Cameron, Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, and 
Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, had quickly developed into 
"a very hilarious party," according to Dahlgren, as the 
President poked fun at Seward about a story making the 
rounds of the capital that he had "got drunk." Besides 
chiding his secretary of state, Lincoln also brought his 
desire to promote Dahlgren to Welles's attention. "'I 
will,'" Lincoln told the secretary of the navy, "'make a 
Captain of Dahlgren as soon as you say there is a place.'" 
The wine which had been served on the trip had apparently
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flowed very freely because Cameron followed the President's 
declaration by exclaiming that If the President transferred 
Dahlgren to the army ordnance department, he would put 
Dahlgren "at the head of it and make ... [him] a 
Brlg.Cadier] General."10
Dahlgren was not willing to accept a transfer to the 
army, even for a promotion. Within weeks, however, Dahlgren 
thought he might get his promotion anyway. The condition of 
the navy officer corps had concerned Welles since the start 
of the war. He felt that there were too many inefficient 
officers In the upper ranks because the navy had no formal 
system of retirement. At the end of the special session of 
Congress held in the summer of 1861, Welles managed to push 
legislation through Congress establishing a board of 
officers whose task was to examine all those on the Navy 
Register to see if they were fit for duty, and to retire any 
"incapacitated by old age, ill health and the enervation 
incident to service in the old navy." Unfortunately, a 
variety of factors, not the least of which was that the 
board members were close friends of the officers they were 
examining, resulted in few officers actually being retired. 
When the new Congressional session opened in December,
Welles renewed his effort to purge his department of what he 
considered deadwood. This time, instead of an examining 
board, a bill was proposed to make retirement mandatory for 
any officer who had served for forty years.11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9 2
Dahlgren was extremely interested in the bill because 
the retirement of older officers ahead of him on the Navy 
Register meant that their slots would be opened. On the 
other hand, the bill automatically retired an officer after 
forty years of service, regardless of age, and Dahlgren 
would be slated for retirement in 1866, when he would only 
be fifty-seven. Dahlgren went to work to get the bill 
amended. As he had been so often before, he was successful. 
When the bill was signed by President Lincoln on December 
21, Dahlgren proudly noted in his journal that he had gotten 
one Senator "to extend it to 45 [years of service before 
retirement]. Then 60 years of age was added." as a 
mandatory retirement age regardless of the number of years 
of service, and "I got [Congressman] Sedgewlck to amend 
[that] to 62 years." As soon as the bill passed, Dahlgren 
renewed his request for promotion to captain because the 
bill had opened fifty slots.*2
Secretary Welles's purpose in getting this legislation 
passed had nothing to do with promoting Dahlgren. Instead, 
he Intended to reform the Navy Department, and the 
retirement bill was Just the first in a series of 
legislative reforms he had planned. Therefore, for the time 
being, he left the many vacancies unfilled, to Dahlgren's 
chagrin.13
Shortly after the retirement bill passed, the second 
and third parts of Welles's legislative package came before
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Congress, and again Dahlgren showed his ability to shape 
legislation to his advantage. The first of these was a 
straightforward bill which called for adding two new bureaus 
to the department. But when the bill was sent to the Senate 
Naval Affairs Committee for review, It was completely 
rewritten and renamed “An Act to Reorganize the Navy 
Department." Instead of simply adding two new bureaus, the 
new bill reorganized the existing five bureaus Into eight. 
Among the most significant differences In the revised bill 
was that the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography was divided 
into two separate bureaus, the Bureau of Ordnance and the 
Bureau of Navigation. Dahlgren had been calling for this 
since 1856. Furthermore, between the time that the 
Reorganization Bill was Introduced and the bill was revised, 
Dahlgren wrote to the chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs 
Committee, and outlined a plan for a separate ordnance 
department, emphasizing how this would save the government 
money. Dahlgren's handiwork was evident in another part of 
the bill. Among its original provisions was one calling for 
the chiefs of all of the bureaus to receive an annual salary 
of $3,500. This was less than Dahlgren was already being 
paid, and he obviously pointed this out. During debate on 
the bill, Senator Grimes offered an amendment, which passed 
both Houses of Congress, to allow any new bureau chief who 
was already receiving a higher salary than that provided for 
by the current bill be allowed to keep it. "My purpose In
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offering this amendment," Grimes told the Senate, "is to 
leave the President, if he sees fit to employ the services 
of Captain isle] Dahlgren at the head of a bureau, the 
privilege of doing so without any diminution of the salary 
to which he is now by law entitled."1'4
While debate on the Reorganization Bill was Just 
beginning, the third part of Welles's legislative package 
was introduced: House Resolution No. 280, "An Act to 
Establish and Equalize the Grade of Line Officers of the 
United States Navy." This bill has been described by one 
naval historian, at least as far as navy line officers were 
concerned, as "the most important naval legislation of the 
Civil War, or indeed the most important since the navy was 
founded." Prior to the war, there were only four officer 
ranks in the navy, midshipman, lieutenant, commander, and 
captain. Navy personnel had complained about this for 
decades. Among the loudest of their complaints was the lack 
of any rank above captain— officers who commanded squadrons 
were accorded the unofficial title of commodore. Prior to 
the Civil War the main problem with having no rank above 
captain was that it put American squadron commanders at a 
disadvantage in the number of guns fired in salute when 
encountering squadron commanders of foreign nations, who 
were in most cases admirals— an admiral was entitled to a 
thirteen gun salute while a captain received nine guns in 
return and in the highly ritualized navy this was hardly
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considered irrelevant by most officers. The Civil War 
exposed a more serious problem. The war brought the army 
and navy into closer contact than at any other time before, 
and combined operations were conducted from the earliest 
stages of the conflict. In the navy, squadron commanders 
were captains, whereas in the army, commanders of armies 
were generals. Because a navy captain only equated with an 
army colonel, this created an awkward question of authority 
when naval and army forces worked together. Since the 
beginning of the war this difficulty had been dealt with on 
an unofficial basis, but Welles wanted to eliminate the 
problem officially.15
Like most navy officers, Dahlgren wholeheartedly 
supported the creation of a rank above captain. He also 
agreed with the second major provision of the bill, which 
called for a partial introduction of a merit-based promotion 
system to replace the existing seniority-only system.
Still, Dahlgren believed one component of the bill needed 
amending. This section, he noted, pertained to himself, and 
he only most "reluctantly" brought it up; but, as he pointed 
out to Charles Sedgewlck, who was both the Chairman of the 
House Naval Affairs Committee and the author of the bill, as 
it was then written, he would not be eligible for the new 
rank because admirals were to be "selected from the Captains 
and Commanders for dlstLnguished conduct in Battle."
Dahlgren felt that this provision was unfair to himself. In
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a letter to Congressman William Kelly, Dahlgren wrote, "the 
present bill bears upon me with peculiar severity." By 
taking command of the Washington Navy Yard, Dahlgren argued, 
he had "rendered an important service...at the most critical 
period of the Rebellion." Then, because he had remained at 
this post, he argued, he had not been able to serve afloat. 
"It would be cruelly unjust," Dahlgren concluded, "to render 
these circumstances to disfranchise from the highest grade 
of my profession and pass Junior officers over my head. All 
that I ask is to have these conditions amended so as to 
include that of 'other meritorious conduct.'"16
The Navy Grade Bill interested not only navy line 
officers, it was also very important to members of Congress 
because one of its key provisions dealt with control of 
midshipmen slots in the Navy Academy. Debate over this 
issue dragged on for months as congressmen fought Jealously 
to protect their prerogatives. Because of the overall 
importance of the bill, however, as Congress drew to a close 
certain legislative procedures were waived in order to make 
sure that the bill came up for a vote. Normally, before a 
bill is brought up for debate in the full House or Senate, 
the bill is printed, which allows the legislators to read 
the exact provisions being debated. But because of the 
length of debate in committee there was no time for printing 
the bill. Therefore, the proposed bill was simply read
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aloud in Its entirety and then debate began before the full 
House.
The reason why this was not normally done soon became 
apparent, which in turn also exposed Dahlgren's 
effectiveness in lobbying Congress. As already noted, 
Dahlgren had been writing to various legislators trying to 
alter the language regarding promotion eligibility. One 
person that he had written to was Congressman Phelps of 
Missouri. When the House reached the section listing the 
eligibility requirements for admiral, Phelps rose and 
objected because it excluded "all who shall not have 
distinguished themselves in battle." There was one, not so 
slight, problem with Phelps's objection, and Sedgewlck, whom 
Dahlgren had also written to as he worked to reword the 
bill, quickly pointed it out to him. "The bill," Sedgewick 
told Phelps, "has been altered in that particular." It now 
read, "That nine rear-admirals may be commissioned, who 
shall be selected, during war, from those officers ... who 
have heretofore distinguished themselves, or hereafter 
distinguish themselves by courage, skill, and genius in 
their profession." In other words, Sedgewlck was telling 
Phelps, Commander Dahlgren was now eligible for the higher 
rank.1?
In the military, rank and position determine one's 
status. Thus the fact that Dahlgren wanted to amend any 
bill before Congress that affected his rank is hardly
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surprising. What is surprising is Dahlgren's uncanny 
success in shaping almost every piece of legislation that 
affected him. At the very least, his success in doing so 
illustrates how influential he had become. What was the 
source of Dahlgren's influence? One explanation is that 
Congress seems to have wanted to reward Dahlgren for his 
loyalty. Dahlgren certainly utilized this theme In his 
campaign with individual congressmen. He repeatedly 
recalled the circumstances surrounding his taking command of 
the Washington Navy Yard, which in his own words was done 
"at the most critical period of the Rebellion," and which, 
in his interpretation, had saved the Union from disaster. 
While this was an overblown analysis of his contributions, 
it seemed to have a positive effect with members of 
Congress. There was at least one other factor involved. In 
both the special session of Congress held in the summer of 
1861, and the regular session of Congress that began in 
December 1861, one of the bills passed involved the 
administration of the navy's ordnance department. In the 
debate over each bill, Dahlgren was specifically mentioned 
in connection with this post. While Dahlgren's ideas may 
have been controversial, by the beginning of the Civil War 
he was recognized as the navy's leading ordnance authority. 
It was logical therefore, to make him eligible to hold the 
position of chief of ordnance.
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Of course, neither the legislative debate on naval 
reform nor Dahlgren's lobbying efforts took place in a 
vacuum. By the time that the Reorganization Bill and Navy 
Grade Bill were Just reaching the Congressional floor for 
the first time, after months of relative Inactivity, Union 
forces began offensive operations. These included the 
combined operations of navy and army forces under Captain 
Andrew Foote and General Ulysses Simpson Grant, who moved 
against the Confederate forts which controlled the Tennessee 
and Cumberland rivers. The first of the forts, Henry, fell 
quickly to the guns of Foote's flotilla of gunboats on 
February 6. Foote and Grant then moved rapidly to assault 
the second Confederate stronghold, Fort Donelson, and while 
it proved tougher to capture than Fort Henry, it fell on 
February 16.18
The Union successes at Henry and Donelson brought Foote 
and Grant an avalanche of praise. Dahlgren was happy for 
Foote, who was his longtime friend, but the Union victory at 
Fort Donelson also concerned Dahlgren. When he began his 
lobbying efforts to make himself eligible for promotion to 
admiral it was far from certain that he would succeed. As 
the legislation then stood, the only sure way to be eligible 
for the new rank was "for distinguished conduct in battle." 
Even more important, as far as Dahlgren was concerned, 
Foote's and Grant's victories marked the beginning of the 
end of the war. "After the capture of Fort Donelson,"
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Dahlgren wrote to one of his sons, "I allowed 60 days for 
the final denouement— things move rapidly now." In other 
words, Dahlgren believed that time was quickly running out 
for him if he was going to get promoted.19
While the fall of Henry and Donelson were Indeed 
important for the Union war effort, the main reason for 
Dahlgren's optimism was that after months of inactivity, 
McClellan's Army of the Potomac finally appeared ready to 
move. Amidst growing pressure to begin a campaign, which 
finally led President Lincoln to issue General War Order No. 
1 ordering all "Land and Naval Forces" to begin a "general 
movement" on February 22, McClellan revealed his plan for a 
campaign that he believed would end the war. It Involved 
transporting his army via ship up the Rappahannock River and 
landing at Urbanna, Virginia. McClellan argued that this 
would put the Union army between General Joseph Eggleston 
Johnston's army which was entrenched near Centerville, 
Virginia, and Richmond, and would force Johnston to 
withdraw. McClellan believed that he would then be able to 
either capture Richmond before Johnston could react, or be 
in the position to meet Johnston's army out in the open at a 
place of his own choosing rather than having to attack 
Johnston's strong defensive position. President Lincoln 
opposed this plan because of his fear that the movement 
would expose Washington to a swift Confederate offensive,
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but he ultimately agreed to it provided McClellan leave 
enough forces to keep the capital "entirely secure."20
President Lincoln gave McClellan final approval for his 
campaign on March 8; but that was not the only thing of 
importance which took place that day, especially as far as 
Dahlgren's future was concerned. For months, rumors had 
circulated throughout the North that the Confederacy had 
raised the Merrimack. which had been scuttled when the 
Gosport Navy Yard was abandoned in April, 1861, and had been 
working on converting it into an ironclad vessel. The 
rumors were true. On what ranks among the most successful 
shakedown cruises of any warship in history, the Merrimack. 
newly rechristened C.S.S. Virginia, steamed from its berth 
on the Elizabeth River into Hampton Roads. The Confederate 
warship, captained by Franklin Buchanan, the former 
commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, headed straight for 
the Union fleet of wooden warships that lay at anchor. The 
VIrginia was slow, deep in draft, and extraordinarily 
cumbersome, but the Union's wooden ships were no match for 
the iron-plated vessel. Within a matter of hours the Union 
fleet was in shambles. Of the five major Union shlps-of-war 
which guarded the entrance to Hampton Roads, Cumber 1 and was 
sunk, Congress lay burning and would explode and sink 
shortly, Minnesota was run aground. Only the coming 
darkness and the falling tide saved the Roanoke and St .
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Lawrence. both of which had taken refuge under the guns of 
Fort Monroe.21
News of the VIraln i a's dramatic success reached 
Washington by early the next morning, Sunday, March 9. 
President Lincoln immediately asked for all of his Cabinet 
members to assemble at the White House. Secretary of War 
Edwin Stanton, recently appointed to replace Cameron who 
resigned admidst controversy, and Welles were among the 
first to arrive. The two Cabinet members proceeded to 
engage in a heated argument as Stanton predicted that the 
Confederate warship was probably just then on its way up the 
Potomac River to bombard the Capitol, before proceeding on 
to destroy New York and Boston. Welles dismissed Stanton's 
prediction, telling everyone that the vessel drew too much 
water to reach Washington and was too unseaworthy to venture 
out on the open ocean. Furthermore, Welles told Stanton and 
the President, the Union's own ironclad had just reached 
Hampton Roads and was probably already well on its way to 
destroying the Virginia. But Welles's description of the 
Union's two-gun Mon 1 tor did little to allay anyone's 
concern, especially Stanton's, and the deep sense of 
foreboding was only amplified by the inorportune failure of 
the Washington-Fortress Monroe telegraph line which broke 
down that morning.22
Perhaps growing tired of listening to Welles and 
Stanton argue, or wanting to hear a professional navy
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officer's opinion, Lincoln called for his carriage and along 
with Senator Orville Hickman Browning, he headed for the 
Washington Navy Yard to see Dahlgren. Although It was a 
Sunday morning, the President found him In his office, when, 
Dahlgren recorded somewhat apologetically in his Journal,
"he should have been In church." The President told 
Dahlgren that he had "frightful news," as he recited the 
events of the previous day's catastrophe in Hampton Roads. 
Moreover, Lincoln wondered If the Virginia "might not have a 
visit here which would rather cap the climax."23
Lincoln probably hoped that Dahlgren would confirm 
Welles's assurances that Washington was safe from attack 
from the Confederate ironclad. Dahlgren certainly was in 
the position to offer as much of a positive assurance as 
anybody could. Only two days earlier, Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy Gustavus Fox had telegraphed and asked Dahlgren 
what was the "greatest draft which can be brought up" to 
Washington? In response to Fox's query one of Dahlgren's 
assistants Informed the Navy Department that twenty-two feet 
was the maximum. The Merrimack was originally designed to 
draw no more than twenty-three feet of water, but when It 
was built in 1854 it actually drew twenty-three feet, nine 
Inches. This had led to a great public controversy because 
with this deep a draft the vessel could not enter more than 
ninety percent of the ports in the United States, including 
Washington. While one could not be absolutely certain how
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much water the rebuilt vessel drew, one could be fairly 
confident that replacing the upper portions of the vessel 
with an ironplated casemate had not improved its draft by 
almost two feet. Dahlgren, however, did not give any 
assurances. Instead, he recalled, "I could give but little 
comfort: such a thing might be prevented.1 he told the 
President, "but not met." Instead of assurances, "If the 
Merrimactkl entered the [Potomac] river," Dahlgren told 
Lincoln, "it must be blockedC,] that was about all which 
could be done at the present."2-4
While Dahlgren had not given the assurances that he had 
probably could have, his suggestion that something could be 
done to prevent the Virginia from attacking Washington 
apparently had somewhat of a calming effect on the 
President. As they rode up to the White House from the navy 
yard, Dahlgren noted that Lincoln "was in his usual 
suggestive mood;" though as he followed him inside the White 
House, he also noted, "poor gentleman, how thin & wasted he 
is." While the President had been to see Dahlgren, many 
more people had arrived at the White House and the earlier 
discussion was renewed in its full vigor. "There was," 
Dahlgren recalled, "a hasty and very promiscuous emission of 
opinion from everyone without much regard to rank[,3 and 
some lnterCesting] talking which [was] rather confused." 
Among the more recent arrivals was McClellan who worried 
what the Virginia's presence meant to his proposed campaign.
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As long as the Confederate ironclad remained unchecked, 
transporting his army by water was out of the question. 
Stanton wanted to cancel the campaign immediately, stating 
bitterly that it should never have been approved in the 
first place. At some point during the discussion Dahlgren 
renewed his earlier proposal to block the Potomac River ship 
channel. This drew the enthusiastic approval of Stanton, 
and because Welles had momentarily left the meeting to 
conduct some related business, the President directed 
Dahlgren, Quartermaster-General Montgomery Meigs, who had 
been called in to provide advice from the army's 
perspective, and McClellan to make the necessary 
arrangements. The three officers, along with the secretary 
of war left the meeting and proceeded to arrange for the 
filling of a number of river barges with stone so that they 
could be sunk in the Potomac ship channel. Later that 
afternoon, Dahlgren took both Stanton and Seward down the 
Potomac and advised them on the best spot to sink the 
barges. Dahlgren also arranged for erecting batteries at a 
number of spots along the river. At about 9 p.m., Dahlgren 
telegraphed Lincoln "that all the measures were in progress 
& ready for u s e . "25
By the time that Dahlgren informed Lincoln that he 
could obstruct the Potomac River whenever he ordered, the 
situation in Hampton Roads had changed dramatically. The 
Virginia had been affecting Union naval policy since the
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previous summer. As soon as the first rumors reached 
Washington that the Confederacy was converting the wooden 
Merrimack into an ironclad, Welles had asked for a special 
appropriation so that the navy could initiate its own 
ironclad building program. In August 1861, Lincoln had 
signed a bi11 authorizing the construction of three 
experimental ironclads, resulting in the construction of the 
Moni tor. Galena. and New Ironsides. The Monitor, designed 
by John Ericsson and built at the Continental Ironworks in 
Greenpoint, Brooklyn, was the first of the three built, and 
after extremely limited trials the vessel was taken under 
tow from New York to Hampton Roads on March 6. After a 
frightful voyage, the strange looking little craft arrived 
in Hampton Roads on the night of March 8, Just as the 
Congress exploded and sunk. When the Virginia ventured down 
the James River to complete the grisly task it had begun the 
day before, the Mon 1 tor lay waiting; and during the morning 
hours of March 9, the Union and Confederate ironclads fought 
their historic stalemate.26
The telegraph link between Washington and Fort Monroe 
was reestablished by the evening of March 9, and the first 
reports detailing the battle between the two ironclads, 
while sketchy, provided enough details to assure everyone in 
Washington that the Virginia would not be seen steaming up 
the Potomac that night. Welles felt vindicated by the 
success of the Mon 1 tor in checking the Virginia, and the
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next day when everyone again gathered at the White House he 
made his feelings known. He was extremely upset about the 
plans that had been put Into motion to sink obstructions In 
the Potomac River. He had not been a party to this 
operation and he only became aware of It when Dahlgren 
Informed him along with the President that the river barges 
could be sunk at any time. This had led Welles to "rouse" 
Dahlgren at 2 a.m., and he ordered him to "suspend further 
operations for blocking the channel." Welles demanded to 
know who had ordered obstructing the river, and he pointed 
out that this ran counter to what the navy had been trying 
to do since the beginning of the war, namely to keep the 
Potomac River open for navigation. Somewhat sheepishly, 
Lincoln admitted that he had approved Stanton's desire to 
carry out the operation, believing "no harm would come of 
it, if it did no good." Lincoln's admission was amazingly 
similar to the one that he made regarding Seward's detaching 
the Powhatan from the Fort Sumter expedition in April 1861; 
but Welles, rather than expressing anger at the President, 
appeared most upset with Stanton, which was undoubtedly the 
result of the latter's dismissal of Welles's assurances the 
previous day.27
Besides being furious at Stanton, Welles was also 
extremely disappointed with both Dahlgren and Meigs. Both 
officers had been called in to provide military advice 
during the crisis, and Welles felt that they had failed.
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"Dahlgren and Meigs were both Intelligent officers and In 
their specialties among the first of their respective 
professions," Welles recorded in the diary that he kept,
"but neither of them was endowed with the fighting qualities 
of Farragut or Sheridan, and in that time of general alarm, 
without information or facts, they were not the men to allay 
panic or tranquillize the government officials. They were," 
Welles continued with his criticism, "prudent, cautious men, 
careful to avoid danger and provide the means to escape from 
it.” Moreover, Welles noted, the two officers, had proven 
"powerless" during the crisis "and in full sympathy with 
Stanton in all his fears and predictions." Welles made one 
final observation about Dahlgren: he had become so 
"attentive" to the President, that he behaved more like a 
"courtier" than a military advisor.28
The observations about his character could not have 
come at a worse time for Dahlgren. The only serious 
casualty on the Union ironclad was its commanding officer, 
Lieutenant John Lorimer Worden, who was temporarily blinded 
when a shell from the Virginia struck the Mon 1 tor7s pilot 
house while Worden was looking out of it. The 
ever-ambitious Dahlgren, believing that the war was rapidly 
drawing to an end and knowing that the only sure route to 
the rank of admiral was for "distinguished conduct in 
battle," asked Welles that he be allowed to "take command of 
the Monitor."29
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Welles refused his request, which was not surprising 
after Dahlgren's performance on March 9. Dahlgren probably 
did not help his cause any with Welles when he engaged in a 
game of I-told-you-so with Welles. When the first rumors 
reached the North in late January that the Virginia was 
about to attack the Hampton Roads Squadron, Dahlgren had 
submitted a memorandum detailing a list of things which 
could be done to prevent this from occurring. Among his 
suggestions were: obstructing the Elizabeth River channel; 
erecting a floating battery within range of the 
obstructions; preparing some vessels as rams, including 
suspending heavy anchors from their yard arms to drop on top 
of the Virginia; and finally, he suggested that the best way 
to neutralize the Confederate ironclad was to launch a land 
attack on Norfolk, which he argued would force the 
Confederates to abandon both the navy base and the vessel. 
While there was merit in some of Dahlgren's proposals, it is 
hard to believe that reminding Welles about them now, 
especially in front of the President, won him any gratitude 
from Welles. Fortunately for Welles, he had a graceful way 
to refuse Dahlgren's repeated requests to command the 
Mon 1 tor. He simply told him that his work in the ordnance 
department was too important to give him duty afloat.313
As if not securing command afloat was not bad enough, 
in the aftermath of the historic battle between the Mon 1 tor 
and Virginia. Dahlgren also found himself in the middle of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
n o
an ordnance controversy. Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Fox had gone to Hampton Roads as soon as he heard that the 
Confederate Ironclad might attack. Fox witnessed the battle 
between the two ironclads from the deck of a nearby vessel. 
As he watched he could see the projectiles from each ship 
bounce off the sides of the other, apparently doing no harm. 
In reality, the shots were not as harmless as they appeared, 
especially the Mon i tor^s against the Virginia. The iron 
plating of the Confederate Ironclad had been cracked in a 
number of places and after the battle the vessel went into 
dry dock for repairs and modifications, not emerging until 
April 4 .  Of course Fox had no way of knowing this at the 
time. He wondered what could be done to insure that the 
Moni tor would destroy the Virginia in the event there was 
another battle, which everyone anticipated. The Monltor's 
armament consisted of two XI-inch Dahlgren guns, which were 
capable of firing both explosive shells and solid-shot. The 
136 pound shells the gun fired were intended primarily for 
use against wooden vessels, while the 170 pound cast-iron 
solid-shot were intended for battering solid targets, such 
as masonry forts, or in this case, the iron-plated sides of 
the Virginia. Besides the standard cast-iron shot the 
Mon 1 tor also carried a supply of heavier, and somewhat 
harder, 185 pound wrought-iron solid-shot. Despite the 
apparent ineffectiveness of the lighter shot, Worden had 
refrained from using the heavier projectiles since he had
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received a directive from the ordnance department ordering 
not to because it was not known whether the guns could 
withstand the heavier projectiles without bursting. Shortly 
after the battle, Fox wired Dahlgren and asked him for 
permission to use the wrought-iron shot, stating, "It is the 
only thing that will settle the MerrimacCk]."31
Despite Fox's emphatic suggestion that only the 
wrought-iron shot could insure the Moni tor's victory, 
Dahlgren refused to approve their use, telling him that they 
were "dangerous to the gun." Nothing would have probably 
come of this except that in the aftermath of the battle, a 
number of newspapers printed articles that included 
information about the Union ironclad's wrought-iron shot. 
Much was made about the effort that had been taken to 
fabricate the special projectiles, and how each cost 
forty-seven dollars. Dahlgren took special offense at an 
article in the New York Herald. While aimed primarily at 
Welles's administration of the Navy Department, the Herald 
reporter suggested that if Worden had been allowed to use 
the heavier wrought-iron shot, the Virginia would have been 
sunk.32
Always sensitive to criticism of any kind, Dahlgren 
prepared a long written statement to rebut the newspaper 
stories. But Lincoln, whom Dahlgren asked to read and 
comment on his statement before he sent it out for 
publication, counseled Dahlgren not to send it, telling him,
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"too much attention would be drawn to whatever ...Che] 
wrote." The President was right. Dahlgren might logically 
argue that the danger of bursting a gun inside the turret of 
the Moni tor outweighed the possible advantages of using the 
heavier wrought-iron shot. The public, however, did not 
want to hear logical arguments, they wanted to see the 
Virginia sent to the bottom of the Chesapeake Bay. Heeding 
the President's advice, Dahlgren did not publish his 
rebuttal.33
The ordnance controversy did not end there. Fox's 
request to use the wrought-iron shot had only been a stopgap 
measure in his mind. He also had a long term solution.
From his vantage point, the battle between the Monitor and 
Virginia demonstrated that the Union Ironclad's armament was 
clearly inadequate. As chance would have it, as Fox landed 
at Fort Monroe, he just happened to see a 15-inch bore gun 
lying on the ground. Having not supported the construction 
of Ericsson's vessel initially, Fox did a quick about face. 
In the same telegram in which he pushed Dahlgren for 
permission to use the wrought-iron shot, he also told him, 
"we must have more of these boats," and instead of XI-inch 
guns, they must be armed with "fifteen inch Guns." "You 
must," he Implored Dahlgren, "go ahead with your furnaces at 
once to make [15-inch guns] ... to stand solid shot."34
The reaction in the Navy Department to the battle 
between the Mon i tor and Vi rgln1 a has been aptly described by
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one historian as "Monitor Mania." Fox became especially 
enthusiatic about the vessel, and he boasted to a friend 
shortly afterwards, "We have about $25,000,000 for iron 
vessels, thanks to our disaster at Old Point." Even before 
Congress had officially appropriated these funds, the Navy 
Department had decided to build more monitors. On March 17, 
it informed Dahlgren that it required "for the class of 
vessels like the 'Monitor' at least 20 15-inch guns; and for 
another class at least 10 of 20 inches diameter;" and that 
Dahlgren needed to produce them "in the least possible 
tlme."35
Dahlgren did not have any inherent objections with the 
idea of a fifteen inch gun. In his January 31 memorandum to 
Welles in which he listed ways to combat the Confederate 
ironclad, Dahlgren had himself proposed using a "15in gun on 
a Raft properly plated." But now he listed a series of 
objections about manufacturing more fifteen inch guns. The 
15-inch gun that Dahlgren had recommended using was the same 
gun that Fox had seen. It was also the only gun of its type 
yet made. Designed by Dahlgren's army counterpart, Major 
Thomas J. Rodman, it had only been fired using shells, a 
total of 504 rounds. In great contrast to his own 
arguments more than a decade earlier to adopt his IX-inch 
and Xl-inch guns before even one had been cast, Dahlgren 
argued it was a mistake to order full-scale production of a 
weapon that had not fully proven its endurance. Dahlgren
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also detailed some other concerns against casting 
fifteen-inch guns at this time, but all of his technical 
reasons were secondary to his main argument. "Using all 
despatch," he told the secretary of the navy, "it would be
impossible to fabricate the first 15-lnch gun in less than
seventy or eighty days, whilst the present urgent necessity 
must pass away in the third of that time, and cannot arise 
again for a considerably longer period— having reference, of 
course, to foreign nations." In other words, Dahlgren 
believed that the war would be over before the first 15-inch 
gun could be ready, and it was unlikely that the guns would 
be needed in a war against a foreign nation anytime in the 
forseeable future.
Welles did not share Dahlgren's optimism about the war 
rapidly drawing to an end, and so despite his ordnance 
expert's continued protests, the navy secretary ordered 
production of the guns. Because the navy did not have a
foundry large enough to cast the guns itself,- the main thing
that Dahlgren had to do was to design them. He completed 
his drafts in early April; and when he submitted his plans, 
he washed his hands of the 15-inch gun, telling Welles that 
he would not bear any responsibility for any accidents that 
might occur with them.S’?
Even as he argued with his superiors in the Navy 
Department about the proper armament for future monitors, a 
disgruntled Dahlgren remained convinced the war would be
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over soon. "CElvents," he recorded In his journal on April 
9, "are hastening rapidly to a consummation." Many 
northerners shared Dahlgren's optimism. Stanton was so 
confident that he actually shut down all of the North's 
recruiting offices. From its earliest moments, however, 
McClellan's campaign developed problems. His original plan 
of landing at Urbanna, which lay on the south side of the 
Rappahannock River, was thwarted by Johnston's decision to 
withdraw his forces to below the Rappahannock. Then, the 
appearance of the Virginia almost destroyed McClellan's 
"worst coming to the worst" contingency plan of landing at 
Fort Monroe which lay at the tip of the James-York Peninsula 
and marching on Richmond from there. While the Mon i tor's 
timely arrival in Hampton Roads allowed McClellan to proceed 
with this plan, as soon as Union forces met slight 
resistance near Yorktown, he decided to establish siege 
lines rather than to attack the Confederate lines 
direct 1y .38
McClellan's decision became the center of a storm of 
controversy. He maintained that he did not possess an 
adequate force in the face of greatly superior numbers. He 
was especially critical of President Lincoln's decision to 
withhold about one-third the number of troops that he had 
called for in his original plan. The President withheld 
these troops because his approval of the campaign had been 
conditional on there being a sufficient force left to defend
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Washington. Unfortunately, some calculation mistakes in 
McClellan's report of the number of troops he left behind, 
an over secretive McClellan who refused to provide civilians 
the details of his plans, including those for the defense of 
the capital, and an overly worried President who became 
almost obsessed that the Confederates were about to attack 
Washington, led to the President's decision to withhold some 
of McClellan's troops, primarily McDowell's corps.39
McClellan subsequently came to view and portray 
Lincoln's decision as part of a conspiracy to destroy him. 
The general, however, was not the only one speaking about 
conspiracies. While Lincoln had never liked McClellan's 
plan of operations, the President's Cabinet, excepting 
Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair, and numerous prominent 
Radical Republicans were downright hostile to both the 
Democratic McClellan and his plans. The complaints against 
him had begun in the fall, and had really picked up momentum 
with the creation of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of 
the War established with the opening of the Congressional 
session in December 1861. By April 1862, criticism of 
McClellan was reaching a crescendo. Now, the complaints 
about his lack of aggressiveness escalated into charges that 
McClellan was a traitor and that his campaign was a 
deliberate attempt to expose Washington to an enemy 
assault.40
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Dahlgren's command of the Washington Navy Yard and his 
Important political contacts gave him a bird's eye view of 
the controversy. Ferrying Lincoln and his Cabinet back and 
forth between Washington and the front lines where they met 
frequently with their military commanders, Dahlgren had the 
opportunity to hear, and even to participate in to a degree, 
the debate about McClellan. On one trip Dahlgren made with 
the President, he got to see firsthand the partisan nature 
of the debate. After being retained in northern Virginia, 
McDowell had slowly advanced toward Richmond via Manassas 
and Fredericksburg, which was the line that Lincoln had 
wanted McClellan to take. The President, along with 
Stanton, Chase, and Dahlgren, met with McDowell near Aqula 
Creek on April 19. Dahlgren had also begun to criticize 
McClellan. He believed that the general had made a mistake 
by moving up the Peninsula without first taking the 
Confederate batteries at Gloucester Point on the York River, 
Just opposite Yorktown. Dahlgren now believed that the 
Union's best hope for success was to reinforce McDowell so 
that he had "100,000 men here in front and [to] move 
straight down to Richmond." Dahlgren privately told 
McDowell that he had been pressing this plan on "the 
President for ten days." The main problem with this idea 
was where to secure the needed troops? Chase, who was a 
strong supporter of McDowell as well as an opponent of 
McClellan, suggested that General John C. Fremont and his
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army be brought east. Fremont was a darling of the Radical 
Republicans. The Pathfinder had been the first Republican 
nominee for president. At the start of the war he was 
placed in command of the Union forces in the West. From the 
outset, however, he was mired in controversy. He clashed 
with the professional soldiers under his command and he 
proved an incredibly inept military leader. More important, 
one of his first acts was to issue a proclamation that 
included a provision which freed all the slaves of persons 
who resisted the government. Radicals cheered the act; but 
Lincoln, who was trying desperately to maintain the loyalty 
of the border slave states was aghast. He quickly rescinded 
Fremont's proclamation and shortly afterward removed him 
from command. But the rise of the Radical Republicans in 
the winter of 1861-1862 forced Lincoln to reappoint Fremont, 
and he placed him in charge of the Mountain Department, 
which was created Just for him and partially supplied with 
some troops originally promised to McClellan. Lincoln's 
appointment of Fremont was a clearcut effort to assuage the 
Radical Republicans, but he would not bring him east. The 
President reacted strongly to Chase's suggestion. He would 
not do it, "there is the political trouble." Part of the 
problem was that Fremont outranked McDowell, and thus would 
then be in command of McDowell's troops. Chase countered 
that the President had the authority to place McDowell ahead
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of Fremont. But the President said that he could not do It, 
"there would be an outcry."41
Chase did not give up In his attempt to do something 
about McClellan. Two days later, he approached Dahlgren 
privately. He tried to convince the navy officer that the 
President was "indecisive between McCElellan]— who ... 
representCedD the Demofcrat] wing and Fremont who stood for 
the RepubE1icanls." The obvious answer, according to Chase, 
was to give the President an alternative. Since Dahlgren 
himself had been arguing to reinforce McDowell, he asked 
Dahlgren to meet with him the following morning and go to 
the White House to press on President Lincoln the need to 
make McDowell's force the main body attacking Richmond.
While this was exactly the kind of political intrigue that 
Dahlgren excelled at when it came to promoting his own 
interests, he "thought Ehe] better not" assist someone 
else.4^
Chase's attempt to use Dahlgren dramatically 
illustrates the level of Influence that people around 
Washington had come to believe that Dahlgren had with the 
President. The entire affair, however, also shows the 
tightrope that Lincoln was walking between the Radical 
Republicans, and the moderates and conservatives both in his 
party and in the North as a whole. The President tried 
desperately to convince McClellan to advance. But no amount 
of cajoling was about to force McClellan to move before he
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was ready. In four days his estimate of the enemy's 
strength had risen from 15,000 to "not less than one hundred 
thousand." Eventually, preparations for his siege stretched 
on for more than four weeks. Then, Just before McClellan 
said his siege was ready to begin, the Confederates 
abandoned their lines. This victory, with hardly a shot
fired, "satisfied" McClellan "of the correctness" of his
campaign. "Our success," he wrote to Washington, "is
brilliant & you may rest assured that its effects will be of
the greatest importance."43
After the Confederate withdrawal Dahlgren quickly 
reappraised McClellan. His "strategy seems ... conclusive. 
He forced the Confeds. to leave Manassas without a blow— and 
now to abandon their formidable lines at Yorktown— But the 
battle Impends.... they must now accept battle or give up 
their Capital." Dahlgren also noted, however, "The extreme 
Repubs, are persistent ... in their attacks on McCllellanl 
as if nothing but a battle would content them— in reality 
they would dismount McCClellan]— who will however be safe 
enough if he reaches Richmond wlth battle or without,"44
Excepting the mood of the Radical Republicans, the 
North was exuberant. The Confederate withdrawal from 
Yorktown came on the heels of a number of other Confederate 
losses, including the surrender of New Orleans, and at 
Shiloh. The evacuation of Yorktown also made Norfolk 
untenable for the Confedracy and they evacuated that city
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shortly afterward. This led to the loss of the Virginia, 
because efforts to reduce the Ironclad's draft sufficiently 
to allow it to be taken up the James River to Richmond were 
unsuccessful and the vessel was thus destroyed rather than 
to allow it to fall into Union hands. Official Washington 
seemed on the move to the Peninsula to watch firsthand what 
they believed was the end of the war. While Dahlgren was 
not at the navy yard on May 6 when the President, along with 
Stanton and Chase sailed for the Peninsula, he did take 
Welles, Seward, Attorney-General Edward Bates, and their 
"guests and ladies" to see McClellan a few days later. 
Ironically, while McClellan claimed he was too busy to meet 
with the President, as soon as the General learned of the 
most recent arrivals from Washington, he "came on board and 
there was a long talk." McClellan also arranged for the 
party to go ashore and view "the troops at evens parade." 
While Dahlgren only had the warmest descriptions for 
McClellan's hospitality, the General had a very different 
view of the visit. "We had quite a visitation yesterday," 
he wrote to Mary Ellen McClellan, "in the shape of Secy. 
Seward, Gideon Welles, Mr. Bates, Fred Seward, Dahlgren," 
and some others. "I went on board their boat— then had some 
ambulances harnessed up 8. took them around camp— was very 
glad when I got thro' with them— such visits are always a 
nuisance." The next day Dahlgren took the party to Norfolk. 
On the 16th, they went up the James. On the way up river
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they passed the sunken hulks of the Congress and Cumberland. 
As they moved further up the river they encountered some of 
the vessels which had moved on Richmond the previous day, 
only to be turned back at Drewry's Bluff. Dahlgren noted 
that up until this point, "Our party has been in most 
buoyant spirits." But news of the rebuff at Drewry's Bluff 
changed this. "Curious," Dahlgren wrote in his Journal, "to 
see how they were quelled by a little reverse and Mr. Seward 
began to remember reasons for returning."45
On May 22, after Dahlgren arrived back in Washington, 
he received orders to prepare a vessel for that evening. To 
Dahlgren's surprise his passenger was the President.
Lincoln, now comfortable about the security of the capital, 
had reversed his decision about McDowell's corps. He now 
wanted McDowell to cooperate with McClellan by moving 
simultaneously with the Union army on the Peninsula. But 
before McDowell moved, Lincoln wanted to confer with him.46
Even before McDowell moved, the President reversed his 
decision again. The reason for the sudden reversal was 
General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's activities in the 
Shenandoah Valley. After evacuating Yorktown, Confederate 
forces fought a brief delaying action near Virginia's 
colonial capital of Williamsburg, before eventually falling 
back behind the Chickahomlny River, the last natural 
obstruction before Richmond, less than ten miles to the 
west. McClellan slowly moved his forces up the Peninsula
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and as he did before Yorktown, he began preparations for a 
siege. The Confederate leadership did not want to allow 
McClellan to utilize the superior force and artillery he had 
at his disposal to lay siege to their capital because they 
realized this was a battle they were destined to lose. As 
McClellan was beginning his methodical preparations, General 
Robert E. Lee, who had been brought to Richmond by President 
Jefferson Davis to serve as his military advisor, 
recommended that Jackson begin an offensive to try to keep 
the Union from shifting forces from northern Virginia to the 
Richmond area.4?
Jackson's "Valley Campaign" had been under way since 
early May, but it really began to heat up on the same day 
that Lincoln met with McDowell, May 23. On that day,
Jackson defeated a portion of General Nathaniel Prentiss 
Banks's force at Front Royal, Virginia. Banks, another of 
Lincoln's political generals and who proved as militarily 
inept as Fremont, had been assuring Washington that Jackson 
posed no threat. Two days later, Jackson's army won another 
victory at Winchester.48
When Dahlgren, the President, and Stanton, had returned 
from their secret visit to Fredericksburg in the early 
morning hours of May 24, there was an important message 
waiting at the dock for the President. More than likely it 
was a report of the battle at Front Royal. Lincoln 
immediately canceled McDowell's move and ordered the
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divisions that had Just rejoined his army from the 
Shenandoah Valley, to return posthaste. The battle at 
Winchester the next day really threw Washington into a 
panic. After this battle, Banks and the remnants of his 
shattered force retreated north to Harper's Ferry, which 
seemed Jackson's next target. Harper's Ferry sat along the 
Potomac River and was Just a short march from the capital.
It suddenly appeared to the President that Washington could 
very soon be under attack.49
While Jackson's campaign was having tremendous impact 
upon Union military strategy, it also looked 1 ike a godsend 
to Dahlgren. Thoughts of his need to distinguish himself in 
battle if he was going to receive consideration for 
promotion was never far from his thoughts. Suddenly, here 
was another chance. On May 25, orders arrived at the 
Washington Navy Yard asking that Dahlgren send all his 
available heavy cannon to Harper's Ferr?. Dahlgren 
immediately went to see Stanton and volunteered to go along 
with the guns, and to command the artillery there. Stanton 
agreed to the proposal, telling Dahlgren that he would make 
him "Chief of Artillery." There was one condition, Stanton 
told Dahlgren that he could go provided that Welles agreed. 
While Dahlgren had not pursued an earlier offer to take a 
land command, this time was different; he was getting 
desperate. Dahlgren and Stanton went in search of Welles; 
but when they found him, he predictably refused. Dahlgren
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did not give up, and he asked that they go and ask the 
President. The trio of men now went off to look for 
Lincoln, whom they found In the War Department, undoubtedly 
waiting for news from Harper's Ferry. The President wanted 
to support Dahlgren, but in the face of determined 
opposition from both Welles and Fox, who again renewed their 
argument that Dahlgren was more important In Washington, he 
would not overrule his navy department.50
While Dahlgren may not have gotten what he wanted for 
himself, the crisis at Harper's Ferry was not a total loss 
for the Dahlgren family. After not being allowed to go to 
Harper's Ferry himself, Dahlgren sent his son Ulrlc Dahlgren 
along with the cannon. Having returned to the North at the 
start of the war, Ulric had begun the study of law in 
Philadelphia. In late April, he became his father's 
assistant at the Washington Navy Yard. Ulric Dahlgren came 
back to Washington on May 29 in order to gather needed 
ordnance supplies for the guns Just sent to Harper's Ferry. 
Rather than sending his son right back, Dahlgren instead 
took him to see the President to give him a firsthand report 
of the situation there. Besides wanting to give the 
President a fresh report, the elder Dahlgren had another 
motive. He gave "a hint" that his son needed an official 
"position ... to give him authority." The hint had the 
desired effect. Fox offered to make Ulric Dahlgren an 
"Act.ting] Master's App.trentic]." Stanton did the navy
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offer one better, and he offered to make Ulric a captain. 
Despite his more than thirty years of service in the navy, 
John Dahlgren never even hesitated. The latter offer "was 
the best," the career navy officer noted, "when we left the 
War Dep.tartment3 Ully was a Capt.tain]— not having had the 
most remote idea of it when he entered."51
If Dahlgren felt any parental concern about his son's 
returning to Harper's Ferry the following day, he did not 
express it. Nor, as events quickly demonstrated, did 
Dahlgren have much need for concern. Jackson's move toward 
Harper's Ferry was exactly what both General McDowell and 
General McClellan tried to convince President Lincoln it 
was, a feint to draw attention and resources from the front 
near Richmond.52
This became obvious to everyone, including the 
President, on May 31. Johnston suddenly launched a major 
attack against McClellan's forces on the Peninsula.
Although the battle at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks was 
militarily inconclusive, it had very important results. The 
Confederate attack took McClellan completely by surprise and 
convinced him more than ever of the need to be fully 
prepared for his own offensive. After the battle, he 
returned with renewed vigor to his ever methodical 
preparations to place Richmond under siege.5^
There was at least one other significant consequence as 
a result of the Battle of Seven Pines. Johnston was
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seriously wounded. His replacement was General Lee. 
McClellan could not be unhappy with this. About a month 
earlier he had characterized the new commanding general: he 
“is too cautious & weak under grave responsibility," and 
"likely to be timid and irresolute in action." Nothing 
could have been further from the truth. As McClellan 
continued with his seemingly endless preparations, Lee 
quickly prepared his own plan. On June 26, on what was the 
second day of what would become known as the Seven Days 
Battles, Lee's forces, which now included Jackson who had 
managed to avoid the three Union armies trying to trap him 
in the Shenandoah Valley, attacked as Lee tried to detroy 
the Union army. Over the next six days the opposing armies 
fought, first at Beaver Dam Creek, then Gaines's Mill, 
followed by Savage's Station and Frayser's Farm, and 
finally, at Malvern Hill.5,4
All allusions that the war was coming to an end came 
crashing down with the Seven Days' Battles. After Gaines's 
Mill, McClellan retreated to Harrison's Landing on the James 
River. President Lincoln told McClellan, "save the Army at 
all events." Even when the fighting on the Peninsula was 
not renewed after July 1, saving the Army of the Potomac 
remained paramount in the President's mind. Early on the 
morning of July 5, Lincoln sent word that he wanted to see 
Dahlgren.55
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Dahlgren received the President's message at about 9 
a.m. His optimism had been shattered by the Seven Days' 
Battles. No longer boldly predicting the end of the war, he 
now fretted that Union forces everywhere were about to be 
overrun. Dahlgren dropped his work and rushed from the navy 
yard.56
Entering the War Department, Dahlgren sensed that the 
President was "anxious." Lincoln told Dahlgren that the 
most pressing concern was keeping the James River open and 
he asked him "If It could be donet?]" Dahlgren probably 
could not believe his ears. "I would guarantee it," he told 
the President, "if [you] ... would send me in command there 
8. [give] ... me the means."57
After months of listening to his generals give him 
every manner of ambivalent answer, Lincoln was more than 
glad to hear this kind of decisive talk. Lincoln and 
Dahlgren went over to see the secretary of the navy. The 
President went into Welles's office by himself and spoke to 
him for a few minutes, and then left. Welles then called 
Dahlgren in. Immediately, Dahlgren recalled, the secretary 
"objected....said I could not be spared— the ordnance would 
not go on without me— my services were more important where 
I was." Dahlgren had heard this same argument before. He 
pleaded with Welles to give him this chance to serve afloat. 
Fox, who had joined the meeting, pointed out to Dahlgren 
that if his request were honored the department would have
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to find two men to replace him, one as the commandant of the 
Washington Navy Yard, and another to take over the direction 
of ordnance experiments. Dahlgren shot back, 111 Cam] ... 
willing to give up both for the command in the James River." 
But Fox had not pointed out Dahlgren's dual role to ask him 
if he was willing to give up both Jobs; rather, it was Fox's 
way of seconding Welles's assertion that Dahlgren was too 
valuable where he was to send him out to sea.5B
Despondent, but not yet without hope, Dahlgren left 
Welles's office. He headed straight back to see the 
President. He tried in vain to convince Lincoln to overrule 
Welles; but reluctantly, Lincoln told Dahlgren, he "did not 
see how it could be" done. Someone else would have to get 
the command.59
As had been the case when Dahlgren tried to secure 
command afloat before, Welles never had any Intentions of 
favoring his request. He believed he knew exactly where the 
navy officer belonged. That evening Dahlgren and Welles saw 
each other again. They talked, but not about service 
afloat. Earlier that day President Lincoln had signed the 
Navy Reorganization Bill, which had finally made it through 
Congress. The bill had passed with Dahlgren's long desired 
amendment, a separate Bureau of Ordnance. Heading the 
navy's ordnance was what Welles had been pressing on 
Dahlgren now for almost a year. Welles asked Dahlgren if he 
would take the post. Dahlgren knew that once installed as a
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bureau chief the likllhood of being offered a fleet command 
would be almost non-existent; now, however, rather than 
refusing the position, he responded in the tones of a 
defeated man. " I  would leave that," he told the secretary of 
the navy, "to the DepartCment].1,60
Dahlgren's answer sounded like that of a man who had 
given up the fight. Less than two weeks later he was 
officially appointed to head the Bureau of Ordnance. In his 
journal entry recording his feelings about being named a 
bureau chief, he tried to make the best of it, noting that 
"being [only] a Commander in the Navy I have been Commandant 
of Yard and Chief of Bureau, which no other officer of that 
rank had done." No matter how he painted it, however, being 
named chief of ordnance marked a defeat in his effort to 
secure duty afloat and a coveted promotion to rear-admiral. 
And it quite possibly was a fatal one, as Dahlgren 
recognized when he wrote about Welles denying him the James 
River Squadron: "it was perhaps my last chance for a 
flag."6 !
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Chapter IV 
The Failed Coup
"I ask for no addition to my present rank,
... that of Captain is quite sufficient."
Dahlgren was not the only one to receive a setback 
during the summer of 1862. The Union's military prospects, 
which seemed so promising in the spring, had changed 
dramatically by mid-summer. McClellan's failed Peninsula 
Campaign was Just one part of the turnaround. General John 
Pope, who had been brought to the East after building a 
reputation as a bold, aggressive fighter in the West, proved 
an utter failure. Pope became the second Union general to 
suffer a defeat along the banks of Bull Run. In the West, 
Union forces under Grant in Mississippi and General Don 
Carlos Buell in Kentucky, bogged down in their respective 
campaigns. The navy had its string of seemingly 
uninterrupted successes broken during the summer when 
Farragut failed to capture Vicksburg. After his successes 
against McClellan and Pope, Lee marched the Army of Northern 
Virginia into Maryland, throwing Washington and the rest of 
the North into its most intense panic yet. Where Lee was 
and what were his intentions were unknown, which only added
139
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to the disquietude which enveloped the North. But the Navy 
Department had a solution to these problemst to capture 
Charleston, South Carolina. This campaign would have 
enormous implications for Dahlgren and in order to 
understand them fully it is necessary to follow in some 
detail the Navy Department's policy toward Charleston since 
the start of the war.
During the Civil War the Union navy was administered 
essentially by a two-man team. At the top was Gideon 
Welles, the secretary of the navy. Welles was a classic 
political appointment. The former Jacksonlan-Democrat from 
Connecticut made a perfect addition to the Cabinet in 
Lincoln's effort to achieve geographical and political 
balance. That Welles had administrative experience in the 
Navy Department as the Chief of the Bureau of Provisions and 
Clothing during the Polk presidency was all the better. 
Intelligent, efficient, hard-working, Welles proved to be, 
in the estimation of naval historians, "one of the ablest 
Secretaries in ... CU. S. Navy] history." This historical 
Judgement, however, comes with the benefit of viewing Welles 
long after his tenure in command had ended. His 
contemporaries had no such vantage point from which to Judge 
him, and at the outset of the Civil War few people believed 
that the long-time Journalist from Hartford was up to the 
task of administering the Navy Department.1
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The other half of the naval administrative team was 
Gustavus Vasa Fox. Like Welles's, his route to the Navy 
Department also requires explanation. Fox was the 
superintendent of a ml 11 in Lowell, Massachusetts, when in 
early January 1861 he heard about the first expedition to 
relieve Fort Sumter. A former navy officer, he rushed to 
New York and visited Marshall Roberts, president of the 
steamship company which owned the Star of the West, the 
vessel that the government chartered for the expedition.
Fox knew Roberts from his navy duty. He asked Roberts to 
allow him to lead the operation, but Roberts told him that a 
commander had already been assigned. But when the Star of 
the West was driven off by cannon fire on January 9, 1861, 
Fox had another opportunity to offer the federal government 
his services. While most of Lincoln's advisors were 
counselling the President to evacuate Fort Sumter, Fox was 
telling Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, his 
brother-in-law, that he had a foolproof plan to reinforce 
Sumter. Blair brought Fox to Washington; Lincoln liked what 
he heard and placed Fox in charge of the operation to 
resupply Fort Sumter. But Fox's expedition arrived off 
Charleston in the early morning hours of April 12, Just in 
time to witness the bombardment of Fort Sumter.2
Despite the failure, Lincoln thought highly of Fox.
The President told him, "I most cheerfully and truly declare 
that the failure ... has not lowered you a particle, while
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the qualities you developed in the effort have greatly 
heightened you, in my estimation." Lincoln offered Fox a 
commission in the navy. Neither Fox nor Postmaster General 
Blair thought that a command at sea was a good thing, 
"especially," Fox told his wife, “as the naval war will be 
one only of blockade." Rather than being lost somewhere on 
blockade duty, Blair suggested an administrative spot in the 
Navy Department. Unlike today's bureaucratic giant, the 
pre-Civil War Navy Department consisted of the secretary of 
the navy, a chief clerk, and a handful of assistant clerks, 
draughtsman, and messengers. The obvious position for Fox 
was the department's second highest post of chief clerk 
which was more like that of assistant secretary than it was 
a clerk's position, but Welles had already selected someone 
else for the Job. A compromise proposed by Blair was worked 
out by creating a new post in the department, that of 
assistant secretary of the navy, to be given to Fox.
Besides being an obvious reward to Fox, this arrangement, 
according to Welles's biographer John Niven, was designed to 
split duties in the Navy Department. Welles would 
"supervise office management, official correspondence, and 
routine administration....Fox would have primary 
responsibility for professional matters— operational 
planning, communication with squadron commanders, direct 
supervision of fleet movements, and the blockade." In other
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
words, Fox as assistant secretary of the navy was the 
driving force behind Union naval strategy.®
Despite exhortations to "starve, drown, burn, [and! 
shoot the traitors" of Charleston, the necessity of 
establishing the blockade precluded Fox from ordering an 
attack against Charleston in the early part of the war.
This did not mean than Fox forgot about Charleston 
altogether. In the spring of 1861, Fox had organized a 
board of officers to help him develop a plan for blockading 
the Confederacy. Among the board's recommendations was a 
suggestion to block access to North Carolina's inland waters 
by sinking stone-filled hulks In the passes through the 
Outer Banks. Fox seized on the idea and proposed to do the 
same thing in the shipping channels of some of the 
Confederacy's major ports. Not surprisingly, the first port 
he suggested was Charleston.4
There were sound reasons for not attempting to obstruct 
Charleston's ship channels. While the inland waters of 
North Carolina had mild tidal fluctuations and currents, at 
Charleston both the tides and currents were exceedingly 
strong. Most naval experts believed that either the vessels 
would be washed away, or new channels would form. Captain 
Samuel Francis DuPont, who was in command of the Union's 
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, considered the operation 
"a thorn in the flesh," an "elephant," that he wanted to 
"dispose of so soon as I can find means." But no matter how
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he felt privately, he admitted that the plan "was a hobby of 
Fox's which nothing could put out of his head."®
The question of probable success was not the only 
concern that people had about the operation. Perhaps the 
modern mind, long tempered by the concept of total war, 
views the permanent blocking of a harbor with obstructions 
as within the rules of war, but the same could not be said 
of military leaders in the mid-nineteenth century. Many 
were aghast. Captain Charles Henry Davis, the Union navy 
officer in charge of sinking the "stone fleet," as it was 
called, decried his participation, "Ctlhls is disagreeable 
duty, and one of the last I should have selected."®
General Lee, in charge of establishing the Confederate 
defenses along the south Atlantic coast at the time, 
bristled at the Union operation. Reporting the event Lee 
noted, "The achievement, so unworthy any nation, is the 
abortive expression of the malice & revenge of a people 
which they wish to perpetuate by rendering more memorable a 
day hateful in their calendar."7
The Northern press viewed the "stone fleet" very 
differently. Rather than objects of scorn, the old battered 
whaling ships used in the operation were the "mediums" of 
"righteous retribution" which had finally begun against this 
most detested of southern cities.®
Even though Fox had wanted to attack Charleston since 
the first days of the war, he believed that it would require
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
a large combined navy and army expedition. Fox's thinking 
changed with the success of the Mon 1 tor In March 1862. The 
Ironclad had, according to Fox, eliminated the need for army 
cooperation. "[Slo soon as the Merimacik] is disposed of," 
Fox told Captain DuPont, "We can give you the Monitor and 
Galena, ... the former can go up to Charleston and return in 
perfect safety....What do you say to it," he asked, "and 
what should you require besides these vessels?" He could 
send DuPont at least another "dozen vessels," but with the 
Mon i tor these should not be necessary. He assured DuPont 
that with the Mon 1 tor he could strike the war's "crowning 
act of retribution."9
Fox believed that DuPont was the perfect man for the 
job. Probably the most distinguished officer in the navy at 
the beginning of the Civil War, DuPont had become one of 
Fox's most Important advisors, including heading the 
blockade board. Not surprisingly, when Fox assigned 
commanders to the separate squadrons which the blockade 
board had recommended as the best way to Implement the 
blockade, Fox gave DuPont command of the South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron, which Included Charleston. His command 
to date gave Fox only more reason to believe that DuPont 
would now capture Charleston. In November 1861, he had 
captured Port Royal, South Carolina, which now served as the 
Union's major base of operations on the southern Atlantic 
coast. But Just as important to Fox, DuPont had the proper
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views about the Civil War and South Carolina. Never an
anti-slavery advocate before the war, DuPont changed his
mind once he landed on the southern coast. Writing to a
friend after his first visit to a plantation, he wrote:
may God forgive me for the words I have ever 
uttered in its tslavery/s] defense as intertwined 
in our Constitution. I have been a sturdy 
conservative on this question, defended It over 
the world, argued for it as patriarchal in its 
tendencies, which I believed it to be in the old 
cotton states, particularly in this [South 
Carolina]; the condition of the slaves was far in 
advance of the race in Africa, etc. Oh my! What a 
delusion— there are no swine in Massachusetts not 
better cared for. The Dahomeys and Congos are 
better off— these cotton lords who have been 
boasting of their wealth and power, ... have never 
spent a dollar in ameliorating the condition of 
these people physically.
DuPont wanted to return the southern states to the Union,
and "hopeCd it] not far off now." But South Carolina "will
be the exception," he noted grimly, "and she will have to be
dealt with as Cromwell recommended as the only true policy
for Ireland."1°
From the time that he began to consider operations
against Charleston, DuPont believed that it would require a
combined navy and army operation to take the city. A sailor
from the "Old Navy," he was not as enthralled with the
Moni tor as was Fox. DuPont also worried that Fox had been
misled by other naval victories, especially Farragut/s
running past forts St. Philip and Jackson at the mouth of
the Mississippi, which allowed him to take New Orleans.
"Think coolly and dispassionately on the maln
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object— remember there is no running the gauntlet, night or 
day,— no bombardment of a week to fatigue and 
demoralize— the defenses of Mississippi the merest sham in 
comparison." Charleston's harbor was ringed with batteries, 
he reminded Fox, and the vessels would always be under fire, 
as if "in a 'cul de sac' or bog. I merely allude to al1 
this," DuPont told Fox, "that your own Intelligent and 
brave mind may not be carried away by a superficial view of 
recent events, where the results have beenC,] thank God for 
his mercies, so great that the difficulties have been 
naturally overrated. I only have to add on this subject," 
he closed, "that if the enemy do their duty as we expect to 
do ours, then it must be a 'do or die' work."11
With his new found confidence in the Mon i tor. Fox had 
no intention of making the attack on Charleston a Joint 
navy-army operation. When he received DuPont's letter, Fox 
immediately responded that while a navy-only assault "may be 
Impossible, ... the crowning act of this war ought to be by 
the navy. I feel," showing incredible bitterness toward the 
army, “that my duties are two fold; first to beat our 
southern friends; second, to beat the Army." He concluded 
by reminding DuPont of Port Royal and New Orleans. In both 
places, he happily noted, the army "looked on" as the navy 
received the accolades.
Interservice rivalry was one thing, but even more 
Important to Fox was the destruction of Charleston. He was
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convinced the war was coming to a close, "which leaves 
Charleston for the closing act...." Fox assured DuPont that 
the Moni tor was "absolutely impregnable," and with it he 
could "go all over the harbor and return with impunity." He 
then closed with his strongest statement about Charleston 
yet, "I pray you give us Charleston ... for the Fall of 
Charleston is the Fall of Satan's Kingdom."13
As Fox implored DuPont to destroy Charleston, military 
events elsewhere made this a secondary consideration. While 
in early May Fox was positive that Richmond was about to 
fall, by early July all of the Union military plans in the 
East had unraveled. With McClellan's reverses on the 
Peninsula, rather than being sent the Moni tor. DuPont 
received orders to send as many ships as he could spare to 
Hampton Roads. Fox told DuPont that the "reverse at 
Richmond has forced us to pack [the] James River with 
gunboats to save the army. 26 of our best craft are there." 
It was "unfortunate," Fox lamented, but a "necessity."14
Fox characterized the summer as the "Dark days" for the 
North. Despite this, Fox was anything but pessimistic. In 
fact, he may have been the most optimistic person in the 
North. While admittedly upset about the Union's recent 
defeats, which had even brought Confederate flags within 
sight of the Capitol building again, Fox showed supreme 
confidence. He told DuPont, "we shall come out of it....we 
shall strike the flood soon." What was necessary, Fox
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realized, was a military victory. He also had the perfect 
place for one, Charleston. Thus, on September 10, orders 
were sent to DuPont to report "in person" to the Navy 
Department "as soon as practicable."1^
Fox was not the only person In Washington who anxiously 
awaited DuPont's arrival; so too did John Dahlgren. Within 
a week of accepting the Ordnance Bureau position, Dahlgren 
realized that he might have made a fatal mistake in his 
effort to become an admiral. While he had succeeded In 
getting the admiral's bill altered so that distinguished 
service other than in battle also qualified an officer for 
the new rank, one other significant change had been made In 
the bill. Only those officers who received a "Vote of 
Thanks" for their service during the war could be considered 
for promotion to admiral. Dahlgren's friendship with 
Lincoln meant that he certainly did not have to worry about 
the President recommending him for this honor; but that by 
Itself was not enough. The President's recommendation was 
Just that, a recommendation; and It required the approval of 
both houses of Congress. Dahlgren did Indeed receive the 
President's recommendation, but when It came before the 
Senate Naval Affairs Committee It was blocked. Furthermore, 
Dahlgren learned that the reason for this was because one 
Influential committee member believed that the rank of 
admiral was Intended only for those officers who 
distinguished themselves in battle. It was clear to
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Dahlgren that the only sure way to win the promotion that he 
so greatly coveted was to secure a command afloat and to win 
a batt1e .16
As soon as Dahlgren learned that DuPont had been 
ordered to Washington, he put a plan Into action to try to 
secure his command for himself. On October 1, 1862,
Dahlgren submitted a most remarkable request to Welles.
Sir: I am induced by circumstances to renew my 
request for service afloat, In command of the 
forces that are to enter the harbor of Charleston, 
which will probably occur very soon.
How far my antecedents Justify so great a 
trust I respectfully leave to the consideration of 
the Department, without remark from me. I must 
say, however, that the operation will be almost 
entirely restricted to the application of the 
ordnance, and in this I should be able to claim 
some advantage.
There could hardly be any special exception 
as regards rank, because the acting rear-admiral 
of the Northern Atlantic Squadron (Captain Lee) is 
only the fourth officer above me, and it is 
understood that Commander Porter, who is an entire 
grade below me, is to command the Mississippi 
Flotilla with suitable rank.
As Rear-Admiral DuPont is now about to leave 
his command, I beg leave to suggest the 
opportunity as convenient; this distinguished 
officer has had, and well used the occasion 
offered, and would, I presume, offer no objection 
to some respite.17
As reasonable as he tried to make it appear, Dahlgren 
knew his request was anything but that; and by itself, it 
would never be approved by Secretary Welles. But if 
Dahlgren had learned anything in his more than thirty-five 
years in the navy, it was how to promote his own Interests. 
The same day that he made his formal request for command of
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the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Dahlgren also wrote 
to President Lincoln.
I have submitted a formal application to the Navy 
Department for command of the sea forces that are 
to attack the Charleston Forts.
Two officers now have Flag commands, one of 
whom (Captain Lee) Is the fourth above me and the 
other (Commander Porter) Is of a rank below mine.
I only mention the facts to show no objection can 
be made to my rank and not that I question the 
propriety of their appointment which I believe to 
be well deserved.
The command that 1 ask for is responsible, 
but not more so than that of this Yard which I 
held under critical circumstances, and the Bureau 
of Ordnance which I now occupy.
The work to be done belongs almost entirely 
to the Ordnance of our ships, and I may be 
permitted some consideration on this account.
As Admiral DuPont has reaped so many laurels,
I am sure he would not object.
May I ask, if you entertain any proposition 
at all, that I may be favored with an early 
decision. For Battle is only the harvest of 
preoarat1 on . and much of this remains to be done.
I ask for no addition to my present rank, In 
order to perform this duty— that of Captain is 
quite sufficient.
While similar in most respects, there was one 
significant difference between Dahlgren's letter to the 
President and the one that he sent to the secretary of the 
navy. When writing to the President, Dahlgren made a 
pointed reference to his command of the Washington Navy 
Yard. This was a not so subtle reminder to the President 
that he had remained loyal to the Union at a time when many 
other officers were leaving it. Of course, the unstated, 
but implicit point he was making was that now, in his hour
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5 2
of need, he could expect the President's loyalty, could he 
not?19
Dahlgren's effort to try and seize command of the South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron was carefully timed. Planning 
for the naval assault against Charleston had been under way 
for more than a year and it looked like the active campaign 
would begin shortly. To discuss final plans, DuPont had 
been ordered to Washington, and he arrived in the capital on 
October 2. Dahlgren's move coincided perfectly with 
DuPont's arrival.20
One of the more notable similarities between the 
letters that Dahlgren sent to Welles and Lincoln was his 
assertion that DuPont would willingly step aside to allow 
him to take command. In his two letters Dahlgren referred 
to DuPont as having already "distinguished" himself, and 
having "reaped so many laurels;" therefore, he argued, "I am 
sure he would not object" to being relieved. This would be 
very difficult for Welles and Lincoln to believe, unless of 
course, DuPont suggested it himself. Amazingly, Dahlgren 
set out to get DuPont to do Just that. Besides the obvious 
problem of personally asking DuPont to step down in favor of 
himself, Dahlgren did not enjoy a close relationship with 
him. Thus it did not make sense for him to try to persuade 
DuPont personally. But they did have a mutual, and highly 
respected friend, Andrew Hull Foote, and Dahlgren did not 
have any problem in asking a friend to help him in his
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cause. In a letter to Fox, DuPont recounted how Dahlgren's 
effort materialized. He told Fox:
I forgot to tell you the other day, because I 
never had a chance to see you alone, that Foote 
... made a most extraordinary appeal to me to give 
up my command to Dahlgren. I was astounded, but 
as to what passed I w l 11 reserve untii we 
meet— simply observing that Dahlgren is a diseased 
man on the subject of preferment and position. As 
I told Foote, he chose one line In the walks of 
his profession while Foote and I chose another; he 
was licking cream while we were eating dirt and 
living on the pay of our rank. Now he wants all 
the honors belonging to the other but without 
having encountered Its Joltings— it is a disease 
and nothing else.
Dahlgren may have believed that he could convince DuPont to
step aside, but this belief may properly be described as
nothing more than a delusion on his part.21
The full extent of Dahlgren's efforts did not reveal
themselves until a few days after he submitted his Initial
request to Welles. President Lincoln left Washington at 6
a.m., on October 1, to visit General McClellan and the Army
of the Potomac then at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and he only
returned to the capital at 10 p.m. on October 4 .  Therefore,
in all probability, the President was not in a position to
know of Dahlgren's request any earlier than October 5.
DuPont himself did not arrive to see Welles until October 2,
so the meeting between him and Foote could not have taken
place at least until that day.22
Not yet knowing the full details of Dahlgren's actions,
Welles recorded his feelings about Dahlgren's request.
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“Dahlgren," he wrote, "has asked to be assigned the special 
duty for capturing Charleston, but DuPont has had that 
object In view for more than a year and made It his study.
I cannot, though I appreciate Dahlgren, supersede the 
Admiral In this work." Ironically, that same day Welles 
had decided to replace Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis, who 
commanded the Mississippi Squadron, with Commander David 
Dixon Porter, and Welles believed that this decision would 
infuriate Dahlgren. Furthermore, Welles believed this would 
involve Lincoln because, Welles noted, "the President will 
sympathize with D.tahlgrenl whom he regards with favor while 
he has not great admiration or respect for Porter." Perhaps 
if he had known about Dahlgren's October 1 letter to the 
President, Welles may have had even sharper comments to 
record in his diary. But still, considering the audacity of 
Dahlgren's letter, Welles's remarks are remarkably free of 
passion, although he noted that Dahlgren's request had to be 
rejected and DuPont would retain his command.2®
Welles finally had an opportunity to see the President 
at the Cabinet meeting on October 6. While Welles made no 
mention in his diary of having discussed either Dahlgren or 
the Charleston command, events during the next few days 
suggest that the President had indeed broached the subject; 
and during this meeting the two of them appeared to have 
reached a compromise on how to deal with Dahlgren.24
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Two days later Welles finally responded to Dahlgren's 
request. He told him that DuPont had Indeed “been called to 
Washington to concert measures for this attack!;]" but, "the 
Department can not consent to deprive him of the honor of 
leading and directing these forces." All was not lost for 
Dahlgren, because, Welles continued, "Your natural desire 
... is appreciated, and if you desire it, you can have 
orders to an ironclad that will take part In the attack, as 
ordnance officer to this special force." Welles attached 
one condition, Dahlgren had to retain his "position as Chief 
of the Bureau of Ordnance."25
The unlikely architect of this proposal appeared to 
have been Fox. The assistant secretary of the navy had 
twice earlier recommended that Dahlgren not be given a 
command afloat. While the ostensible reason for this was 
that he considered Dahlgren too valuable as head of the 
Navy's ordnance, this was probably not the only cause. Fox 
personally detested Dahlgren. In a letter to a friend, Fox 
decried Dahlgren's past success in lobbying Congress, 
noting, "he has molded all naval Legislation for ten years." 
Fox also realized the possible consequences if Dahlgren went 
to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron: "If he takes 
Charleston he will dictate for the rest of his life to the 
Service." Despite his misgivings, Fox was obviously willing 
to risk this if it would lead to the capture of Charleston. 
Fox had grown concerned about DuPont, who had become less
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and less sure of the wisdom of attacking the city and the 
final straw for Fox may have been when DuPont told him to 
"not go It half cocked about Charleston."26
Fox was convinced that Charleston could be easily 
captured by a monitor or two, and the monitors contracted 
for after the Virginia scare the previous spring were 
scheduled for completion that fall. All that was necessary, 
so it seemed to Fox, was to give one of the vessels to a 
bold commander who would steam his way past Fort Sumter and 
capture Charleston itself and he had two reasons to think 
that Dahlgren would do Just that.
The first was obvious. The opportunity to be 
associated with, if not given the outright credit for, the 
capture of Charleston, was exactly the kind of distinguished 
service which would surely secure Dahlgren his coveted 
promotion to admiral.
Dahlgren had a less obvious, but just as important an 
incentive to act boldly if he was given the command of one 
of the new ironclads. The new monitors, like the original 
Union ironclad, were designed to carry two Dahlgren guns. 
Officially, Dahlgren had only received praise from Welles 
for meeting the dramatically increased ordnance demands 
since the start of the war. But even before the battle 
between the Mon 1 tor and Virginia had led to controversy and 
criticism of Dahlgren and his guns, people had begun to 
criticize the Navy's ordnance, especially the relative lack
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of heavy rifled guns. Rifling overcame the Inherent 
weaknesses of smoothbore guns, namely Inaccuracy and short 
range. It also put increased strain on a gun, which made It 
more susceptible to bursting. While It would take advances 
In metallurgy and ordnance engineering not made until after 
the Civil War before dependable heavy rifled ordnance pieces 
would be available for widespread use, publicity about 
England's Armstrong, Whitworth, and Blakely cannon made it 
appear that dependable rifled cannon already existed by the 
beginning of the war. Partially because of the United 
States Navy's conservatism, and partially because he devoted 
most of his energy in the 1850s to getting his smoothbore 
shell-guns adopted, Dahlgren had been slow to begin work 
with rifled ordnance. But by the late 1850s, Dahlgren had 
begun experimenting with rifling and in the early months of 
the war the navy began using a series of his rifled guns. 
While looking outwardly like his large smoothbore 
shell-guns, the rifled Dahlgren guns did not demonstrate the 
same endurance as his smoothbores, and since the beginning 
of the war a number of them had burst during shipboard use. 
The most recent and perhaps most spectacular occurrence of 
this happened Just a month before the Moni tor and Virginia 
battle, during the Navy's assault on Roanoke Island. The 
report of the accident on the U..S.S. Hetzel read:
At 5:15, rifled [Dahlgren! 80-pdr. aft, loaded
with 6 pounds of powder and solid Dahlgren shot,
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80 pounds, burst. In the act of firing, into four 
principle pieces; the gun forward of the trunnions 
fell on deck, one third of the breech passed over 
mastheads and fell clear of ship on starboard bow, 
one struck on port quarter, and the fourth piece, 
weighing about 1000 pounds, driven through the 
deck and magazine, bringing upon the keelson; set 
fire to the ship.
Because of this, all of the Dahlgren 80-pounder rifles, and
a number of the Dahlgren 30-pounder rifles were withdrawn
from service. The failure of Dahlgren's rifled ordnance,
coupled with the criticism of his smoothbore guns after the
Mon 1 tor failed to sink the Virginia gave Dahlgren great
incentive to see that the new monitors were a success
because their success would also serve as a vindication for
his smoothbore shell-guns and his ideas about ordnance in
general.27
Maybe because it had been his idea in the first place, 
Fox was accorded the unenviable task of Informing DuPont 
what the Navy Department had decided to do with Dahlgren.
He wrote unofficially to DuPont, who, after meeting with 
Welles and Fox in Washington, had gone to his home near 
Wilmington, Delaware. Fox told him, "Dahlgren frets under 
the war bugles, and I shall advise that he either take an 
ironclad with you or go as your ordnance officer: the latter 
would be more proper." DuPont quickly shot back, "let him 
take an Ironclad and I shall be glad to have him as one of 
my captains." But as to Fox's suggestion that Dahlgren 
serve as the fleet ordnance officer, DuPont stated, "it is
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simply Impossible— that cannot be and I want that 
understood." As DuPont finished his remarks, he must have 
wondered what would happen with Dahlgren.28
If DuPont worried about the possibility of having 
Dahlgren assigned to him as ordnance officer, he need not 
have. Fox never told Dahlgren that he was behind the 
secretary's proposal, and after receiving it Dahlgren 
decided that he was in the driver's seat. After a few days 
consideration, Dahlgren replied to the secretary, and if 
possible, showed even more audacity than he did in his 
initial request. He agreed to accept command of an ironclad 
"because," he said, "I am willing to render any service that 
the country may demand." He did not wish to retain his 
Ordnance Bureau position, however. Dahlgren also showed 
that his statement that his request for the Charleston 
command had nothing to do with his desire for promotion was 
a boldface lie. He told Welles that, as proferred, the 
reponsibi1ity he would have in the Charleston attack was no 
more than equal to that of many officers Junior to him, 
which "must necessarily be attended by a sense of painful 
humiliation, which the Department might well forbear to 
Inflict on one whose professional standing has ever been 
without blemish, and who during the present struggle to 
maintain the Union has discharged the highest duties that a 
naval officer can render near the Government.". Therefore, 
he requested that he be allowed "to hoist the flag of a
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rear-admiral .... It will In a measure relieve me from the 
stigma that must attend my service as a captain afloat, 
while a junior by a whole grade commands as a rear-admiral." 
This was a last desperate attempt to salvage a de facto 
command for himself. As Dahlgren envisioned the assault, it 
was probable that because of the nature of the targets in 
Charleston harbor DuPont would divide the ironclad fleet 
Into two parts. His hope was that DuPont would be with one 
and Dahlgren would lead the other; thus in effect, Dahlgren 
would have command of his own force.
Welles learned of Dahlgren's reaction to the offer to 
command one of the Ironclads even before his ordnance chief 
submitted his formal answer. Welles was nothing less than 
furious. In his diary, he angrily wrote, "My proposition 
has not been received in the manner I expected." Welles 
also recognized that Dahlgren was in a position to cause 
more problems for him than most officers because he "has his 
appetite stimulated by the partiality of the President, who 
does not hesitate to say to him and to me, that he will give 
him the highest grade if I will send him a letter to that 
effect, or a letter of appointment." Because of this,
Welles noted, Dahlgren "cannot be reasoned with. He has yet 
rendered no service afloat during the war,— has not been 
under fire,— and is not on the direct road for professional 
advancement. But he is a favorite with the President and 
knows it." Welles then proceeded to criticize both the
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President and Secretary of War Stanton, perhaps Welles's 
most detested enemy: "The army practice of favoritism and 
political partylsm cannot be permitted in the Navy....I am 
compelled, therefore, to stand between the President and 
Dahlgren's promotion, in order to maintain the service in 
proper condition." Welles concluded his long private tirade 
with reference to Dahlgren's counter-offer of accepting an 
Ironclad provided he receive a promotion to rear-admiral and 
be allowed to resign the Ordnance Bureau: "This I can't 
countenance or permit."30
Welles waited almost a week before he penned his formal 
reply to Dahlgren's latest request, but even after six days 
to cool down his anger still showed. Welles stated, "Your 
communication of the 11th Instant, placed in my hands 
yesterday by yourself, has caused me both surprise and 
regret." He then proceeded to reply to each of Dahlgren's 
propositions, starting with his request to replace 
Rear-Admiral Dupont and ending with his suggestion that he 
resign his position in the Ordnance Beaurea. To each 
Welles's answer was the same, the requests were simply 
"inadmissible." He then reminded Dahlgren of the 
department's many favors to him. "The honors bestowed upon 
you have greatly exceeded those of any of your 
contemporaries or any officer of equal grade from the 
organization of the Government." This included giving him 
command of the Washington Navy Yard and then getting "the
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law ... altered [so] that you might be continued in the 
position which had been confided to you in a great and 
trying emergency." He did this even though he realized he 
would be criticized; but he had endured the criticism 
willingly, Welles now told Dahlgren, because "I was 
satisfied of the rectitude of the course pursued and that 
what was done was for the best Interests of the country."
In this same vein, Welles concluded by trying to call on 
Dahlgren's sense of duty to the war effort and suggested, 
that "in no position can you render the country so great 
service as in the Ordnance Department, and in these times it 
becomes everyone to sacrifice all personal considerations 
for the good of the country."31
The bluntness of Welles's response made it clear that 
there was no possibility of Dahlgren securing a spot in the 
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron which would allow him to 
exercise independent command. When he finally replied to 
the secretary of the navy's October 14 letter, instead of 
trying to strike some other arrangement to suit his own 
desires, he tried to mend the rift which this incident had 
opened between them. He expressed his "regret," and told 
Welles, "It is entirely unnecessary for me to say that my 
services are always subject to any disposition which may 
please the Department." A few days later, Welles responded. 
He was also conciliatory. He was "gratified," Welles told 
Dahlgren, that any "misunderstanding ... is removed."32
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During his month long effort to seize control of the 
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Dahlgren made few 
references about It In his private Journal. On October 26, 
the day after he sent his note of "regret" to the secretary 
of the navy, he made one brief comment. "The Sec.Cretaryl 
declined to let me go in a single vessel." In light of the 
facts of the case, Dahlgren's comment was totally untrue; 
but perhaps this was his way of convincing himself that it 
was not his fault that he was still behind his desk in 
Washington. His actions demonstrate how desperate he had 
become, and no matter how he tried to paint his situation, 
he must have recognized that he was further away from 
service afloat than he had ever been. Momentous events 
would have to transpire before he would at last raise an 
admiral's flag.33
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Chapter V 
The Making of a Squadron Commander 
"So I am at last an Admiral of the Republic"
Having failed in his bid to displace DuPont, Dahlgren 
had little else to do but to devote his full attention to 
his ordnance work. Normally, this would have given him 
solace; now, however, all it served to do was to remind him 
of his failure. This was because he was working on the 
Navy's new XV-inch guns, which he had designed for 
Ericsson's new and improved monitors. Scheduled for 
completion that autumn, both the monitors and the guns were 
intended for the navy's Charleston campaign.
From its outset, the XV-inch gun project gave Dahlgren 
nothing but headaches. His failed effort to dissuade Welles 
and Fox from proceeding with the project was followed by 
problems in design, manufacture, and proof firing.
Production of the guns fell so far behind schedule that a 
change in the armament of the new ironclads had to be made; 
instead of carrying two XV-inch guns as originally intended, 
the improved monitors, beginning with the Paasa1c . the first 
of its class, were equipped with one XV-inch gun and one of
169
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Dahlgren's smaller Xl-lnch shell-guns. That did not really 
matter to the monitor's designer. Ericsson told Dahlgren 
not to worry about the change because "I feel well convinced 
that [even] with only one of the large guns in each vessel 
we shall be able to destroy all rebel craftC,] inspire a 
wholesome dread in rebeldomt,] and prove to foreign powers 
that we can punish intermeddling." Despite Ericsson's 
assurances, Dahlgren still worried a great deal about the 
XV-inch guns. Not until he was actually able to fire one of 
the guns himself, which he did in mid-October, did he show 
any sign of relief, stating simply, the gun "works well."1
As chance would have it, the first navy XV-inch gun
ever manufactured and the Monitor arrived at the Washington
Navy Yard within days of each other, the former for firing 
tests and the latter for repairs, primarily to the delicate 
machinery common to all of the monitors. This unlikely 
convergence of the navy's most famous warship and the navy's 
newest weapon led to a steady stream of guests visiting the 
yard. Dahlgren usually relished these events because of the 
opportunity that they provided him to advance his own 
interests; but one set of visitors that came down to the
yard could not have given Dahlgren even the least bit of
pleasure. Before returning to his command off Charleston, 
Rear-Admiral DuPont, along with Assistant Secretary Fox, 
visited to see both one of the guns and one of the vessels 
that Fox was assuring him would enable him to capture
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Charleston easily. Unfortunately, neither Dahlgren nor 
DuPont commented upon the awkwardness of meeting so shortly 
after the former's ill-fated attempt to secure the command 
of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, but it is hard to 
believe that both men did not have at least a few 
Interesting thoughts about the situation. DuPont did 
comment about the XV-inch weapon, however. "The gun," he 
wrote to his wife, "makes the effect upon you, in size, to 
all other guns you have seen, great as some of these are, 
that the elephant in a menagerie does, in comparison with 
the small quadrupeds. They are to be on the new 
monitors!;3" and with uncharacteristic optimism he 
concluded, "with a sufficient number of these vessels so 
armed they would tear away, I believe, the walls of forts."2 
DuPont's positive comments about the XV-inch gun was 
one of the few good things associated with the project that 
occurred that fall. Problems continued to plague almost 
every aspect of the operation. Equipment at the Fort Pitt 
Foundry broke down repeatedly. Thus the foundry's initial 
assurances of the first four guns being completed by 
September 1, with two guns to follow every week thereafter, 
proved nothing more than a hollow promise. The fourth gun 
was not actually completed until October 25, almost two full 
months late. Even when the guns were finally finished, the 
problems continued. There were only three transport cars 
capable of carrying the massive 42,000 pound guns, and for
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at least part of the autumn two of them were contracted to 
the army quartermaster general to carry locomotive engines 
to the armies out west. This led Dahlgren and the ordnance 
department to make extraordinary efforts to transport the 
guns. At one point Dahlgren literally had one of his 
assistants chasing after one of the guns to insure its safe 
transport from gun foundry to shipyard. He implored his 
subordinate to locate the whereabouts of the missing gun, 
and once he did, to catch it, and "remain with it until it 
reaches its destination." Furthermore, he told his 
assistant, he wanted daily updates about the gun's location; 
and if there were any delays he was to notify Dahlgren 
immediately. Of course, efforts such as these incurred 
tremendous costs, which in the case of the XV-Inch gun sent 
to Boston for the monitor Nahant resulting in shipping costs 
of $3,082.66 compared to $157.43 for the XV-inch gun of the 
Patapsco. which was being built in Wilmington, Delaware.
But it was clear to Dahlgren, when it came to anything 
involved with the Charleston campaign, cost was no object.3
Fortunately for Dahlgren, he did not find himself 
personally criticized for holding up the monitors, and 
therefore the Charleston attack, because the ironclad 
construction program experienced its own share of 
difficulties. Among the most serious problems were 
Ericsson's arrangements for mounting and firing the XV-inch 
gun. The Swedish inventor's first and foremost concern was
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to make his ironclads impervious to enemy gunfire. This was 
especially true for the turret, the most likely part of the 
vessel to be struck. Ericsson would not enlarge the gun 
ports sufficiently to allow the muzzle of the XV-inch gun to
extend outside the turret wall, believing that doing so
would weaken it. The ship designer argued that it was 
possible to fire the gun while the whole of it was inside 
the turret without either tearing the turret apart or 
killing the gun crew. Welles was extremely skeptical of 
Ericsson's plan so he ordered Dahlgren, along with Fox and 
Admiral Joseph Smith, to "witness [the] test experiment."
After watching one of the early tests, Dahlgren concluded in
a most extraordinary understatement, it made a "terrible 
noise." While the sound must have Indeed been horrific, 
firing the gun this way created an even more immediate 
problem; the smoke from the burned powder filled the turret, 
choking breath and obscuring vision. Still, Ericsson would 
not alter his opinion about enlarging the gun ports; instead 
he constructed a crude device to direct the smoke out of the 
turret. Alvah Folsom Hunter, who served on board the 
monitor Nahant. described Ericsson's contraption. "A 
cast-iron flange, the Inside diameter of which was an inch 
larger than the bore of the gun, was bolted onto the muzzle. 
As this flange was beveled to fit up against the inner curve 
of the turret wal1, when the gun was run up to the edge of 
the porthole and fired, most of the smoke from the gun
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
passed out through the porthole." The so-called "smoke box" 
that Ericsson built did direct much of the smoke out of the 
turret, but it took weeks to make it even moderately 
reliable, further delaying the Passaic/s departure from New 
York.4
Perclval Drayton, Dahlgren's longtime acquaintance and 
colleague in the ordnance department for much of the 1850s, 
commanded the Passaic. He likened the new vessel to a 
complex clock, "and the least thing out of adjustment 
destroys the whole." Almost as if to prove the accuracy of 
his analogy, when all of the arrangements for the Passaic's 
XV-inch gun were completed, allowing it to leave New York 
and head for Hampton Roads to rendevous with the Moni tor and 
the other vessels being gathered for the proposed attack 
against Charleston, it became disabled by "a regular 
burst-up of the boiler". It was towed to the Washington 
Navy Yard for repairs, arriving on December 3. In a way, 
this was a blessing; when Drayton tried the XV-inch gun 
again, some of the components of Ericsson's smoke-box broke, 
"which rendered it [the XV-inch gun, and the vessel,! 
perfectly useless."5
As the crippled Passaic arrived at the Washington Navy 
Yard, Dahlgren no longer had much to do with either the 
XV-inch gun project or the new monitors. By this time, most 
of the problems involving the production and transportation 
of the large guns had been solved. As for the precise
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arrangements for firing the guns inside the turrets, this 
was a problem for Ericsson to deal with and was none of 
Dahlgren's concern. Freed from a project that he really 
never wanted to be Involved with in the first place,
Dahlgren seemed to have little more to do than to watch both 
political and military events unfold around him.
While Dahlgren always watched both the progress of the 
war and events in Washington with great Interest, in the 
fal1 of 1862 there seemed to be a superabundance of 
important happenings. In October and ear 1y-November, 
Dahlgren noted that the mid-term elections "have gone 
swimmingly with the Democrats," and "the political elements 
are looking angrily." He boldly predicted that the results 
would lead to a shakeup "in the Cabinet." He was quite 
correct to predict a change, but he looked to the wrong 
j  place, at least initially. The day after the Democrats
carried New York, the North's most populous state, President 
Lincoln ordered Major-General McClellan's dismissal once and 
for all. Dahlgren was shocked. To remove the general "Just 
now," Dahlgren recorded in his private Journal, "seems 
unaccountable."6
While Dahlgren may not have understood McClellan's 
removal, the general's replacement certainly did. 
Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside took command of the Army 
of the Potomac and Immediately moved south. Burnside knew 
exactly what was expected of him, a direct offensive against
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Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. The new commander of 
the Union's most prominent army did not disappoint, at least 
not in that way. But Burnside's frontal assault on the 
Confederate's entrenched positions near the town of 
Fredericksburg was nothing more than wanton slaughter of 
obedient soldiers.^
Full details of the Union disaster at Fredericksburg 
did not reach Washington until December 15, two days after 
the battle. Almost 13,000 dead, wounded, and missing Union 
soldiers seemed the lone result of Burnside's poorly 
executed campaign; and the Army of the Potomac quickly 
retreated back across the Rappahannock River. Even though 
Dahlgren had heard the news of numerous other disastrous 
Union defeats before, until this point in the war he had
written about them in his journal relatively calmly, almost
matter of factly. This time his response was different. 
Perhaps this reflected his own growing personal frustration. 
Whatever the cause, he now only used harsh words to describe 
the battle. "Begins to look like a confirmed repulse. No 
generalship, no mind— but merely a hurling of masses upon an
army strongly entrenched. And a repetition the only
resource....How terrible to think of so many thousands 
losing life or limb on such stupid plans!"8
After witnessing the effect that political pressures 
had on the battlefield, Dahlgren watched from closehand the 
Impact that events on the battlefield had on political
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affairs. Whereas Dahlgren did not hold either Lincoln or 
his administration in any way accountable for Burnside's 
foolhardy attack, many others in the North were not nearly 
so generous. Within days of the battle, a group of Radical 
Republican Senators met and developed a plan to try to gain 
control over the conduct of the war by gaining control over 
the President's Cabinet. They felt that Seward had too much 
Influence over Lincoln and that it was the secretary of 
state's conservatism on the slavery issue which kept the 
President from prosecuting the war as vigorously as they 
believed necessary in order to secure victory. Furthermore, 
the senators wanted Burnside removed. They complained that 
the general, who was a friend of McClellan and a Democrat as 
well, was no better than the former general-in-chief 
himself. The senators unveiled their plan in a long meeting 
with the President on the night of December 18 in which they 
demanded both a change in the military leadership of all the 
Union armies and a reorganization of the President's 
Cabinet, beginning with Seward's removal.9
News of the senators' meeting with the President 
quickly became public knowledge and everyone in Washington 
wondered what would happen. This certainly included 
Dahlgren. On the morning of December 19, Dahlgren heard 
that Lincoln had been "asked ... to re-construct his 
Cabinet. Whereon Seward resigned." Dahlgren understood the 
connection between Fredericksburg and the rapidly
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transpiring political crisis. "And so we have the first 
political fruit of the ... failure of the campaign.
Probably a new Cabinet." But even more important, Dahlgren 
asked himself, what did this mean for the administration's 
"policy!! Is it war and confiscation & emancipation or 
Peace?"10
Dahlgren did not sit by passively to learn what was 
transpiring. The next day he arranged for a get-together at 
his house, the featured guests being prominent Republican 
Senators John Sherman and Jacob Howard, the latter of whom 
had attended the meeting with the President. Unfortunately, 
as far as Dahlgren was concerned, his efforts shed little 
light on affairs, and he lamented, "The secret as to action 
generally of the Cabinet [is] well kept."11
If his guests did not provide him any new insights, at 
least Dahlgren did not have long to wait before finding out 
exactly what was going on. On the morning of December 22, 
the President sent word that he wanted to see him. Much had 
happened in the preceding days. After meeting with the 
Radical Republican senators, Lincoln demonstrated his 
mastery of political infighting. He knew that Secretary of 
the Treasury Chase, the most outspoken supporter in the 
Cabinet of the Radical Republicans' viewpoint, was involved, 
if not behind, the move to oust Seward. Lincoln called a 
meeting of his Cabinet and maneuvered all of them, Including 
Chase, to announce their support for Seward verbally. With
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this accomplished, he asked the senate committee back to the 
White House and Lincoln had all of his Cabinet, excepting 
Seward who was not present, reaffirm their public support 
for the administration as it presently stood. The Radical 
Republican Senators sat dumbfounded as Chase went along with 
all of the other Cabinet members. Having badly 
underestimated the President's abilities and having been 
exposed, Chase offered to resign. The President gleefully 
took Chase's letter of resignation from the secretary of the 
treasury's "reluctant" hand and stated triumphantly, "'This 
... is all I want; this relieves me; my way is clear; the 
trouble is ended.'"12
When Dahlgren arrived at the White House on the morning 
of the 22nd and was shown into the President's office, John 
W. Forney, the prominent Philadelphia newspaper editor who 
was then serving as the secretary of the Senate was pleading 
with Lincoln not to accept Chase's resignation. Then almost 
as an afterthought, he also suggested that the President 
should refuse to accept Seward's too. Although by this 
point Lincoln had decided not to accept either resignation, 
he apparently did not mind seeing Chase and his backers 
worry a little bit more. He told Forney, "'why will people 
be such damned fools.'" Then the President's face 
“reddened," Dahlgren recalled, before he exclaimed, “'If one 
goes, the other must, they must hunt in couples.'" At this 
Forney hurriedly departed, leaving Dahlgren and the
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President by themselves. Dahlgren noted that as soon as 
Forney exited, Lincoln reverted to "his usual humor," 
suggesting that the President had enjoyed the exchange with 
Forney. The President immediately launched into the reason 
for summoning Dahlgren, which was to conduct an impromptu 
experiment with some gunpowder that someone had brought to 
the White House; but after a short time, perhaps sensing 
Dahlgren's inquisitiveness about what had Just occurred, or 
not being able to get his own mind off the topic, the 
President turned the subject back to the Cabinet 
controversy. Lincoln recounted to his favorite navy officer 
the visit that he had from the committee of senators from 
the Caucus. The President told Dahlgren that while it was 
all well and good that the Senators "talk of remodelling the 
Cabinet," the problem with this, according to Lincoln, was 
that they "had thought more of their plans than of his 
[Lincoln's] benefit." When the President finished, Dahlgren 
took his leave. That evening he visited the secretary of 
the navy, and then afterwards, with the secretary of state. 
Seward, Dahlgren noted, was as might well be expected "in 
high spirits," and by evening's end Dahlgren had received "a 
full exposition" from the victorious side. Dahlgren, 
however, was troubled by something. As he recorded his 
thoughts he admitted that "It was certainly a great liberty 
with the Constitution for the majority of the Senate to 
meddle with the President's Cabinet. But," he wrote
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worriedly, "what they felt to be the necessity for the 
measure has not been removed."13
As important as it was, the President's political 
victory did nothing to reverse the North's lack of recent 
success on the battlefield and declining morale at home. 
Dahlgren's Journal entries for late 1862, and early 1863, 
show that like so many other people in the North he had 
become extremely pessimistic about the Union's military 
prospects. On Christmas day, he devoted his Journal entry 
to listing and recounting the defeats that the "Armies of 
the Union" had suffered since the beginning of the war.
While he thought that "Cwlhat is left ... makes up a 
formidable army," he asked, "who shall head itC?3" Events 
in the new year gave Dahlgren only more reason for concern. 
"In the evening," he noted In his journal entry of January 
3, "comes the news that the Monitor foundered off Cape 
Hatteras." A few days later word reached Washington that 
Grant had failed to take Vicksburg. Worse news followed.
On January 11, Dahlgren's journal entry read, "Fox sent word 
in the evening that the Confeds. had taken the [Harriet]
Lane at Galveston 8. the Westfield was blown up. Town taken 
and our troops in it....So we lose Galveston and these 
vessels and are beaten at Vicksburgh [sicJ." Dahlgren now 
came to question whether or not the North would win the war. 
"[The! Prospects," he noted grimly, "(are] rather dull." He 
then proceeded once again to recount the Union's growing
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list of military setbacks. But defeats on the battlefield 
were only one area of his concern. He noted that the 
North's "Cfllnancial condition [was] bad— [the] Army 
unpaid— in debt all around for everything— Credit so low 
that $1 in gold is worth $1 1/2 in U.S. Notes and no loans 
anywhere." Dahlgren's concerns did not end there. Popular 
support for the war, he continued, "wanes," and the "Army 
being of the people is more or less affected by the feeling 
of the people at large." In contrast, he concluded sadly, 
"the Confeds. are victorious, savage by reason of the 
Confiscation & Emancipation ActsC,] which will ruin them and 
make them homeless & penniless. So they fight under the 
best generals, for all that men can fight."14
As troubling as the progress of the war may have been 
for Dahlgren, a personal matter undoubtedly gave him even 
greater cause for concern. With the opening of the 
Congressional session in December 1862, Dahlgren's thoughts 
had once again turned to the possibility of his being 
promoted to admiral. The route to this rank, established 
in the summer of 1862, was rather complex. It began with an 
officer receiving the President's recommendation for a vote 
of thanks. The recommendation then went to Congress, where 
it required approval of both houses. As detailed in the 
preceding chapter, Dahlgren had received Lincoln's 
recommendation and the favorable vote from the House. The 
result in the Senate was different. Grimes, believing that
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the rank of admiral should should only be awarded to 
officers who had distinguished themselves in battle, 
successfully blocked a full Senate vote on Dahlgren's 
recommendation by keeping debate on the issue bottled up in 
committee until the end of the Congressional session.15
It appeared that Grimes was attempting to do the same 
thing during the current session. Elizabeth Blair Lee kept 
a close watch on the Senate Navy Committee's actions because 
her husband, Samuel Phillips Lee, who commanded the North 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron, was also hoping for a 
promotion to admiral. On January 25, 1863, she wrote to her 
husband, "Father [Francis Preston Blair, who was also the 
father of Postmaster General Montgomery Blair,] has returned 
after several days sojourn in the City with a conviction 
that no vote of thanks will get throCugh] the Senate except 
Separately & for special acts of merit— The [Navy] 
Committee," she continued, "will not report any of the names 
sent up from the House now before them." This was due to, 
she concluded, "This thing of Dahlgren's ... it defeats the 
object of making the Admirals."15
Dahlgren also saw what was happening and he wanted to 
make sure that his chance for promotion was not blocked 
again. As he had done so many times in the past, he 
initiated a letter writing campaign supporting his case.
One of his letters, a sixteen page plea to Senator David 
Wllmot, was classic Dahlgren. He told the senator that he
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wished that he could tell him about all of the battles that 
he fought and won during the war, "but," he stated rather 
ironically, "it is not the province of an officer of the
Navy to dictate to the Department how he shall be employed."
Dahlgren argued that while he may not have fought directly
in any battles, he had still contributed to numerous Union
victories through his work in the ordnance department; and 
he cited letters that fellow officers had sent to him which 
complimented his guns and the role that they had played in 
their victories. Nor had he avoided sea duty during the 
war, he truthfully told Wilmot, rather, the "[Navy] 
Department would not allow ... [him] to leave" his ordnance 
post. Dahlgren concluded his long plea to Wilmot with an 
analysis of the wording of the admiral's bill. He pointed 
out that the legislation did not stipulate that one's 
distinguished service had to be rendered in battle; 
therefore, he closed, he should not be "excluded by cold and 
formal rules [from] that recognition which is ... [accorded] 
to others."17
Although there is no direct evidence to show that 
Dahlgren's efforts had any bearing on events, on January 31 
the Naval Affairs Committee unexpectedly brought the 
President's recommendation of a vote of thanks before the 
full Senate. The committee had made some amendments to the 
House version and noted that votes of thanks had already 
been requested for upwards of fifty officers, which was
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seven times as many as given In the entire history of the 
United States. This had the effect, the committee reported, 
of "rendering votes of thanks too cheap." The committee 
therefore recommended that it would be a "wise rule" that 
votes of thanks should only be given to officers "In command 
of an expedition, or when it was a separate service!,] like 
the conflict of the Monitor and Merrlmac." The report 
sounded as If It was aimed directly at Dahlgren. He had 
certainly not commanded an expedition. As for rendering 
special service, the committee's wording seemed to Imply 
that it was necessary to do so In a separate command at sea. 
But Dahlgren was In for a surprise. Only Captain James 
Lardner, who had been nominated for his supporting role in 
the Port Royal campaign, had been dropped from the list; 
Dahlgren's name remained. And on January 31, 1863, the 
Senate approved a "Vote of Thanks" for "Captain John A. 
Dahlgren, for distinguished service In the line of his 
profession, Improvements in ordnance, and zealous and 
efficient labors in the ordnance branch of the service."18
Dahlgren's quest did not end with the Senate's 
affirmation, however. Because Lardner had been dropped from 
the resolution, the amended bill had to go back to the 
House. On February 4, the amended resolution passed in the 
House; three days later, the President signed it. This had 
two immediate effects. First, Dahlgren and the others were 
now eligible to serve on the navy's Active List for an
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additional ten years. More Important, it also made each of 
them eligible for promotion to the rank of admiral; but the 
key was that they were only eligible for the promotion, they 
were not guaranteed one. But if a promotion was not 
assured, Dahlgren certainly was going to try to secure one 
for himself. In his Journal Dahlgren recounted how this 
came about. On one of his frequent visits to the White 
House, "I mentioned [to the President! the vacancies on the 
Admiral's list— that I also was legally eligible and 
reminded him of his old promise to promote me." Dahlgren 
obviously did not feel that Lincoln received his proposition 
as enthusiastically as he could have because Dahlgren ended 
this entry, "Willing enough[,] poor gentleman," which 
suggested that Dahlgren did not believe that the President 
would act on his request. But Dahlgren was wrong. That 
same night, Lincoln met with Welles, and according to the 
navy secretary the President "expressed a wish that Captain 
Dahlgren should be made an admiral." Welles, who had often 
cited his belief that Dahlgren did not deserve this honor, 
reluctantly agreed; and on February 19, Welles nominated 
Dahlgren for promotion.^
Dahlgren learned of his nomination from his friend 
Foote. Dahlgren was estatic. He went to see Welles to 
thank him for nominating him. Dahlgren could only have been 
shocked at Welles's response. "Told him," Welles recounted 
in his diary, "to thank the President, who had made it a
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specialty; that I did not advise it." Welles's lecture did 
not end there. He then proceeded to give Dahlgren a severe 
tongue-lashing for his relationship with the President, 
telling Dahlgren that it had adversely affected his role as 
a military a d v i s o r .20
Dahlgren made no mention in his journal of Welles's 
harsh comments. Instead, he simply followed the progress of 
his nomination. Grimes, like Welles, had apparently given 
up the struggle to prevent Dahlgren from being promoted, and 
Dahlgren's nomination quickly passed through the Senate 
Naval Affairs Committee for a vote before the Senate. Two 
days later, February 27, the Senate confirmed Dahlgren's 
nomination. Dahlgren exclaimed: "So I am at last an Admiral 
of the Republic. There are five above me, Farragut,
Goldsborough, DuPont, Foote, and Davis....Went into the 
President's to present the new admiral & shake h a n d s . "21
Dahlgren made no mention of how the President responded 
to his visit, but it would not have been at all surprising 
if the bulk of their conversation concerned Charleston. On 
January 6, Welles had sent orders to Admiral DuPont that he 
was to attack and capture Charleston as soon as the five 
ironclads the Navy Department was sending him arrived. The 
ironclads, Welles told DuPont, would "enable you to enter 
the harbor of Charleston and demand the surrender of all of 
its defenses or suffer the consequences of a refusal." 
Furthermore, the navy secretary informed his squadron
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commander, even though reinforcements for the Union army 
were also on the way to Charleston, DuPont was to make no 
mistake, "Etlhe capture of this most important port.... 
rests solely upon the success of the naval force." Since 
Welles had issued these orders, almost every time that 
Dahlgren and Lincoln spoke to each other, the discussion 
invariably came around to that same topic. Dahlgren 
recognized that the President's personality had changed. He 
noted that Lincoln "never tells a Joke now," and that he 
"always asks about Charleston. Very anxious is he about 
it— and his countenance shows it."22
Lincoln may have been anxious about Charleston, but Fox 
was obsessed with attacking the city. The same day that the 
orders for the campaign were written, Fox penned a private 
note to DuPont. Fox told DuPont that he would be the 
North's "avenging arm" as he delivered "the final blow" of 
the war. "The eyes of the whole country are upon you, and 
knowing your skill and resource, and reliance upon Him who 
gives victory, I commend you to his keeping, no misgivings 
as to the result."23
DuPont certainly shared Fox's ml 1lennialist outlook 
about the war in general and Charleston in particular, but 
he did not share his optimism about the supposed ease with 
which he could capture Charleston, even with five ironclads 
at his disposal. DuPont did all that he could to convince 
Fox to drop the idea of attacking Charleston, but Fox would
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not be deterred. After he learned that DuPont wanted to 
make the attack a Joint navy and army operation, Fox 
reminded the Admiral that the navy alone was to capture 
Charleston. "I beg of you not to let the Army spoil It,"
Fox Implored. “The Immortal wreath of laurel should cluster 
around your flag alone." Then, exhibiting a level of 
overconfidence which bordered on delusion, Fox suggested to 
DuPont that he steam into Charleston harbor with his guns 
"silent amid the [enemy's] 200 guns until you arrive at the 
centre of this wicked rebellion and there demand the 
surrender of the Forts, or swift destruction."24
Fox's determination to see Charleston attacked and 
destroyed flew in the face of sound military planning and he 
knew it. In a letter to Commander David Dixon Porter, who 
commanded the Mississippi River Squadron, Fox stated, "[t]he 
opening of that river [the Mississippi] as early as possible 
is the imperative act[,] to be considered above even the 
capture of Charleston." In a series of incredibly revealing 
communications with his western commanders, however, Fox 
repeatedly admitted that while he recognized the importance 
of the control of the western waters to the Union's overall 
war effort, this would take a backseat to the Charleston 
operations. When Admiral Farragut told him that he could 
not "perform the duties which I came to execute" without 
ironclads, the most that Fox offered was to send him some 
after the capture of Charleston. Even more revealing was a
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letter that Fox sent to DuPont. After informing him that he 
had arranged to have a total of nine Ironclads sent to him, 
Fox stated: "If we had more you should have every one of 
them, that you might give us success. To do this, my dear 
Admiral, we have neglected the Gulf and fear every moment to 
hear of a disaster there...." When DuPont then complained 
that the Navy Department was holding back vessels from him, 
Fox spelled it out starkly:
The status is this, on the rebel side one Iron 
Clad in James River (Richmond No 2) & two others 
nearly ready: defence— Sangamon alone. Sounds of 
North Carolina one [Confederate! Iron 
Clad,— defence none. Lying at Fort CaswellC,] 
Cape Fear River, all ready one [Confederate] 
Ironclad;— defence none. Apalachicola river[,3 
one [Confederate ironclad] under Catesby Jones; 
defence none. Nobile, five [Confederate 
ironclads] under Buchanan; defence none. The 
Admirals in command of the Squadrons have placed 
these facts on record against us and called for 
Iron Cl ads to defend themselves but we have not 
given them any. Secretary Chase begged the 
Secretary to send some of the Iron Cl ads to New 
Orleans or we should lose the place and the army 
of Banks; we declined.25
Fox's bleak analysis of the Union's tactical situation 
versus the Confederate navy's ironclads was probably his way 
to spur DuPont to attack Charleston. DuPont stalled 
instead. He had sound military reasons for being cautious. 
As he pointed out, his ironclads and their crews were new 
and untried; therefore he wanted to give his ships and crews 
"the fullest test of active service." He thus ordered an
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attack against Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee River, south 
of Savannah.26
DuPont may or may not have had it as an ulterior motive 
when ordering the attack against the Confederate fort, but 
the results of the action provided him with more ammunition 
to argue against the Charleston campaign. After three 
monitors bombarded the fort for eight hours, no damage had 
been inflicted which "a good night's work would not repair." 
Furthermore, DuPont felt that the McAllister attack had 
provided him with an ace up his sleeve. Alban C. Stlmers, 
the navy's chief engineer, had recently arrived at Port 
Royal to instruct DuPont and his officers on the removal of 
underwater obstructions and torpedoes. Stimers's primary 
responsibility, however, was overseeing the monitor 
construction program. According to DuPont, he "belonged to 
the [monitor] enthusiasts and, like Fox, thought one could 
take Charleston." But after witnessing the unsuccessful 
attack on McAllister from inside the turret of the Passaic. 
Stimers was convinced that more ironclads were necessary 
before attacking Charleston. With the Chief Engineer's 
conversion under fire, DuPont decided that instead of simply 
forwarding his reports of the McAllister attack to 
Washington, he would have Stimers hand deliver them, because 
as he cheerfully confided to his wife, "[h]e will enlighten 
them more at the Department than fifty letters from me would 
d o ."2^
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Stlmers's surprise visit to Washington did indeed 
create a sensation. When he arrived at the Navy Department, 
a meeting was hastily arranged, with Welles, Fox, Lincoln, 
Chase, and Hal leek in attendance. The President was 
extremely agitated. "CI ] t was," according to Lincoln, "the 
Peninsula all over again," as he disparagingly compared 
DuPont to McClellan. Welles was none too happy either. He 
expressed concern about the continued talk of a combined 
navy and army campaign at Charleston. As for postponing the 
attack until even more reinforcements could be sent, Welles 
stated this could not be done. "Old Welles," according to 
Stimers, "said the attack must be made whether successful or 
not, the people would not stand it and would 'turn us all 
out.'1,28
Dahlgren was out of Washington for a long stretch of 
time in March, therefore he missed much of the controversy 
that Stimers's unexpected visit created. But even when he 
returned to the Navy Department on March 29, the fallout was 
still evident. "Found [the] President in Chief Clerk's 
room," Dahlgren recorded in his Journal, "with Sec.Cretary] 
and Fox. He [Lincoln] looks thin and very badly[,] very 
nervous. Complained of everything— they were doing nothing 
at Vicksburg or Charleston. DuPont was asking for one iron 
clad after another, as fast as they were built....I tried my 
hand at consolation," continued Dahlgren, "without much 
aval 1."29
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What the President did not tell Dahlgren was that he 
wanted to cancel the Charleston attack altogether, but Fox 
had talked him out of it. In what was apparently the last 
letter ever exchanged between Fox and DuPont, the assistant 
secretary boasted that he had "restrained" Lincoln "from 
sending off Hunter and all the Iron Clads directly to New 
Orleans;" although once again Fox acknowledged that "the 
opening of the Mississippi [is] ... considered the principal 
object to be obtained" by the Navy.30
Thoroughly disgusted, DuPont resigned himself to attack 
Charleston. In the last days before the attack he repeated 
his belief that even if he succeeded in capturing 
Charleston, it would have "nothing to do with the results of 
the war." "CTlhe rebellion," he stated, "goes down when 
those 400,000 soldiers are put down and not before." As far 
as DuPont was concerned, an attack only went to "the 
gratification to the morbid appetite of the public" and the 
personal and political interests and ambitions of his 
civilian superiors in Washington.31
The attack on Charleston finally came on April 7. With 
months to prepare, the Confederate engineers established a 
series of strong batteries to defend the entrance to 
Charleston's inner harbor. Moreover, continuous ordnance 
practice allowed the gun crews to establish precise ranges, 
which they marked with floating buoys. The gunners thus 
exhibited remarkable precision and in the roughly two hours
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that the Union ironclads were in range. Confederate gunners 
struck the nine Union warships a total of 520 times out of 
slightly more than 2,200 shots fired. The experimental 
ironclad Keokuk suffered the most punishment. Struck ninety 
times in only thirty minutes, nineteen shots pierced the 
vessel Just at or below the water line; and in the words of 
the ship's commander, the "vessel was completely riddled." 
Despite the best efforts of the vessel's crew, the Keokuk 
sunk in the morning hours, April 8. While none of the 
monitors suffered the fatal injuries of the Keokuk. four of 
the seven lost the use of one or both guns during the 
engagement and in the opinion of DuPont thirty more minutes 
of action would have disabled the guns of the remaining 
three.32
According to DuPont, when he ordered his vessels to 
withdraw, he did so "intending to renew the attack" the 
following morning. But after listening to the verbal 
reports of his Ironclad commanders, "I determined not to 
renew the attack, for in my Judgement, it would have 
converted a failure into a disaster, and I wl 11 only add," 
he concluded, "that Charleston can not be taken by a purely 
naval attack, and the army could give me no cooperation."33
It would take a few days for both the news of the 
failed attack and of DuPont's decision not to renew 
operations against Charleston to reach Washington. As 
Welles awaited word of the fate of DuPont's forces, the Navy
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Secretary's diary entries betrayed his lack of confidence.
On April 6, he wrote, "Rumors are current and thick 
respecting Charleston, but they are all conjectural. A 
movement against the place Is expected about these days, but 
there has not been time to hear of It. I have great anxiety 
and apprehension. Operations have gone on slowly and 
reluctantly." Less than sanguine of the prospects, Welles 
consoled himself. "[W3e have furnished DuPont the best 
material of men and ships that were ever placed under the 
command of any officer on this continent." Hopeful of 
victory, he admitted, "I am not without apprehensions."34
The lack of news became nearly unbearable. On April 9, 
Welles noted, "A yearning, craving desire for tidings from 
Charleston, but the day has passed without a word....A 
desperate stand will be made at Charleston, and their 
defenses are formidable. Delay has given them time and 
warning, and they have improved them." Welles also showed 
that he shared the general northern hatred of Charleston. 
"[Tlhere is no city so culpable, or against which there is 
such intense animosity." This of course explained why he 
and Fox had allocated "fifty-two steamers for the work and 
the most formidable ironclad force that ever went into 
battle." Despite this, Welles conceded:
For months my confidence has not increased, and 
now that the conflict is upon us, my disquietude 
is greater still. I have hope and trust in 
DuPont, in the glorious band of officers that are
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with him, and in the iron bulwarks we have 
furnished as well as in a righteous cause. The 
President, who has often a sort of intuitive 
sagacity, has spoken discouraging!y of operations 
at Charleston during the whole season. DuPont's 
dispatches and movements have not inspired him 
with faith; they remind him, he says, of 
McClellan. Fox, who has more naval knowledge and 
experience and who is better informed of 
Charleston and its approaches, ... entertains not 
a doubt of success. His reliant confidence and 
undoubted assurance, have encouraged and sustained 
me when doubtful. I do not believe the monitors 
impregnable, as he does, ... but it can hardly be 
otherwise than that some, probably that most of 
them, will pass Sumter.3®
The first word of DuPont's failure reached Washington 
on April 10. Fox Interpreted the account of the brief 
afternoon action gleaned from Confederate newspapers as a 
prelude to 1 the main attack." He wrote to his 
brother-in-law Montgomery Blair, "I infer that the attack 
was for the purpose of obtaining full information, otherwise 
it would have been made In the morning. They are now 
preparing for more serious work." Fox was concerned about 
one thing, the possibility of obstructions; but he 
optimistically told Blair that "they CDuPont and his forces] 
now know them and will reduce the fort. It is evident that 
they can attack it every day and at night retire to their 
anchorage Inside of the bar. The damage upon Sumter can not 
be repaired. The only question is, Can the ironclads stand 
the work? I believe the monitors can." As for the news 
about the Keokuk. It "was a small experimental vessel and 
was probably injured so that they beached her. I see no
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reason whatever," he concluded even more optimistically than 
before the battle, "to be in the least discouraged. On the 
contrary, my faith in the vessels and the officers is 
strengthened by these rebel accounts."38
Welles's diary entry for April 10, suggests that he 
believed Fox's interpretation. "On the whole, the account, 
if not what we wish, is not very discouraging. The movement 
I Judged to have been merely a reconnoissance, to feel and 
pioneer the way for the grand attack." Welles, however, did 
not share all of his assistant's views. "Fox persists," he 
continued, "that the ironclads are Invulnerable. I shall 
not be surprised if some are damaged, perhaps disabled. In 
fact, I have supposed that some of them would probably be 
sunk, and shall be satisfied if we lose several and get 
Charleston. I hope," he concluded, "we shall not lose them 
and fail to get the city."37
The first official news about the failed attack reached 
Washington on the afternoon of April 12, When Commander 
Alexander Rhind, who commanded the now sunk Keokuk. 
unexpectedly showed up at Welles's front doorstep with 
DuPont's preliminary reports in hand. "[TIhey were not," 
Welles complained, "very full or satisfactory, — contained 
no details." He went on to disparage DuPont, "He has no 
idea of taking Charleston by the Navy."38
DuPont's detailed report finally reached Washington on 
April 20. After reading it, the navy secretary dejectedly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
198
telegraphed Fox who was then In New York: "No indications of 
movements or intended movements." And although it would be 
ten more days before Welles stated directly that DuPont was 
"no longer useful in his present command," from the moment 
that he received DuPont's detailed report on April 20, 
Welles's private diary entries indicate that he had given up 
on his commanding officer at Charleston. The receipt of 
DuPont's detailed report led Welles to make an even more 
important acknowledgement, however. "I am," he wrote on 
April 20, "by no means confident that we are acting wisely 
in expending so much strength and effort on Charleston."
For after all, in Welles's own frank words, Charleston was 
"a place of no strategic importance."39
What probably upset Welles most was DuPont's post 
battle assertion that he never advocated attacking 
Charleston. When Welles read this in one of DuPont's 
letters he immediately recalled the admiral's October visit 
to Washington, especially his reaction to Dahlgren's request 
that he be allowed to lead the attack. Welles remembered 
how DuPont rejected any and all ideas of anyone but him 
leading the attack against Charleston, claiming for himself 
"the right to perform this great work."
As chance would have it, the same day that Welles 
recalled how DuPont had earlier quashed all suggestion of 
Dahlgren's leading the Charleston attack, the ordnance 
expert returned to Washington from an inspection tour of the
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navy's western posts. Having Just received DuPont's 
detailed report, Welles not surprisingly turned the 
conversation to Charleston. Welles, recalled Dahlgren, was 
extremely critical of DuPont, and Dahlgren found himself 
defending the man he had attempted to supplant. Dahlgren 
tried to reason with Welles, pointing out that all of "the 
Capts. of the Iron Cl ads who were chosen officers concurred 
with DtuPont]," but Welles did not want to hear it. 
Undoubtedly surprised at the anger in Welles's assault on 
DuPont, Dahlgren had to be even more shocked at what came 
next. Leaving Welles's office, Dahlgren ran into Fox, who 
immediately renewed the discussion about Charleston. After 
stating a similar position about DuPont as did the 
secretary, the assistant aecretary ended by concluding that 
he wished that Dahlgren was "down there." Dahlgren reacted 
simply and emotionally after speaking with Fox. "I am," he 
wrote in his private journal, "an applicant for sea 
serv ice.
Unbeknowst to Dahlgren at the time, he was one of at 
least two applicants. Just as they did about the Charleston 
campaign in general, Welles and Fox disagreed on who was 
best to lead the Union forces there. Welles's first thought 
to replace DuPont was Andrew Hull Foote. Besides being the 
naval hero at Forts Henry and Done Ison, Foote and Welles 
were boyhood friends. But as far as Fox was concerned,
Foote was DuPont all over again. While Foote had ultimately
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proven successful on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, 
he was best known for being an unbending stickler for 
details, who was unwilling to act until he was completely 
satisfied that every possible preparation had been 
completed. Moreover, since being severely wounded during 
the attack against Fort Donelson, he had been serving as a 
bureau chief in Washington; and his painful wound which had 
not yet completely healed, and which restricted Foote to 
moving about on crutches, added to Fox's concerns.43
The behind the scenes discussions about what to do 
about the Charleston command continued from late April and 
through most of May. The decision to replace DuPont only 
became easier with time as his reports became more hostile 
and filled with greater demands. In mid-May he requested 
that his reports detailing "every defect and weakness of the 
ironclads" be published. At DuPont's request, his political 
ally Henry Winter Davis went "to see the President that he 
may call his dogs off." Then DuPont demanded that Alban 
Stimers be court-martialed because the chief engineer openly 
disagreed with him about the condition of the monitors after 
the April 7 attack. As far as Welles was concerned,
DuPont's actions were his way of providing "a victim. More 
than this," Welles continued, "he wants to lay his failure 
at Charleston on the Ironclads.1143
Welles did not want a public trial of either Stimers or 
the monitors, at least one that he could not control,
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because as he readily admitted this would only provide 
ammunition for his and the acbnlnlstratlon's enemies. Welles 
had Just learned that his arch enemy in the Senate, "John P. 
Hale, Chairman of the Naval Committee ... [was] occupying 
his time ... preparing for an attack on the Navy 
Department." Welles certainly did not want to provide him, 
or anyone else for that matter, with additional ammunition. 
Meanwhile, the question as what to do at Charleston also 
remained. In a meeting between Welles, Lincoln, Stanton,
Hal leek, and Fox, the army contingent stated that if an 
attack was made, it had to be led by the navy. Fox 
immediately supported the idea and said he welcomed the 
Navy's carrying the "brunt" of the work.44
Still, Welles was less than sure. Once again he 
questioned the wisdom of attacking Charleston, admitting, 
"[tlhe place has no strategic importance." He also 
realized, however, "there is not another place our anxious 
countrymen would so rejoice to see taken as this original 
seat of the great wickedness that has befallen our country. 
The moral effect of its capture would be great." Moreover, 
it was hard to argue against a renewed attack for other 
reasons as well. The ships were already there and with each 
passing day there was less need for them along the 
Mississippi because both Farragut and Porter were managing 
their jobs without the ironclads. But Welles would not
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order an attack "without some change of officers." The 
question was, Whom to put In charge?45
By late May, Welles privately admitted that he was at a 
complete "loss as to his [DuPont's] successor." He would 
have liked to have named Farragut as the replacement, but as 
Welles termed It, he was "employed elsewhere." He also 
worried about his good friend, Foote. Welles confided to 
his diary: "Had some talk with Admiral Foote respecting 
Charleston. He believes the place may be taken, but does 
not express himself with confidence." Just as troubling to 
Welles was Foote's "great respect for DuPont, who, I fear, 
will exercise a bad influence upon him should he be given 
command." Welles also considered Admiral Francis Gregory, 
but ruled him out because of age and illness.45
Finally, there was Dahlgren. On May 28, Dahlgren in 
his usually direct way spoke to Welles about the assignment. 
"He speaks of it earnestly and energetically," which were 
important considerations after Welles's trouble with DuPont. 
"Were it not so that his [Dahlgren's] assignment to that 
command would cause dissatisfaction" with so many other 
officers already upset that Dahlgren had been promoted to 
admiral, Welles lamented, "I would, as the President 
strongly favors him, let him show his ability as an officer 
in his legitimate professional duty. He would enter upon 
the work intelligently and with a determination to be 
successful. Whether," Welles concluded, “he has the skill,
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power, and ability of a first-rate naval commander is yet to 
be tested. He has zeal, pride, and ambition, but there are 
other qualities in which he may be deficient." The "best 
arrangement," Welles realized, would be to have Foote and 
Dahlgren "act together." This offered the combination of 
the prestige of Foote, thereby eliminating Welles's concern 
of opposition to the new commander, and with Dahlgren, the 
promise of a vigorous campaign, easing both his and Fox's 
concern of a less than active attempt to take Charleston.47
Having finally made up his mind about whom to replace 
DuPont with, Welles acted quickly. He immediately sent for 
Foote and offered him the command of the South Atlantic 
blockading Squadron and was relieved to learn that Foote 
"really desired it." With Foote committed to leading the 
squadron, Welles next broached the subject of having 
Dahlgren Join him. According to Welles, Foote responded 
enthusiastically to the suggestion, "thought it would be 
well for the country, the service, and himself, were Admiral 
Dahlgren associated with him."48
After nearly two years, it finally appeared that 
Dahlgren's long struggle to secure a command at sea was 
over; but was it? Foote followed his enthusiastic approval 
of Dahlgren serving alongside him with a warning. It was 
"doubtful," believed Foote, "if D.iahlgrenl would consent to 
serve as second." Foote was indeed right. Having learned 
that it was being considered to send both Foote and himself
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to Charleston, Dahlgren made a long entry in his diary 
opposing the idea. "CTlhis is objectional," wrote Dahlgren, 
"as it renders collision of opinion possible 8< hence 
dissension....Gen,teraH Gilmore tsicl too is called on and 
on the whole, it does not look like unity of action. Foote 
wants to be of the party and there is a national wish to 
ob11ge him & to use me."49
Welles learned how Dahlgren felt from Fox, whom he had 
sent to feel out Dahlgren on the possibility of serving as 
Foote's second. Welles probably had a hard time believing 
what Fox had to say. "[NIot only was D.tahlgrenl unwilling 
to go as second, but ... he wished to decline entirely, 
unless he could have command of both naval and land forces." 
Welles had seen Dahlgren make outrageous demands before, but 
this clearly topped them all. The secretary of the navy 
noted:
This precludes farther thought of him. I regret 
it for his own sake. It is one of the errors of a 
lifetime. He has not seen the sea service he 
ought for his rank, and there is a feeling towards 
him, on account of his advancement, among naval 
men which he had now opportunity to remove. No 
one questions his abilities as a skillful and 
scientific ordnance officer, but some of his best 
friends in his profession doubt his capability as 
a naval officer on such duty as is here proposed.
It is doubtful if he ever will have another so 
good an opportunity.
Foote suggested that as Dahlgren's longtime acquaintance,
they had sailed together in the mid-1840s aboard the
Cumber 1 and on what was Dahlgren's last sea service on a
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regular cruise, that he might be able to "Induce" Dahlgren 
to change his mind, but Welles said he "doubtCedl it. 
Dahlgren," Welles continued with his analysis,
is very proud and aspiring, and will injure 
himself and his professional standing in 
consequence. With undoubted talents of a certain 
kind he has intense selfishness, and I am sorry to 
see him on this occasion, as I have seen him on 
others, regardless of the feelings and rights of 
officers of greater experience, who have seen 
vastly more sea service and who possess high naval 
qualities and undoubted merit. In a matter of 
duty, such as this, he shows what is charged upon 
him,— that he is less devoted to the country than 
to himself, that he never acts on any principle of 
se1f-sacr i f i ce ."50
Dahlgren must have also realized that this was his last 
chance to secure a command at sea, and when he met with 
Welles and Fox a few days later on June 2, he suggested to 
Welles that there had been a misunderstanding. He now told 
Welles that he was "willing to go Cto Charleston] if the 
Iron clads were assigned" to him.51
Probably the most relieved person in the room was Fox. 
Unlike so many others, he never lost faith in the monitors 
and he still believed that the only thing lacking at 
Charleston was a commander who believed in them and was 
willing to take them boldly right into Charleston harbor. 
While still finding Dahlgren personally distasteful, the 
combination of Dahlgren's driving personal ambition to wrap 
himself in glory, coupled with his continued desire to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of his guns, made Fox
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confident that Dahlgren would attack Charleston with vigor. 
Therefore, Fox wholeheartedly endorsed Dahlgren's offer.
When Welles accepted the idea, Fox quickly urged Dahlgren to 
hurry to New York to confer with Foote, who was then making 
final preparations before heading to Charleston.52
Events then took on an almost frantic pace. The next 
day, June 3, Welles wrote to DuPont to inform him that he 
had ordered Foote to relieve him. That same day, Dahlgren 
traveled to New York and met with Foote, who agreed to 
Dahlgren's joining him. The next day Dahlgren reported to 
Welles, telling him about his discussions with Foote and 
General Quincy A. Gillmore, who had recently been assigned 
to command the land forces along the south Atlantic coast.53
It is unclear exactly what role Dahlgren was intended 
to play in the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. In the 
long run, however, it did not matter, because shortly after 
Foote agreed to Dahlgren's Joining him, he informed Welles 
that he was ill and that he would have to delay his 
departure. Foote's health quickly deteriorated. Dahlgren 
happened to be in New York making his own preparations 
before heading to Charleston when he learned of Foote's 
situation. He rushed to Foote's bedside, only to learn "his 
illness was considered fatal." Upon returning to 
Washington, Dahlgren's first stop was to see Secretary 
Welles. Dahlgren noted that after Informing Welles of the 
"events of ... [his] Journey," Welles made no mention of the
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morning, Dahlgren went to church; but shortly after the 
service began a messenger arrived and told Dahlgren that the 
secretary wanted to see him immediately.54
Because Welles had already sent DuPont notice he was to 
be relieved, Foote's Illness left Welles with little choice 
other than to name Dahlgren as the new squadron commander, 
and he wanted to make this clear to Dahlgren. "[Your] 
appointment," Welles told Dahlgren, "was a specialty imposed 
upon the Department by Admiral Foote's affliction when on 
his way to assume these duties; ... this interruption made 
prompt action necessary." Welles then reminded Dahlgren 
that he had been originally offered the position of "an 
assistant and second to Foote; that he was to go for a 
particular purpose." To make sure that there was absolutely 
no confusion about this, Welles told Dahlgren that "his 
absence from the [Ordnance] Bureau would therefore be 
temporary."55
That Welles was uncomfortable about naming Dahlgren as 
DuPont's sole replacement is evidenced by his diary entries 
during the last days that Dahlgren spent in Washington, when 
the two met to discuss final details. Welles was Intent on 
avoiding the problems of communication that he had 
experienced with DuPont. "Told him," wrote Welles, "there 
must be frankness and absolute sincerity between us in the 
discharge of his official duties,— no reserve though we
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might differ. I must know, truthfully," Welles continued, 
"what he was doing, what he proposed doing, and have his 
frank and honest opinions at all times. He concurs, and I 
trust there will be no misunderstanding." But despite the 
frank discussions and apparent concurrence of views, Welles 
continued to worry. Welles reminded Dahlgren that while 
anyone who replaced DuPont would experience the animosity of 
other officers because of DuPont's strong reputation amongst 
his peers, the feelings against him would be ampllfed 
because his promotion had come largely from the “partiality 
of the President." Therefore, Welles told Dahlgren, "Cllf 
any of his seniors [whom Dahlgren had Jumped with his 
promotion] ... desired to be transferred, they must be 
permitted to do so, without prejudice." As troubling as 
were his concerns about Dahlgren's relationships with his 
fellow officers, Welles had an even greater concern. While 
acknowledging that Dahlgren had "intelligence and ability 
without question; his nautical qualities," Welles noted,
"are disputed." Moreover, the secretary continued with his 
critical analysis, "his skill, capacity, courage, daring, 
sagacity, and comprehensiveness in a high command are to be 
tested." But as if Dahlgren's lack of command experience 
were not enough, Welles believed there was an even greater 
problem. "He is intensely ambitious, and, I fear, too 
selfish. He has the heroism which proceeds from pride and 
would lead him to danger and to death, but whether he has
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the innate, unselfish courage of the genuine sailor and 
soldier remains to be seen."56
Perhaps he was too busy, but Dahlgren wrote little in 
his Journal about his last days in Washington, making 
nothing more than passing remarks such as "getting matters 
in order to leave." Arriving in New York again late on June 
24, he spent most of the next week making his final 
preparations before heading to Port Royal, South Carolina. 
Not once did he Indicate the slightest hint of concern about 
his ability to handle the task ahead of him, remarking only 
on whether he would ever again get to see all of his 
children, who were then scattered all around, his oldest son 
Charley at Vicksburg, his middle son Ully with the Army of 
the Potomac, his youngest son Paully at sea as a Naval 
Academy midshipman, and his fifteen year old daughter living 
safe from the war in Newport, Rhode Island. As he left New 
York on the morning of June 30, Dahlgren noted simply, "At 
11 the steamer ... pushes off from the wharfC,3 down the 
superb bay and puts to sea."57
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Chapter VI 
Failure at Fort Sumter
"Inregret to say that an attempt to assault Sumter last 
night was unsuccessful. Our column was repulsed with loss."
The appointment of a new commanding officer was not the 
only Important change that occurred involving the South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron in the spring of 1863.
DuPont's failed assault also dramatically altered the plans 
for capturing Charleston. Now, even Fox, who previously had 
done all that he could to ensure that the navy alone 
captured Charleston, realized that the best chance of taking 
the detested city was through the cooperation of navy and 
army forces. In fact, Fox even supported a plan which 
called for the army to lead the way, a plan which would have 
enormous consequences for Dahlgren's command of the South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron.1
DuPont's April 7th attack against Charleston was based 
on the Navy Department's naive assumption that the monitors 
simply would be able to steam past Fort Sumter into 
Charleston harbor, forcing the city to surrender. But 
DuPont's attack demonstrated that Fort Sumter was the key to 
Charleston's outer defenses not only because of its guns,
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but also because the fort anchored a line of obstructions 
which blocked the single ship channel between the fort and 
Sullivan's Island to Its north. It was this line of 
obstructions which had prevented DuPont from simply steaming 
into Charleston's inner harbor as the Navy Department had 
hoped and expected.
Fort Sumter had been designed and built with an eye 
toward any attack on Charleston coming from the ocean. 
Situated Just to the south of the ship channel, its 
offensive and defensive powers were concentrated on its 
north and east sides. Its weakest point, both offensively 
and defensively, was the long gorge wall facing to the 
southwest, toward James and Morris islands.
An attack via James Island was definitely out of the 
question. Union forces had already tried this route in June 
1862, but against the heavily fortified Confederate lines 
which stretched across the width of the Island, they 
suffered what General Hunter described as "a disastrous 
repulse." Some Union army officers, however, believed that 
Morris Island offered them an opportunity to exploit Fort 
Sumter's vulnerable gorge wall.2
Typical of the barrier islands which skirt much of the 
United States' Atlantic coast, Morris Island was Just shy of 
four miles in length and ran more or less along a 
north-south line. Narrow and for the most part treeless, 
the island faced the ocean along its entire eastern side,
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while to the west it bordered what were generally considered 
impassible marshlands. Uninhabited before the war, the 
island became Important when Major Anderson occupied Fort 
Sumter in December 1860. South Carolina authorities then 
erected a strong artillery battery at Cummings Point at the 
island's northern tip, less than a mile from Fort Sumter's 
gorge wall. After the capture of Sumter, additional 
defenses intended primarily to protect the battery at 
Cummings Point were begun along Morris Island, the most 
important of which was Fort Wagner, which stretched across 
the narrowest section of the island, approximately 
three-quarters of a mile south of Cummings Point. However, 
because of an overall lack of resources and General 
Beauregard's belief that Morris Island was not absolutely 
essential to Charleston's defense, work on Fort Wagner and 
the other defensive works on the island proceeded slowly and 
were not yet completed by the spring of 1863. The hope in 
Washington was that the army would be able to land at the 
southern end of Morris Island from its base on Folly Island, 
directly to the south, and capture Fort Wagner before it was 
completed. This would make the Confederate battery at 
Cummings Point untenable, since all of its defenses faced 
north and east toward Charleston harbor and the Atlantic 
Ocean. With possession of Morris Island, it was believed 
that heavy long-range artillery batteries beyond the reach 
of Confederate guns could "demolish Fort Sumter." Once the
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fort was destroyed, Union authorities thought that it would 
be easy to clear a path through the line of obstructions. 
Then, Union warships could steam into the harbor.3
There was good reason for officials in Washington to 
support the plan. On May 23, Quincy A. 611lmore wrote to 
General-in-Chief Hal leek's chlef-of-staff, George W. Cullum, 
and assured him that not only could "the forts in Charleston 
be reduced," but it could be accomplished without any 
additions to either the army or navy forces already there, 
save "a suitable number of the best heavy rifled guns."
G 1 1lmore's opinion carried a great deal of weight. A 
respected military engineer, in 1849 he graduated first in 
his class at the United States Military Academy. Assigned 
to the army's prestigious Corps of Engineers, he had since 
specialized in coastal fortifications, helping to supervise 
the construction of coastal defenses in both New York harbor 
and Hampton Roads, as well as serving as Instructor of 
Military Engineering at West Point. Even more important,
Gi1lmore had commanded the army operations against Fort 
Pulaski, near Savannah, Georgia. Utilizing plans very 
similar to those now proposed for Charleston, Gillmore 
succeeded in capturing Fort Pulaski after the navy had been 
unsuccessful there. Gillmore's military qualifications 
coupled with his bold promises stood in stark contrast to 
the controversial political general, David Hunter, then in 
command of the Department of the South. Hunter seemed
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primarily Intent on securing permission to "organize colored 
regiments," rather than working toward the capture of 
Charleston. Thus on June 3, Gillmore was ordered to take 
command of the Department of the South.4
Even though it was clear that the army was to take the 
lead role in the new plan of operations, at least initially, 
the navy's full cooperation was also essential for success. 
Unfortunately, when Gillmore arrived at his headquarters at 
Hilton Head, South Carolina, in mid-June, he found that the 
situation surrounding the command of the South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron meant that the navy's assistance was not 
forthcoming. Having already been informed he was to be 
relieved, Admiral DuPont did everything in his power to 
delay providing Gillmore any assistance, stating it would be 
unfair to do so because it would commit his successor to a 
course of action which he might not agree with. Gillmore 
found that other than complaining to his superiors in 
Washington, there was little that he could do but wait for 
DuPont's successor to arrive.5
After almost two years of what must have sometimes 
seemed like a vain struggle to escape his desk Job in 
Washington, Dahlgren longed for action. He did not have to 
wait long. On the day of his arrival at Port Royal on July 
4, he met with Gillmore. The General told Dahlgren that 
because the Confederate defenses on Morris Island were 
nearing completion that the campaign "must be tried now or
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it would be too late." Dahlgren agreed to "grant the aid 
asked," recording In his Journal that he felt that he had 
"no alternative" but to do so.6
Dahlgren met with Gi1lmore again the following day to 
find out exactly what the navy was expected to do. As has 
already been described, the army's plan called for an 
amphibious landing along the south end of Morris Island. To 
Gillmore, the entire operation hinged on transporting his 
troops safely across the Stono River Inlet in small boats. 
The navy's primary Job was to ensure that Confederate 
vessels from Charleston and Savannah could not get near the 
southern end of Morris Island. Of course the navy's role 
did not end once the army landed. As the army officers who 
originally proposed the Morris Island attack had pointed 
out, one of the great advantages of advancing along the 
barrier island was that the navy's Ironclads and gunboats 
would be in an ideal position to provide supporting 
artillery fire, both against any Confederate artillery 
positions and troops.7
Ironically, for all of the complaints that he had 
registered about the navy holding the army up, Gillmore 
informed Dahlgren that the army would not be ready until 
Wednesday, July 8. Dahlgren did not complain about this 
delay. If anything, even this date was too soon. As he 
confided in his journal, both he and his staff were "new to 
the squadron & locality," and there were numerous details to
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take care of before the navy could provide the requested 
aid. Alterations to strengthen the damaged monitors had to 
be stopped. The bar off of the Stono River inlet had to be 
buoyed to help the vessels navigate the tricky shallow 
waters safely . Additionally, each vessel called in to 
participate in the operation had to be replaced by another 
vessel to ensure the continued viability of the blockade 
along the rest of the coast for which Dahlgren's squadron 
was responsible. These preparations took time, and three 
days hardly seemed enough.®
Dahlgren's concerns about having enough time were 
alleviated somewhat on July 7 when General Gillmore 
unexpectedly informed him that the army could not be ready 
until Thursday, a day later than previously thought. Even 
though the extra day gave Dahlgren the peace of mind that 
the navy would definitely be in position, Dahlgren still 
worried about the timing of operations. The campaign as 
detailed relied on some measure of surprise. Dahlgren had 
been doing all he could to make sure that the navy did not 
give any clues to the enemy of the upcoming attack. For 
example, Dahlgren had been carrying out all of his 
preparations for the impending attack from Port Royal. 
Additionally, since he Intended to personally lead the navy 
operations, when Dahlgren left Port Royal on July 8, he left 
with as much secrecy as possible. This included leaving his 
admiral's flag flying over his flagship while he quietly
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headed south In a transport ship hoping that this would make 
It look like he was still at Port Royal.9
Unfortunately, Dahlgren's efforts to preserve secrecy 
were for nought. When making arrangements for the attack, 
Dahlgren had ordered that the participating vessels not 
normally stationed at Charleston should arrive after 
nightfall on July 8. But when Dahlgren arrived off 
Charleston that afternoon, some of the vessels were already 
there at anchor. So much for "obeying orders," he wrote 
disgustedly. Their presence only added to his anxiety, 
however. "Do wonder," he noted in his Journal, "if the many 
items of the plan will all work! and so wondering went to 
bed I tried to sleep!,] but in vain for the ship so groaned 
8, shook as the sea tossed her about, that I could not." He 
was still awake at 5 a.m. when a message from Gillmore was 
delivered stating that he had postponed the attack again.10
The long-awaited attack finally began early on July 10, 
when at 5:10 a.m. the army's masked batteries on the 
northern end of Folly Island unleashed a forty-seven gun 
barrage. Dahlgren and the navy were ready. Unlike his 
predecessor, who openly distained the monitors, Dahlgren 
intended to lead the navy operations from inside one of his 
squadron's two-gun Ironclads. Anticipating the attack, 
Dahlgren had raised his admiral's flag on the Catski11 at 4 
a.m. As soon as he heard the army's guns, he ordered the 
vessel to steam into action, the monitors Nahant. Montauk.
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and Weehawken following close behind. The sluggish monitors 
took more than an hour to manuever into position, and the 
navy's first contribution to the assault only came at 6:15. 
Due to the enfilading position that the vessels could take, 
however, their fire had an immediate and telling effect. 
Within minutes of the monitors' opening up, the men manning 
the Confederate batteries on the south end of Morris Island 
were forced to abandon their guns and could be seen running 
up the beach toward Fort Wagner.1*
With the Confederate guns now silenced by the monitors, 
the army's movement across the Stono River inlet began. A 
series of small sand hills near the end of Morris Island 
prevented Dahlgren and the navy from seeing the actual 
landing, but they knew the attack was underway from "the 
rattle of musketry." The tension created by not being able 
to see what was happening did not last long, because within 
minutes at least two regiments of Union troops were visible 
advancing up to the long flat section of the island.12
With the Union troops now in full view, the navy's role 
changed. "The Ironclads," Dahlgren wrote in his official 
report of the action, "moved parallel to the low, flat 
ground that extends northward from the sand hills toward 
Fort Wagner, and as near to it as the depth of water 
permitted, rolling shells in every direction over its 
surface to clear away any bodies of troops that might be 
gathered there." So far, everything had happened quickly
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and according to plan. It was Just 9 a.m. when the first 
Union troops reached the top of the sand hills; and at 9:30 
they were within a half-mile of Fort Wagner. As for the 
monitors, by this time they had closed to within 1200 yards 
of the Confederate fort and proceeded to shell it.13
Dahlgren did not know it at the time, but Gillmore had 
already called a halt to his operations. His troops, who 
had been up most of the previous few nights in preparation 
for the twice postponed attack, were exhausted by their 
effort. As Gillmore's men tried to recuperate in the 
intense heat of the July sun on the shadeless island, the 
four monitors maintained a heavy bombardment against Fort 
Wagner, finally withdrawing in the early evening after being 
in action for nearly fourteen hours.14
It had been a long, but exciting day for Dahlgren; “my 
first battle," he recorded proudly in his Journal. And he 
truly experienced it first hand. Undoubtedly because the 
Catski11 led the way, carried his admiral's flag aloft, and 
did most of the signalling, the Confederate gunners 
concentrated their gunfire against it. This was borne out 
by the damage reports of the four monitors: Weehawken zero 
hits received; Montauk struck twice; Nahant hit six times; 
Catski11 struck no less than sixty times. Moreover, many of 
the hits on the Catski11 were serious. As Dahlgren noted in 
his official report of the day's action, "Cwlhen these heavy 
shots struck, the concussion was very great, an officer ...
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touching the turret at such a time, was knocked down 
senseless and much injured." Dahlgren himself narrowly 
escaped a possibly fatal injury when a direct hit 
"dislodged" one of the bolts holding the iron plates 
together, sending it ricocheting around the narrow confines 
of the pilot house where he was standing. Despite these and 
many other injuries which he described as "very severe," 
Dahlgren reported that he was "most favorably impressed with 
the endurance of these Ironclads," a sentiment which 
tremendously pleased his superiors in the Navy Department.15
Dahlgren noted that he retired to his cabin "a weary 
man" the night of his first battle. He might have also 
noted that he was an uninformed man. That became obvious at 
about six a.m. the following morning when it was reported to 
Dahlgren that General Gillmore's forces had attacked Fort 
Wagner at daybreak. Not knowing about Gillmore's plan to 
attack, the monitors were not prepared for action when the 
fighting erupted at about 4 a.m. Listening to the sounds of 
battle, Dahlgren and his men could only speculate about what 
was taking place. Finally at about 9 o'clock Dahlgren 
received an official dispatch from Gillmore, stating that 
the army's assault had failed and requesting the monitors be 
brought in to bombard the rear of the Confederate fort to 
help prevent its reinforcement. Dahlgren quickly assented 
to Gillmore's request, and he again personally led the four 
monitors in "and peppered away at Wagner." He was, however.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2 7
more than a little annoyed with his army counterpart and in 
a rapidly penned note Dahlgren Informed Gi1lmore that the 
monitors could have assisted sooner if only the request had 
been made.16
Dahlgren finally learned something of Gillmore's 
Intentions the following morning, July 12, when the general 
visited him. Gillmore began by recounting the details of 
the previous morning's assault. The first column in the 
attack, Gillmore told Dahlgren, suffered more than fifty 
percent casualties. Simply ordering another frontal assault 
would more than likely result in a similar defeat, Gillmore 
noted, thus he decided to utilize the same tactics that had 
enabled his forces to land on Morris Island itself, a 
combined army and navy artillery barrage followed by an 
infantry assault.17
With Fort Wagner now the target, it was expected that 
the navy could play a much greater role than in the initial 
landing on Morris Island. That was because most of the 
army's guns were relatively light, 30-pounders and less, 
while the navy ironclads on the other hand, had much heavier 
guns, 11-lnch and larger. Moreover, because the vessels 
could take up an enfilading position along Wagner's weak 
ocean front, the navy's guns stood to do tremendous damage. 
Dahlgren only had one real concern. Dahlgren very much 
wanted to utilize as many of his squadron's large caliber 
guns as possible. Another monitor, the Nantucket. had only
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recently arrived, making five available. These five 
vessels, however, only carried a total of ten guns. The 
ship that he really wanted to utilize was the iron-sheathed 
frigate New Ironsides, the full broadside of which equalled 
that of the five monitors combined. The problem was that 
the ship drew so much water that it could only cross the bar 
off Charleston at exceptionally high tides, which occurred 
Just a few times each month. Just such a tide was due on 
July 15, but at the morning high tide the sea was too rough 
for the ship to cross. Dahlgren ordered the vessel to be 
lightened as much as possible for the evening high tide. He 
also expressed his concerns to Gillmore, telling him that if 
the ship could not cross the attack should be postponed from 
the scheduled day of July 16. By the afternoon, however, 
the wind abated, and with ship now lightened somewhat, it 
successfully crossed, touching bottom only once.18
With the New Ironsides across the bar, the navy was 
ready, but the army was not. Unable to complete all of its 
counter-batteries, late on July 15, Gillmore notified 
Dahlgren that the attack would have to be cancelled for a 
day. Then the weather proceeded to work against the Union 
operation. A series of heavy summer rainstorms typical of 
the southeast inundated the area, submerging the batteries 
already completed and slowing the progress on those still 
under construction. This forced a second postponement, the 
attack now being scheduled for July 18.19
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As had seemingly become the norm with the Morris Island 
campaign, the attack still did not begin when planned. A 
violent thunderstorm Just before daybreak on July 18 flooded 
the Union batteries again. As the army proceeded with the 
rather ironic task of having to bail themselves out, 
Dahlgren's forces waited. At 8:30, Gillmore signalled that 
he would be ready to move in no more than two hours. All of 
the navy's wooden gunboats which carried rifled pivot-guns 
thus went into action, firing from beyond the range of the 
Confederate smooth-bore guns of Fort Wagner. Dahlgren also 
ordered the ironclads to prepare for action. Unfortunately, 
not long after this Gillmore sent word that the rainstorms 
had soaked the gunpowder supplies for his artillery and he 
was then in the process of bringing up dry powder that he 
had in reserve. Normally, Gillmore probably would have 
postponed the attack until at least the next day. There 
were, however, a number of reasons not to do so. Every 
postponement enabled the Confederates to strengthen their 
position. Gillmore's growing sick list also indicated that 
his troops, already actively working for more than two 
weeks, were rapidly becoming exhausted, both physically and 
mentally. Therefore the attack, Gillmore informed Dahlgren, 
would commence at noon.2°
Dahlgren led the naval operations from one of the 
monitors. He boarded the Montauk shortly before noon and 
led a flotilla of six ironclads into position; one benefit
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of the army's delays was that repairs on the damaged monitor 
Pataosco were completed. Although the army's batteries had 
already opened fire before the ironclads were in position, 
the ships' enfilading position made their fire much more 
effective, and Dahlgren noted that "Ctlhe guns of the fort 
were soon over-crowed by the weight of metal and did not 
respond with spirit." Initially, an ebb-tide forced the 
ironclads to take a position about 1,200 yards from Wagner; 
but as the tide begin to flow Dahlgren took the vessels in 
closer to shore, finally anchoring the monitors about three 
hundred yards from the Confederate position. With obvious 
pride, Dahlgren described the scene. "Such a cracking of 
shells and thunder of cannon and flying of sand and earth 
into the air....the Fort was quiet, would not answer with a 
gun, indeed under such a fire it was very unsafe for a man 
to come out of the bomb-proofs. The gunnery," Dahlgren 
continued, "was very fine!,] the shells of the Ironsides 
going right over the Montauki,] so we had it all our own 
way."21
Confederate reports describing the bombardment 
supported Dahlgren's views, at least in part. General 
Beauregard called it "unparalleled, until this epoch of the 
siege, in the weight of projectiles thrown." 
Brigadier-General Taliaferro, commanding Confederate troops 
in Fort Wagner, wrote:
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With this Immense circle of fire by land and sea, 
he poured for eleven hours, without cessation or 
intermission, a storm of shot and shell upon Fort 
Wagner, which is perhaps unequaled in history. My 
estimation is that not less than 9,000 solid shot 
and shell of all sizes from XV-lnch downward, were 
hurled during this period at the work; the 
estimate of others is very much greater.
The concentrated artillery fire had relatively little 
Impact, however. With most of the defenders safely inside 
the fort's bomb-proof shelter, only eight men were killed 
and twenty wounded during the bombardment. The earthen fort 
itself also suffered only minor material damage. Even the 
massive 330 pound explosive shells from the monitor's 
fifteen-inch guns did little more than to displace some wet 
sand into the air, much of it simply settling back near its 
original location. Additionally, in anticipation of the 
bombardment, many of Wagner's light field-pieces had been 
buried under tons of sand, waiting to be exhumed when the 
artillery barrage ended and the expected infantry assault 
began. Of course, watching from the Union land batteries 
and naval vessels offshore, it would have been hard to 
believe that the concentrated bombardment had done so little 
actual damage, either to the fort or its defenders. Thus, 
Dahlgren was not at all surprised when near sunset he 
received a penciled note from Gillmore informing him that he 
had ordered an assault.22
Dahlgren described the events of the next few hours in 
his journal.
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[B3y the waning light we could see the masses 
coming along the beach, but the darkness shut them 
in ere they reached the Fort.— Presently came the 
flashes of light and the sharp rattle from musket 
& cannon[.] there could be no help from us for it 
was dark and we might kill friend as well as foe. 
All we could do was to look on and await an issue 
not in our control. The contest went on for an 
hour and Ca3 half, lapsed and then died out. It 
was over, but who had won. About 10 almost worn 
out, with exertion for 19 hours. I returned to my 
den in the "Dlnsmore" and there learned that our 
men had been repulsed with severe loss....The 
Gen.[era 13 has not force enough evidently.23
Dahlgren was not alone in feeling that the Army did not 
have enough men. With his force reduced a full one-third 
since the beginning of the campaign, Gillmore Informed 
General-in-Chief Hal leek that he required the immediate 
addition of "8,000 or 10,000 effective old troops" to 
continue the campaign. Believing that the recent Union 
successes at Vicksburg and Port Hudson would enable Hal leek 
to send him at least this many men, Gillmore closed: "I 
shall husband my strength until re-enforcements arrive."24
When Hal leek received Gillmore's request he became 
furious. "It is, to say the least, seriously embarrassing,1 
the general-ln-chlef fumed. He reminded Gillmore of the 
assurances that he made before the campaign began, 
especially his statement that no additional troops would be 
necessary. "Had it been supposed that you would require 
more troops," Hal leek continued in his rage, "the operations 
would not have been attempted with my consent or that of the 
Secretary of War."25
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Hal leek's statements show that the army high command in 
Washington had little Interest In either the Charleston 
campaign generally or the Morris Island campaign 
specifically. The same could not be said of the Navy 
Department. Fox had great expectations for the movement on 
Morris Island. After learning that Gillmore's forces had 
successfully landed on the south end of the barrier island, 
Fox boasted: "I ... got Gilmore [sic] sent down as a man who 
believed that Charleston could be taken and the result is 
that we have just learned that a brilliant lodgement was 
made on Morrisons [sic] Island." With this, Fox continued 
assuredly, "Dahlgren and Gilmore Csic3 will certainly take 
Char 1eston....The rebellion is going overboard fast."26
Dahlgren's report detailing the defeat at Fort Wagner 
elicited an entirely different response from the Navy 
Department. Dahlgren stated that "CwHth 20,000 men Fort 
Wagner would have been ours ... and then the rest must 
follow inevitably." Fox immediately went to see Hal leek and 
asked him to rush reinforcements to Gillmore. But as Welles 
recorded in his private diary, Hal leek brusquely responded 
that "if we [Fox and Welles] would take care of the Navy, he 
would take care of the Army." Welles and Fox refused to 
accept Hal leek's rebuff as the final answer. Instead, as 
Welles later recounted, "I went ... to the President with 
Dahlgren's dispatches; told him the force under Gillmore was 
insufficient for the work assigned; that it ought not now
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fail; that it ought not to have been begun unless it was 
understood his force was to have been increased; that such 
was his expectation, and I wished to know if it could not be 
done." Welles continued his plea for sending the 
reinforcements by arguing that "It would be unwise to wait 
until Gillmore was crushed and repelled, and then try and 
regain lost ground, which seemed to be the policy of General 
Hal leek; instead of remaining inactive til Gillmore, 
exhausted, cried for help. His wants should be 
anticipated."27
According to Welles, Lincoln "agreed with me fully."
Of this fact, no one could be surprised. After all, here 
was the President's friend Dahlgren, who was In Charleston 
in part because of the President's influence, asking for 
assistance. How could Lincoln refuse? Shortly thereafter 
it was announced that 5,000 additional men were being sent 
to reinforce General Gillmore. And while, as Welles noted, 
"I thought it should be 10,000 if we intended thorough work, 
... tlJ am glad even of this assurance."28
While the arrival of the first reinforcements on August 
1 was Indeed welcomed, their presence was no longer as 
crucial as Dahlgren and Gillmore had once assumed. That was 
because Gillmore had decided to change his plan of 
operations. Until the failure of the July 18 assault, he 
had believed that the capture of Fort Wagner would be a 
relatively simple task. This belief was reflected in his
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decision to attack at sunset. Afterward, Gillmore realized 
that the timing of the attack had been a mistake. The 
leading column managed to seize the southeast bastion of 
Fort Wagner Just as night fell. Gillmore noted that in the 
darkness the attackers were at a severe disadvantage.
Unable to distinguish attacker from defender, the Union's 
artillery, which was the greatest advantage that the Union 
forces enjoyed at Charleston, was forced to cease firing.
The attacking column had little choice but to fall back. 
Casulaties reflected the completeness of the defeat;
Gillmore lost more than 1,500 officers and men, the 
Confederates, 181.29
After two failed direct attacks, Gillmore decided not 
to order another. As he wrote wrote in his final report of 
the campaign, because "itihe demolition of Fort Sumter was 
the object in view" of securing Morris Island, "[tio save 
valuable time, it was determined to attempt the demolition 
of Fort Sumter from ground already in our possession." 
Gillmore's decision transformed the Union campaign into a 
siege. Major T. B. Brooks, who was in charge of the actual 
day-to-day engineering work on Morris Island, stated that 
after the failed second assault, the Department of the 
South's operations consisted of three components: first,
"Celstabllshment of defensive lines across Morris Island, in 
order to secure our 1odgement....[Second,] Construction of 
batteries employed in the demolition of Fort
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Sumter....[Th1rd,1 Execution of approaches and batteries 
against Fort Wagner."30
At the outset of operations Dahlgren had concentrated
much of his squadron at Charleston in order to provide as
much support to the army as possible. This had severely 
weakened the blockade up and down the entire south Atlantic 
coast, but Dahlgren had deemed this necessary because of the 
importance placed on capturing Charleston. Furthermore, it 
had been assumed that the campaign would be short-lived and
thus the blockade would be quickly restored to its former
strength. Now, however, there seemed no immediate prospect 
for returning the vessels to their stations, and this 
presented a real problem. Ironically, General Gillmore was 
probably the most upset about the situation. On July 22 he 
wrote to Dahlgren and expressed his concern about the 
concentration of vessels at Charleston. It was not the 
effect on the blockade that concerned him, but rather the 
loss of protective naval support for his troops scattered 
along the coast, especially at Port Royal.
The army's actual operations called for the 
construction of a series of parallels. They served two 
purposes. First, each parallel brought the Union line 
closer to Fort Wagner; when they were close enough the fort 
would ultimately become untenable. Each parallel was also 
designed to hold new artillery batteries, some of which were
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aimed at Fort Wagner, while others were for breaching Fort 
Sumter's gorge wal1.31
A pattern quickly developed. Working under the cover 
of darkness, the Union army slowly but steadily pushed its 
trenches forward. In turn, the navy provided around the 
clock support, suppressing Confederate artillery and sniper 
fire from Fort Wagner and helping to prevent a 
counter-attack. The most difficult and dangerous part of 
the operation was establishing the artillery batteries in 
the completed parallels. The first of these operations came 
in the early morning hours of July 24. Normally, Dahlgren 
alternated the ironclads in the daily firing against the 
Confederate positions in order to allow some of the members 
of the squadron to rest, but transporting the artillery 
across the open beach required that the Confederate guns be 
totally silenced. That morning all of the Dahlgren's 
ironclads were close inshore firing away, while the wooden 
gunboats participated in the bombardment from long range.
For nearly five hours, Dahlgren noted in his Journal, his 
squadron "CpDounded away Cat Fort Wagner,! scattering the 
sand, and silencing "the feeble reply it made."32
Completion of the second parallel brought the Union 
Army's entrenchments to within 870 yards of Fort Wagner and 
placed its long-range batteries "at a mean distance of 3,525 
yards from Fort Sumter." This was just the beginning step 
in the Army's siege operations. The work of pushing the
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lines forward continued, as did the pattern of nearly 
constant naval support.33
The siege tactics had enormous ramifications for 
Dahlgren and his squadron. The constant work quickly showed 
its effect, especially on the monitors. Dahlgren informed 
the Navy Department that while none of his monitors were so 
seriously damaged that they could not be repaired in a few 
weeks each at most, because of the constant need for their 
use he could not send them to Port Royal to have them 
repaired. He asked that the Navy Department exchange two 
undamaged monitors for two of his damaged vessels; in fact, 
Dahlgren suggested, why not send a third monitor as well?34
The officers and crews of the monitors showed the 
effects of the operations even more than the vessels did.
The working conditions Inside the poorly ventilated vessels 
were barely tolerable in the best of conditions, but in 
Charleston's summer heat, they became nearly unbearable. 
Temperatures inside the ironclad vessels soared, reaching as 
high as 140 degrees. Moreover, because the monitors were 
now kept inside the Charleston bar day and night, it was 
necessary to be prepared for a sudden attack at all times. 
This precluded the usual practice of allowing the crews to 
sleep on deck at night, which previously had at least 
provided some relief; and because the vessels were almost 
constantly engaged during the day, the awnings that each 
monitor was supplied with to provide shade, remained in
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storage. By late July, the officers and seamen of the 
ironclads were rapidly breaking down under the strain.
"[Tlhere is," Dahlgren informed the secretary of the navy,
"a diminution of officers from sickness and of men from 
expiration of terms and sickness, so that on the whole, 
without being discouraged or feeling unequal to the task, I 
have my hands full." The need for officers was especially 
acute. Two of the monitors did not have commanders, and a 
third was without an executive officer. In an effort to try 
and provide relief for the men on the monitors, Dahlgren 
requested that the Navy Department provide his squadron with 
an old, but large sailing vessel, which he proposed to use 
more or less like a hotel for the crews. In further 
recognition of the extreme conditions, Dahlgren argued that 
the men should receive bonus pay. Additionally, and in an 
ironic twist considering Dahlgren's participation in the 
navy's first grog-less ship, Dahlgren requested that the 
monitors be exempted from the navy's recently passed 
regulation ending the daily alcohol ration for seamen.35
Dahlgren showed the impact of the constant exertion in 
the hot Charleston weather as well. Never a hardy or robust 
man— about six feet tall he weighed about 130 pounds— in 
early August Dahlgren became so weak it was difficult for 
him to leave his bed. His daily journal during this period 
contains a litany of complaints of his ill-health, which he 
was convinced was due entirely to Charleston's weather.
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Undoubtedly contributing to his physical condition was the. 
fact that Dahlgren apparently suffered from a chronic case 
of seasickness. While he never admitted this personally, 
according to George F. Emmons, who was Dahlgren's Fleet 
Captain, "The Admiral was somewhat affected by motion of a 
vessel in a seaway....A sailor never likes to acknowledge 
this, nevertheless, a great many suffer more or less all 
their lives." To try and combat his condition, every night 
Dahlgren anchored his flagship in a protected anchorage. He
also found relief in another form. "Improved by frequent
but small drafts of ale on ice," Dahlgren recorded in his 
Journal, "and of a teaspoonful of Brandy on Ice with a sprig 
of Mint." Thus when the Navy Department rejected his 
request to provide the monitor crews with a whiskey ration, 
he not surprisingly reacted very angrily. "Mem.Corandum! 
from Bur.CeauI of Med. Heine! against Whiskey to the
crews.... Strange that persons who cannot know will judge of
people who must know. Wish the people at Wash.[ington! 
would try a day's labor in a Monitor." Ironically, Dahlgren 
himself recognized the Bureau of Medicine's reason for 
denying the request, namely that the "issue of whiskey ... 
proves a temporary comfort;" because after extolling the 
virtues of ale and brandy on his own health, he noted, 
"Nothing but will has kept me up— my head screams and I 
could hardly walk five minutes."36
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Of course, the army's operations were not affected by 
Dahlgren's physical condition. On August 9, the "third 
parallel" was opened, Just 540 yards from Fort Wagner. Work 
on the dozen artillery batteries aimed at Wagner and Sumter 
rapidly neared completion as well. Gillmore informed 
Dahlgren that all should be ready for the bombardment to 
begin on August 14. In keeping with the past history of the 
entire campaign, the bomabardment of Fort Sumter did not 
begin when planned because shortly before the scheduled 
attack the army's ordnance officer discovered that the 
powder supply for heavy guns was of "inferior and Irregular 
quality." Fortunately, a loan of gunpowder from the navy 
and the opportune arrival of a shipment of powder from the 
north made the delay a short one.37
The army was eventually ready by August 17. Even in 
ill-health, Dahlgren planned on participating in the first 
direct attack of Fort Sumter since DuPont's failure of April 
7. At 5:30 a.m., he raised his flag on the monitor 
Weehawken. which then led a flotilla of seven Union 
ironclads into battle. Since the first order of business 
was to silence Fort Wagner in order to allow all of the 
army's land batteries to engage Fort Sumter, Dahlgren 
anchored about 1,000 yards "abreast of Wagner" and opened 
fire, and the other Ironclads quickly followed the 
flagship's lead. At first, Dahlgren noted in his staff 
Journal, the Confederate gunners in Fort Wagner responded
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"very rapidly!,] ... using every conceivable form of 
projectile imaginable, from a Minle' ball to a solid X-lnch 
shot." But soon, he noted with obvious satisfaction, the 
combined firepower of the ironclad fleet became so Intense 
that "Fort Wagner was covered by a cloud of dust and smoke," 
and the fort grew silent.38
With Fort Wagner silenced, Dahlgren turned his 
attention to Fort Sumter. In an incredibly Ironic twist, 
Dahlgren abandoned his own ordnance technology when he 
transferred his flag to the monitor Passalc because it was 
armed with a rifled Parrott gun Instead of the usual Xl-lnch 
Dahlgren gun that most of the monitors carried. He knew, as 
did most other commanders, that the longer range Parrott gun 
enabled the Passaic to engage Fort Sumter from a distance 
where the enemy's fire would pose less risk. Dahlgren 
anchored the Passaic, along with the Patapsco which was also 
armed with a rifled Parrott gun, some 2,000 yards from 
Sumter and opened fire. For nearly two hours the two 
monitors maintained a steady long range barrage and Dahlgren 
noted that from the very first shot not a single one missed 
the target.39
The question of the safety of the monitors was shown to 
be more than just an idle abstraction that day. When 
Dahlgren ordered the Passa1c and Patapsco to withdraw to 
allow the crews to get some rest, he learned that during the 
attack on Fort Wagner earlier that morning, one of his
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monitor commanders, Captain George W. Rodgers who commanded 
the Catski11. was killed when a shot struck the top of the 
pilot house. The shot broke the roof's Iron plates, driving 
parts of them into the pilot house, where they struck and 
killed Rodgers, along with another of his officers.40
Dahlgren reported the death of Rodgers as the "one sad 
exception" in what had otherwise been a great beginning in 
the Union's effort to destroy Fort Sumter. As both he and 
Gillmore noted in communications to each other, the day's 
bombardment had "greatly damaged" the Confederate fort. But 
both officers also thought that the key to ultimate success 
was to maintain the attack until Sumter was completely 
destroyed; and in the evening of August 17, Dahlgren and 
Gillmore agreed to "the same programme for to-morrow that we 
had to-day.
In the days following, the bombardment continued and 
Fort Sumter's brick walls quickly began to disintegrate 
under the constant fire. Dahlgren closely monitored the 
destruction. Each day he boarded one of the ironclads and 
"steamed up to take a look at Sumter." On August 19, the 
third day of the bombardment, Dahlgren noted that Sumter's 
gorge wall was "pretty well used up, but not breached." By 
the following day, however, Dahlgren stated that Sumter's 
outer brick work on the gorge wal1 was "beaten in at the top 
and below it so as to make visible the arches within."
After five days of constant bombardment, Dahlgren reported:
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"Sumter Is now completely dilapidated at the Gorge & many 
shells have gone throiugh] the farther walls." General 
Beauregard reported pessimistically to Richmond: "West and 
northwest scarp walls of Sumter badly shattered by reverse 
fire of enemy's 200-pounder Parrott guns and iron-clad 
fleet....Batteries are disabled. Gorge wall damaged.... Fa11 
of Sumter now only a question of time."42
Both Dahlgren and Gillmore wanted to make sure that 
Beauregard's prediction came true, and the sooner the 
better. In the evening of August 21, Gillmore sent the 
following letter to Beauregard:
I have the honor to demand of you the 
immediate evacuation of Morris Island and Fort 
Sumter....The present condition of Fort Sumter and 
the rapid and progressive destruction which it is 
undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its 
complete demolition within a few hours a matter of 
certainty....
Should you refuse compliance with this 
demand, or should I receive no reply thereto 
within four hours ... I shall open fire on the 
city of Charleston....
When no answer was received, the one-gun battery which 
Glllmore's engineers had erected in the marshlands to the 
west of Morris Island, opened fire. Some illustration of 
the magnitude of the North's hatred toward Charleston was 
illustrated by the bombardment on Charleston Itself. Not 
only did the "Swamp Angel," the name which the Union gunners 
gave to the gun, open fire at 1:30 in the morning, it also 
utilized incendiary projectiles known as "Greek Fire" rather
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than conventional projectiles. Fortunately for the citizens 
of Charleston, the "Swamp Angel" burst after firing only 
thirty-six times and the army did not attempt to place 
another gun In the marshlands.43
The same day that Gillmore demanded Sumter's surrender, 
Dahlgren also tried his hand at causing the fall of the 
Confederate fort. Dahlgren called his ironclad commanders 
together and explained his intention to attack Sumter that 
night, the advantage being that under the cover of darkness 
the vessels would make difficult targets for the enemy's 
gunners. But Dahlgren found that his subordinates had "[nlo 
particular zeal" for a night attack. Captain Stephen Rowan 
who commanded the difficult to maneuver New Ironsides voiced 
the loudest protest against the operation. This was 
understandable. His vessel had a much greater draft than 
the monitors and would be very susceptible to grounding in 
the shallow waters near Sumter. Despite the obvious lack of 
confidence, Dahlgren ordered the attack anyway. From the 
first, everything went wrong. When Dahlgren went to board 
the Weehawken. he found the monitor still at anchor. Even 
worse, not a single one of the other ironclads "was to be 
seen." After losing half an hour gathering his ironclad 
fleet together, Dahlgren ordered the operation to begin. As 
badly as the operation had started, things became even 
worse, and Dahlgren described it in his private journal.
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Just as I was abreast of [Battery] Gregg, all 
wel1, comes the Scout and says the Passaic is 
aground. So here Is a nice mess— took instant 
measures,— but so much time had been lost by the 
time she was off and I knew it, that there was too 
little of the night left. So I had to abandon the 
attempt. Very vexatious. Too little interest 
felt in the proceedings, that is the trouble.44
The "catastrophe," as he described the poorly executed 
night attack in his private Journal, frustrated Dahlgren.
The next day he wrote to Secretary Welles and complained 
that while "the shore batteries [had] ... ravaged Sumter," 
he lacked the means necessary to complete the job. Not only 
did he not have enough ironclads, according to Dahlgren, 
those that he did have were worn out. This was due to the 
lengthy Joint operations on Morris Island. "[TJhe calls 
from shore," he complained, "tax me heavily, for the 
trenches can not be advanced nor even the guns [in the shore 
batteries be] kept in play, unless the ironclads keep down 
Wagner, and yet in doing so the power of the ironclads is 
abated proportionately. Please," Dahlgren pleaded, "send me 
ironclads."45
Dahlgren expressed his concerns to Gillmore as well. 
After receiving what had become a routine request for the 
navy to silence Fort Wagner, Dahlgren responded sharply, "I 
will be glad to do [so]. It should be understood, however, 
that this course is likely to expend the force of the 
Ironclads so as to render other active operations on my part 
impossible." Dahlgren pointed out that the army's constant
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requests for the protective fire of the monitors were 
wearing his squadron out, both vessels and crews. Because 
of this, he warned the General, even "if Sumter and Wagner 
are reduced" the navy might not be able to take advantage of 
the situation.46
Dahlgren's concerns were indeed legitimate. While the 
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron had seven monitors, one 
was more or less permanently stationed outside Savannah to 
prevent the Confederate Ironclad in that port from venturing 
forth. Another was then at Port Royal repairing, and the 
Superintendent of Monitor Repairs estimated that at least 
twenty-four days were required to complete them. Of the 
remaining five monitors, three had use of only one guns, 
which Dahlgren noted, left Just two "entirely complete."
The irony of this, Dahlgren pointed out to Gillmore, was 
that while he was now expected to what DuPont had failed to 
do back in April, his squadron was so weakened by the almost 
two month long operation that it did not even compare with 
the force that Admiral DuPont had then. Despite the 
problems with the monitors, Dahlgren had little alternative 
but to provide Gillmore and his troops the protection that 
the general requested. Dahlgren thus ordered three of his 
Ironclads to silence Fort Wagner. And while Dahlgren surely 
would have been comforted if he had been privy to the 
Confederate report stating that Wagner's gunners once again 
had to seek refuge in the fort's bombproof to escape the
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"destructive" enfilading fire of the Union warships, he was 
even more concerned about the impact that the activity would 
have on his planned operations against Sumter set for that 
n i gh t .47
Despite having had half of his ironclads firing at Fort 
Wagner for most of the afternoon, Dahlgren decided to go 
ahead with a second consecutive night attack. And while 
this one went better, it was hardly a stellar success. 
Boarding the Weehawken at 11 p.m., Dahlgren did not fire the 
first shot until 3 a.m. The long delay had two causes. As 
always, the monitors were slow and difficult to maneuver 
into position. Navigation was further complicated this 
night by a heavy fog, which at times completely obscured
Fort Sumter from view and forced the Ironclad gunners to aim
"by direction of stars." When Dahlgren finally ordered the
five monitors to withdraw at 7 a.m., they had managed to
fire a paltry seventy-one rounds, which Dahlgren described 
in a wonderful understatement, "was less than should have 
been."48
After two consecutive days and nights of around the 
clock operations, Dahlgren and his Ironclad crews were 
completely exhausted. Dahlgren thus considered it more than 
"acceptable" when Sunday, August 23, proved "a quiet day." 
The main reason for the quietness was that the Union army's 
bombardment was winding down. After seven days of constant 
day and night bombardment, the army's thirteen long-range
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guns aimed at Fort Sumter had fired off more than 5,000 
rounds weighing more than half a million pounds. Adding to 
this total were about one thousand additional rounds 
expended by the navy's own four-gun battery on Morris 
Island, as well as the contributions from the navy's 
Ironclads and gunboats. 611lmore's chief of artillery 
reported that due to the unparalleled bombardment, Sumter's 
gorge wall was "almost a complete mass of ruins." Moreover, 
from his long distance Inspections of the fort, he believed 
that only one gun was still serviceable. "ITlhe destruction 
of the fort," he continued, "is so far complete that it is 
today of no avail in the defense of the harbor of Charleston 
harbor. By a longer fire, it can be made more completely a 
ruin and a mass of broken masonry, but could scarcely be 
more powerless for the defense of the harbor." He concluded 
that it made no sense to continue the shelling.49
Sumter's destruction began a new phase for the Union 
operations. As had been discussed months earlier in 
Washington it was now up to the navy to take the lead, which 
Dahlgren seemed intent on doing. The same day that the 
Union bombardment of Sumter ended, Dahlgren wrote to 
Secretary of the Navy Welles, "I propose passing Sumter into 
the harbor." While Dahlgren's statement made it appear that 
getting past Fort Sumter was a relatively simple task, he 
realized that this was not the case. His biggest concern 
was the line of obstructions that the Confederates had
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erected in the ship channel between Fort Sumter and Fort 
Moultrie, The obstructions, Dahlgren added as a caveat in 
his report to Welles, might be "of such a nature as to 
prevent" his ironclads from reaching Charleston's inner 
harbor.50
The obstructions were an obvious source of anxiety for 
Dahlgren. He was thus not very upset when severe weather on 
August 24th and 25th forced him to cancel any attempt at 
running past Fort Sumter. The delay gave him time to 
develop a plan for dealing with the obstructions, which he 
detailed to his officers on August 26. The nighttime 
operation called for the monitors and New Ironsides to head 
toward Fort Sumter and open fire. This time, however, their 
bombardment would only serve as a diversion. While the 
ironclads were occupying the attention of the Confederate 
gunners, a small steam tug would tow a detachment of small 
boats up to the line of obstructions. Once there, the men 
in the boats, all of whom were "volunteers for a special 
service", were to use "tackles, straps, fishhooks, ... saws, 
augers, cold chisels, hammers" and a host of other devices 
to try to make an opening in the obstructions large enough 
to allow the monitors "to move up to Rebellion Road."5*
Dahlgren recognized that he could not plan for every 
eventuality. "The general idea alone can be sketched," he 
noted in his orders; "the rest must be left to the coolness 
and Judgement of commanding officers to meet with unexpected
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events." What he did not write, but perhaps should have, 
was that some eventualities could not be overcome even with 
"coolness and Judgement." That was demonstrated that 
evening when the plan was put into operation. Starting out 
at about 9 p.m., which was an hour later than Dahlgren had 
stipulated, the monitors and other vessels were opposed by 
extremely strong currents, greatly slowing their progress. 
Then "Ctlhe weather which had been threatening," Dahlgren 
reported in his account of the affair, "became very bad, 
blowing and raining violently." In the dark and rain 
everything became a mass of confusion. The officer In 
charge of cutting the obstructions reported that while he 
had gotten near the obstacles In the water, the current near 
Sumter was "like a sluice," preventing him from getting any 
closer. This settled matters. At about 2:30 a.m., Dahlgren 
ordered his ships back. He wrote despondently in his 
journal, "raining incessantly, and as dismal a night as one 
would wish to see."52
This first aborted attempt at getting by the 
obstructions was also the last one that Dahlgren's forces 
made. The following night Dahlgren cancelled the proposed 
operation when a mixup in the deployment of his squadron's 
vessels led to the one steam tug that was suited for towing 
the small boats up to the obstructions being sent outside 
the Charleston bar Just prior to the sceduled operation.
"If I attend not to every detail," Dahlgren recorded in
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disgust In his Journal, "thus things go." The forecast for 
bad weather the next day caused another cancellation. Then 
on August 29, it was reported to Dahlgren "that Sumter has 
fired several shots." That settled matters as far as 
Dahlgren was concerned, and he bluntly told General 
Gillmore: "My movement is postponed.115^
Dahlgren's decision led to an acrimonious exchange with 
Gillmore. As soon as the general learned of the reason for 
Dahlgren cancelling his operations, he telegraphed Dahlgren 
that the army's lookouts, who were "specially directed" to 
watch for ordnance fire from Sumter, were "positive" that 
"Sumter has not fired a shot to-day." Dahlgren Immediately 
signalled back to Gillmore that while the army's lookouts 
might "be correct," he had received reports to the contrary. 
According to Dahlgren, the navy's "operations were based on 
the supposition that Sumter was silenced," and clearly in 
his mind this meant totally and completely silenced. Since 
Sumter may have fired a shot, this meant that the navy's 
operations were cancelled.54
Even if Dahlgren was correct that several shots had 
been fired from Fort Sumter, his decision to cancel the 
operations aimed at breaking the Confederate obstructions 
seems unwarranted. Dahlgren readily admitted in his reports 
to Washington that Sumter no longer posed a serious 
offensive threat. On the other hand, the report of ordnance 
fire from the fort may have provided Dahlgren a convenient
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excuse not to deal with the obstructions personally. 
Throughout the Civil War, Union navy officers exhibited an 
absolute dread of underwater obstructions because of the 
recent Introduction of explosive devices, then called 
torpedoes, now called mines. Time after time Union naval 
operations were stymied by torpedoes, real and imagined; and 
Farragut's "Damn the torpedoes! ... go ahead!" speech at 
Mobile Bay in August 1864, was certainly one of the few 
exceptional examples of aggressive action by the Union navy 
in the face of torpedoes. While certainly not lacking in 
personal bravery, as he exhibited constantly by leading the 
monitors into battle time after time, Dahlgren never 
exhibited any aggressiveness with the obstructions. In 
fact, a more scientific approach was his response to the 
torpedoes, which was not at all surprising considering his 
scientific background. For example, the first time that any 
of his vessels were confronted by torpedoes, Dahlgren 
requested that the navy construct submarines with explosive 
devices attached to their bows. "With such a contrivance," 
Dahlgren wrote, "a quantity of powder could be brought to 
bear upon obstructions which would dislocate any nice 
arrangements." Furthermore, the day prior to cancelling the 
operations against the obstructions, Dahlgren Informed 
Secretary Welles that he had been approached by someone who 
proposed removing the obstructions, if the navy provided a
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contract to do so. "I am willing," Dahlgren told Welles,
"to recommend such an agreement."55
It was also possible that Dahlgren/s physical condition 
may have been influencing him to make less than a whole 
hearted attempt to breach the obstructions. His health 
deteriorated dramatically In late August. On August 26, the 
day of the first attempt against the obstructions, Dahlgren 
wrote in his Journal, "I was so feeble that I could hardly 
rise from the chair and walk across the room." Two days 
later he made an extremely dark appraisal of his condition. 
"CMyl debility increases so that to-day it Is an exertion to 
sit in a chair. I feel like lying down. My head is light.
I do not see well. How strange, no pain, but so feeble that 
it seems like gliding away to death. How easy it seems.
Why not[?3" he asked in conclusion, "to one whose race is 
run?" Whatever explained his decision, Dahlgren was not 
going to order another attack against the obstructions. 
Instead he asked Gillmore to resume the army's bombardment 
of Fort Sumter from Morris Island.56
Dahlgren did not explicitly state what had to happen 
before he would renew the navy's efforts to get past Fort 
Sumter into Charleston's inner harbor. Gillmore probably 
believed that once it was demonstrated that Fort Sumter did 
not have any guns mounted, the navy would resume their 
operations against the obstructions. Therefore, even though 
he disagreed with Dahlgren, Gillmore again ordered his
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batteries to open up against Fort Sumter in order to 
dismount any guns that still remained. The army's 
bombardment began on the morning of August 30, but bad 
weather prevented the navy from participating until the 
evening of September 1. Thus uncertainty remained about 
whether or not the fort had been completely silenced. After 
the navy finally Joined the attack, all that Gillmore wanted 
to know was if the monitors had been fired upon from Sumter. 
When he was told that they had not been, he undoubtedly 
assumed that Dahlgren would once again begin to operate 
against the obstructions.57
Dahlgren had no intention of doing this, however. He 
now reported to Secretary of the Navy Weiles that even 
though Fort Sumter was "almost entirely disabled,"
Charleston could not be captured until Fort Sumter itself 
was occupied by Union forces. The navy could not move 
against the fort because of the obstructions. The Army was 
not able to occupy the fort because they had not yet 
captured Fort Wagner. But all was not lost. According to 
Dahlgren, the army was close to capturing Fort Wagner and 
thus he decided to assist Gillmore in a final push to do 
so.58
The need to occupy Fort Sumter was a major change in 
the Union's military plans. Until this point, it had been 
thought that it would only be necessary to silence the 
Confederate fort. Dahlgren, however, had clearly come to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
256
believe that his vessels could not get past the obstructions 
which blocked the ship channel between Fort Sumter and Fort 
Moultrie. But if Fort Sumter were occupied by Union 
forces— which Dahlgren believed would be the natural 
consequence of capturing Fort Wagner— it would not be 
possible for the Confederates to maintain the line of 
obstructions that they had established. Then, the Union 
ironclads would be able to steam directly into the inner 
harbor and capture Charleston itself.
Even when the focus of the Union campaign had shifted 
after the first bombardment of Fort Sumter ended on August 
23, Gillmore and the army had not stopped trying to capture 
Fort Wagner. Utilizing the same method of advancing its 
trenches that it had been using since mid-July, by September 
3, the army's lines were no more than seventy yards from the 
front of Wagner itself. Still, the capture of the fort was 
not a foregone conclusion. To protect Wagner, its defenders 
had burled hundreds of explosive land mines directly in 
front of the fort, which threatened to disrupt a frontal 
ground assault. But with all of the navy's ironclads 
working in conjunction with the army's heavy artillery, it 
was hoped that the troops in Wagner could be driven out.59
From September 3 onward, the Union artillery, army and 
navy, focused primarily on Fort Wagner. Hour after hour, 
day after day, shot and shell rained down on the Confederate 
fort. Unlike previous bombardments which had little impact
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on either the fort or its defenders, now the Union guns 
worked with deadly accuracy. On September 5th alone, of the 
900 soldiers that defended Wagner, 100 were listed as 
casualties because of the day's bombardment. The fate of 
Fort Wagner was now clear; and on the morning of September 
6, General Beauregard ordered the evacuation of Wagner, to 
take place that night.60
The Confederate's evacuation surprised the Union 
forces. In fact, Gillmore had planned to assault Fort 
Wagner the very next morning, September 7. Obviously this 
was no longer necessary; instead, Gillmore reported 
euphorically to Dahlgren, "Ctlhe whole of Morris Island is 
ours."6 *
The Union's campaign had been predicated on the 
assumption that once Morris Island fell, Fort Sumter would 
also fall. Therefore, as soon as he received Gillmore's 
message, Dahlgren demanded that General Beauregard surrender 
Fort Sumter, telling him that the fort was "no longer 
defensible." If the fort was not surrendered, he warned, "I 
shall move at once on It." Beauregard had a decidedly 
different opinion about the importance of Morris Island to 
Fort Sumter's defense. Refusing to surrender Sumter, 
Beauregard tersely told Dahlgren that he "must take it and 
hold it if he can." Dahlgren immediately began to prepare 
to attack Sumter. Unfortunately, as events would quickly 
demonstrate, the attack which followed would be one of the
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most ill-conceived, and poorly executed operations to occur 
during the entire Civil W a r . g 2
Dahlgren thought that it would be easy to take Sumter. 
When Commander T. H. Stevens protested his last minute 
assignment to lead the attack, Dahlgren admonished him, 
“'There is nothing but a corporal's guard in the fort, and 
all we have to do is to go and take possession [of it].'" 
Dahlgren's statement was not just false bravado intended to 
inspire a hesitant officer. He really believed what he 
said. This was reflected in his plan of attack, which 
consisted of little more than landing some four hundred 
marines and seamen in small boats right at the base of Fort 
Sumter. Armed only with muskets, bayonets, and side arms, 
the troops would then simply storm what Dahlgren believed 
was a defenseless fort, and Sumter would be in Union 
hands.63
Dahlgren planned the attack for the night of September 
8, and he spent most of that day "arranging" the details.
The biggest problem, at least so it seemed to Dahlgren at 
the time, was securing enough boats to transport his men to 
Sumter. That morning Dahlgren asked Gillmore to return some 
of the navy boats and crews that had been assisting various 
army operations, telling the General, "I am organizing an 
expedition for to-night."64
Dahlgren's request initiated a remarkable exchange 
between the two Union commanders. Not knowing about
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Dahlgren's plans, Gillmore had also arranged to attack 
Sumter that night. The General thus wrote back to Dahlgren, 
"There should be but one commander in an operation of this 
kind, to Insure success and [to! prevent mistakes. I have 
designated two small regiments. Will your party join with 
them," Gillmore asked, "[with] the whole to be under the 
command of the senior officer, or will the parties confer 
together and act in concert? The former method," Gillmore 
closed, "is much the best. What do you say?"®®
For many Northerners, Fort Sumter was the most visible 
symbol of the detested Confederacy. Undoubtedly, whoever 
captured it would be immediately blanketed with accolades. 
Dahlgren's lifelong quest for personal glory knew no bounds. 
Having spent all of his professional life trying to cover 
himself with fame, Dahlgren was not going to share the 
credit for capturing Fort Sumter. He told Gillmore that he 
had no intention of making the attack on Sumter a joint 
navy-army operation. Furthermore, to insure that it was the 
navy, and thus himself, that received the credit for the 
operation, Dahlgren told Gillmore that he was prepared to 
assign as high a ranking officer as he had to in order to 
insure that he out-ranked any army officer that Gillmore 
placed in charge.66
Gillmore expressed incredulity at Dahlgren's response. 
He reminded Dahlgren that the most important point of the 
attack was capturing the fort, not who planted "our flag
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over it." Dahlgren was firmly committed to having the navy 
alone capture Fort Sumter, however. He demanded to know 
when Gillmore planned to attack. Not receiving an answer 
quickly enough, Dahlgren telegrammed testily to Gillmore, "I 
am waiting. "67
Dahlgren apparently became so worried Gillmore and the 
army would beat him to the punch that he decided to attack 
without ever learning Glllmore's intentions. His force 
found itself unprepared and untrained for the task at hand. 
Landing at the base of Sumter/s walls, they lacked equipment 
to scale the walls. Even worse, they found themselves 
facing a well-armed and alerted enemy. As soon as the Union 
attack was detected, the troops Inside Sumter launched 
signal flares and the Confederate batteries surrounding the 
fort began to fire at the defenseless boats. Meanwhile, the 
troops in Sumter who had been anticipating the attack threw 
hand grenades down at the disorganized Union sailors. The 
attack quickly deteriorated into bedlam, and the few 
officers who actually landed tried to call a hasty retreat. 
But for many, it was already too late. Of the 400 men that 
made up the original force, less than 300 returned.68
Believing that the attack could not fail, Dahlgren 
apparently planned to go into Sumter himself. He was close 
at hand to witness the attack. His boat was about 
one-quarter of a mile away when he heard "the fire of 
musketry from Sumter." Then, Dahlgren later recorded in his
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Journal, "Moultrie opens— the affair of short duration and 
my Impression ... not favorable. Moultrie," he continued, 
"fired like a devil. The shells breaking around me and 
screaming in chorus." Dahlgren did not wait around "to see 
how the matter ended;" instead he gave the order to return 
to his flagship. But Dahlgren's boat got caught in the 
strong currents of the harbor. Lacking a rudder, it proved 
difficult to maneuver the small craft and at one point the 
boat came very near being swept over the breakers at the bar 
and into the open ocean. But finally, after hours of hard 
pulling at the oars, Dahlgren's boat reached one of the 
blockading vessels anchored just inside the Charleston 
bar.69
The boat attack was a disaster and Dahlgren knew there 
was no good way to explain it. The next day he reported 
simply to Welles, "I regret to say that an attempt to 
assault Sumter last night was unsuccessful. Our column was 
repulsed with loss."70
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Chapter VII
A Bitter End
"It would not be easy to say how I received an order so 
unjust in its nature....And yet there is no appeal from the 
pleasure of this poor old imbecile [Wellesl."
The capture of Fort Sumter was to be the capstone of
Dahlgren's career. While exceedingly proud of both his 
promotion to rear-admiral and his appointment to command the 
important South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, neither 
accomplishment completed his lifelong quest for personal 
glory and greatness. The only way to achieve his goal was 
to win a great victory in battle. But rather than providing 
the climactic conclusion to his long and arduous struggle to
be seen as a naval hero, the failed boat attack proved to be
the beginning of a rather anti-climactic conclusion to both 
Dahlgren's Civil War and navy careers.
Immediately following the failure to take Fort Sumter 
by storm it appeared that Dahlgren would continue an 
aggressive campaign to capture Charleston. But it quickly 
became clear that he had no intention of renewing the navy's 
campaign against either Fort Sumter or Charleston, at least 
with the forces that he then had under his command. On
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September 24, Dahlgren wrote to Fox and asked him if the 
Navy Department intended for him "to make the final attack 
with the seven monitors" he presently had in his squadron.
A few days later Dahlgren wrote to Welles. "I could offer 
no assurance," he told the secretary of the navy, "that an 
attack with seven monitors could yield, with certainty, such 
a result as the Department might deem desirable. On the 
other hand," Dahlgren continued, "if a reserve of five 
monitors could be had, ... there would be every reason to 
look for success."1
Dahlgren's boat attack fiasco and subsequent request 
for reinforcements nearly equal in size to the force that he 
already had was exactly the type of thing which normally 
resulted in a commanding officer being removed from his 
post. When Secretary Welles learned about the failed 
assault, he noted rather disgustedly in his diary, "it had 
been a hasty and not very thoroughly matured movement." He 
further said of Dahlgren, while "intelligent," he was "out 
of place" and could "better acquit ... [himself] as tan] 
ordnance officer ... than in active command." But while 
Welles's private appraisal of both the attack and Dahlgren 
were quite harsh, his public reaction was very different.
He told Dahlgren that the Navy Department had "confidence" 
in his "Judgement, firmness, and discretion," not to mention 
his "skill and bravery." Welles's official praise of 
Dahlgren stood in stark contrast to his private assessment.
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It was also clear from his official correspondence with 
Dahlgren that Welles had no Intention of removing him from 
his command. But, why not? The answer was really quite 
simple. Just as when he was originally appointed to command 
the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Dahlgren was still 
the officer best suited for serving the Navy Department's 
interests. Those interests had changed dramatically, 
however.2
In large part, the Navy Department had sent Dahlgren to 
Charleston because he promised to use the monitors 
aggressively. The importance of this promise, besides 
having the obvious potentiality of destroying and capturing 
the most hated city in the South, was that it would aid 
Welles and Fox in their ongoing controversy with Admiral 
DuPont, who blamed the monitors for his failure to capture 
Charleston. Elizabeth Blair Lee, who was in close contact 
with both Welles and Fox, saw firsthand the Navy 
Department's effort to have Dahlgren succeed as a way of 
dealing with DuPont. In August 1863, she wrote to her 
husband Samuel Phillips Lee, who commanded the Union navy's 
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron:
There is evidently a desire on the part of the 
[Navy] Dep[ar]tlment]— to give Dahlgren (who is no 
favorite— but has the ear & control[,] so says 
Fox[,] of Congress) no room for any complaint on 
any score— and then DuPont is on the other side 
bent upon defeat of our operations at Charleston 
by way of self Justification— so the Depart.Cment] 
is in a tight place 8. evidently is oblivious of
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all Its duties save those at Charleston as 
thro'[ugh 3 these two Admirals it is on a sort of 
trial before the public— Brother [Postmaster 
General Montgomery Blair] made this remark to me 
some weeks since— & evidently thought that Fox's 
sickness was caused by his intense excitement 8< 
labor over this matter 8. he evidently feels slaked 
upon the issue which DuPont has made with him 
personally. He never talks to me five minutes in 
the last two months without getting on this DuPont 
fight with the Dep[ar]t[ment] —  in which it is 
evident that both he & Welles have become very 
bi tter.3
Dahlgren, of course, had not managed to capture 
Charleston. But even in defeat, Dahlgren continued to serve 
Welles's and Fox's interests; in fact, keeping Dahlgren in 
command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was more 
important than ever. That was because DuPont's attack on 
the Navy Department began to take shape by the late summer.
Leading the assault on the Navy Department was Henry 
Winter Davis. The powerful Radical Republican congressman 
from Maryland was not at all interested in the technical 
merits of the Union navy's ironclads, but he thought he 
could use the issue to attack President Lincoln and the 
moderate members of the Cabinet, which included Welles, who 
favored a conservative approach to reconstruction. Davis, 
like Chase and Stanton, supported a drastic plan requiring 
the abolition of slavery before a state could be considered 
for readmission into the Union, and an acknowledgement that 
the ultimate authority on reconstruction was the Congress, 
not the President.4
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Fortunately for Welles and Fox, they apparently had 
very precise information about DuPont's and Davis's 
intentions; in fact, it appears that they may have even 
known what documents the latter planned to use against them. 
Welles and Fox defended themselves accordingly, and central 
to their defense was Admiral Dahlgren.5
Their strategy worked brilliantly. When DuPont and 
Davis finally unleashed their attack on the monitors in the 
fall, Welles and Fox were ready with dozens of reports.
Among the most important were those written and compiled by 
Dahlgren. As the commanding officer of essentially the same 
fleet of Ironclads that DuPont had commanded earlier, 
Dahlgren's favorable opinions about the monitors and the New 
Ironsides carried enormous importance. Furthermore, in a 
debate which the Navy Department successfully framed in 
technical terms, Dahlgren's reputation as a techlcal genius 
only made his testimony more damning to DuPont's arguments, 
and thus much more important to the Navy Department's 
defense.5
The ongoing struggle between the Navy Department and 
DuPont over the qualities of the monitors, which was really 
a struggle between the moderate Lincoln administration and 
its Congressional enemies, dragged on for months. It 
culminated, more or less, in late spring 1864, when the Navy 
Department published its, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navv in Relation to Armored Vessels. Of course, the
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importance of Dahlgren to their case meant Welles and Fox 
had to live with his decision not to renew the attack on 
Charleston without the addition of at least five more 
monitors. Unfortunately, as Welles noted in his response to 
Dahlgren's request in the fall 1863, construction of the new 
monitors was far behind schedule. At best, the Navy 
Department could send four more monitors to Charleston by 
early December. The navy's campaign to take Charleston 
would have to w a i t . ?
Although no one knew it at the time, what was 
supposedly a temporary postponement of the navy's campaign 
against Charleston eventually became permanent. Various 
problems continued to plague the navy's ironclad 
construction program, pushing the completion of the vessels 
Dahlgren said he needed well into 1864. But when the new 
monitors were finally completed, they were not sent to 
Charleston. By then, Grant had been appointed the army's 
general - in-chief and he was able to convince the Lincoln 
administration to have all of the Union's forces, with the 
exception of Porter and Banks in the Red River campaign in 
Louisiana, work together in a series of coordinated 
campaigns. The capture of Charleston did not figure into 
Grant's overall strategic plans. When the monitors were 
finally completed, they were sent to the Gulf Squadron. 
There, Farragut used them to enter Mobile Bay. In sharp 
contrast to Dahlgren at Charleston, Farragut steamed
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straight Into Mobile Bay, Ignoring the obstructions and 
explosive torpedoes. Following the closing of Mobile to 
Confederate blockade runners, the Navy Department turned its 
attention to Wilmington, North Carolina, the last 
Confederate port still readily accessible to the outside 
world.8
As the Navy Department was forced to concentrate its 
ironclads on more strategically important targets in 1864, 
Dahlgren and his squadron faced an impasse at Charleston.
He was unwilling to attempt to force his way past the 
obstructions as Farragut had done at Mobile Bay. Thus his 
squadron of ironclads did little more than continue to seal 
Charleston off from blockade runners, a task that they did 
effectively after Dahlgren established an anchorage Inside 
the Charleston bar for the monitors, and bombard Fort Sumter 
periodical 1y .
When Charleston finally fell into Union hands early in 
1865, it had little to do with the navy's efforts. After 
reaching Savannah, Georgia, which completed his "March to 
the Sea," General William Tecumseh Sherman turned his army 
northward. With no major fortifications on its landward 
side, Charleston was completely defenseless to an attack 
from this direction. On February 17, the Confederate army 
evacuated the city.
Dahlgren was among the first Union navy officers to 
enter Charleston. The city, he wrote, was 1 [dDesolate,
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desolate," but, this was "well merited." For after all, 
Charleston "was the hotbed of the Rebellion and for half a 
century has striven by word and deed to produce Rebellion." 
Then after initiating the Civil War, "the whirlwind 
came,— Blood and treasure flowed as if they were water— for 
four years our efforts were Jeered at & taunted," but, now, 
"at last comes fate— and the wretched lying, boasting crew 
sneak away from their dear City and will not risk its bricks 
nor their own hides. Go in ignominy & disgrace."^
Dahlgren's statement showed that he recognized that in 
at least one very important way, the Charleston campaign had 
failed. Ever since Fort Sumter had been fired upon in April 
1861, the goal of the North had been to destroy Charleston 
and to make its inhabitants suffer retribution, because as 
Dahlgren suggested, as far as the North was concerned it was 
South Carolina, especially the citizens of Charleston, that 
had caused the war.10
Of course, if the navy's campaign had failed, so too 
had Dahlgren. To secure the command of the South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron he had made bold assurances of success. 
At one point he even went so far as to tell a navy colleague 
in Washington that the day he attacked Charleston would 
either be his "bestt,] or the last" of his life. But 
Dahlgren's promise of either capturing Charleston in a 
spectacular naval attack or dying in the attempt never 
materialized.11
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Undoubtedly the highlight of Dahlgren's last months in 
command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was April 
14, which he described as 1 The Day.1 To commemorate the 
capture of Charleston a grand celebration was held in the 
now battered Fort Sumter. Among others, General Robert 
Anderson was in attendance, and he raised what was reputed 
to be the very flag that he had lowered when he surrendered 
the fort exactly four years earlier. The Reverend Henry 
Ward Beecher addressed the crowd of assembled sailors, 
soldiers, and dignatarles. Beecher's address, Dahlgren 
noted, was "moderate." This contrasted sharply with the 
sermon that Beecher gave when he learned that Sumter had 
been fired upon in April 1861. Then, he called on the North 
to make the South suffer physical retribution. But now, 
sounding more like Lincoln's calls for a moderate plan of 
reconstruction, the time for conflict was past because, 
Beecher assured his audience, the people who had caused the 
war in the first place had "an endless retribution" awaiting 
them.12
After Charleston's fall, Dahlgren's primary 
responsibility was overseeing the dismantling of his 
squadron. The Navy Department instructed Dahlgren to reduce 
his force to six tugboats and fifteen other steamers. He 
was ordered to send all of the monitors north. "Economize," 
was the word of the day, and Dahlgren was told to make sure
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that the vessels that remained only utilized steam power "in
an emergency
In mid-June, Dahlgren finally received "the Important 
letter," which ordered him "to proceed north." His last few 
days in Charleston were a hectic combination of carrying out 
the Navy Department's orders to cut the squadron to bare 
bone, visiting with his officers to offer his goodbyes, and 
packing for the voyage home. Leaving Charleston on June 17, 
Dahlgren noted the views on his outward voyage, "We passed
Sumter, then Wagner and all the familiar scenes of the last
two years— And a little after 5 [pm] turned out to cross the
Bar....so ends a command of two years."14
Dahlgren began his post-war career with a we 11-deserved 
vacation. He took everyone by surprise when on August 2, 
1865, he married Madeleine Vinton Goddard. Some of 
Dahlgren's naval colleagues, accustomed to ascribing base 
motives to everything that he did, could not help but wonder 
whether the money and influence that his wife enjoyed as the 
daughter of a wealthy former United States congressman were 
not the main reasons for the marriage. It certainly could 
not be explained by Goddard's looks, noted one navy officer 
who wrote: "You may recollect the lady as one of the ugliest 
of her sext,] though adorned with many golden charms!"1®
Dahlgren's vacation ended in early November. For a 
brief time there had been some discussion in the Navy 
Department of sending him to Europe to conduct a tour of the
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ordnance faciltles there, but perhaps because of his recent 
marriage the trip never materialized. Instead, he was 
assigned to serve on the highly publicized court-martial 
trial of Commodore Thomas T. Craven. In command of the 
Niagara in 1865, Craven's vessel was part of what was known 
as the Flying Squadron, which the Navy Department created to 
try to capture the Confederacy's small fleet of commerce 
raiders. Chasing after their elusive prey largely on the 
often months-old Information provided by American diplomats 
stationed in ports throughout the world was somewhat like 
trying to find the proverbial needle In a haystack. But in 
late March 1865, Craven found the Confederate ram Stonewal1 
docked In Ferrol, Spain. There was one major problem as far 
as Craven was concerned. The Niagara and the Sacramento 
sailing with him were both wooden vessels, while the 
Stonewal1 was an ocean-going Ironclad. In Craven's opinion, 
the Stonewal1 was "more than a match for three such vessels 
as the Niagara.1 When the Stonewal 1 left the protection of 
the neutral waters of the Spanish port, Craven did not 
attack the Confederate ironclad; and being faster than the 
two Union vessels the Stonewal1 steamed to points unknown.16
Craven was charged with "Falling to do his utmost to 
overtake and capture or destroy a vessel which it was his 
duty to encounter." The court split three ways, with some 
members arguing for a conviction, others arguing for an 
acquittal, and a third party arguing for what Dahlgren
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described as a partial acquittal. Dahlgren, along with 
Farragut, who was the president of the tribunal, spearheaded 
this latter position. Eventually, after days of discussion, 
the entire court agreed to this viewpoint. Craven was found 
"guilty of the charge in a less degree." As for sentencing, 
the court recommended that Craven "be suspended from duty on 
leave-pay for two years."17
Welles was furious with the court's decision. He 
argued that in this case the court could not legally convict 
Craven of a lesser charge and he sent the case back "for a 
revision of the finding." But the members of the court 
obviously sympathized with Craven because they simply 
revised their decision by finding Craven guilty as charged, 
with the sentence to remain as before, a two year suspension 
on leave-pay. Learning of the court's latest actions Welles 
exploded. "A court martial of high officers in the case of 
Craven," Welles wrote in his diary, "has made itself 
ridiculous by an incongruous finding and award which 1 
cannot approve. It is not pleasant to encounter so large a 
number of high officers of high standing, but I must do my 
duty if they do not." Ironically, Welles's only choices 
were to accept the court's latest ruling or to set aside the 
verdict altogether. Arguing that to allow the precedent of 
court's decision stand was the greater evil, Welles decided 
to set aside the conviction "and Commodore Thomas T. Craven 
is hereby relieved from arrest." Dahlgren was as upset with
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Welles as the secretary was with the court. In typical 
fashion Dahlgren penned a lengthy rebuttal to Welles's 
decision. But Dahlgren decided not to send it, a wise move, 
because it probably would have focused Welles's anger on him 
instead of Farragut, whom the Secretary blamed for the 
court's decision.18
It was extremely unusual for Dahlgren to remain 
publicly silent to anything that he perceived as a personal 
affront, but he had good reason not to raise anyone's ire 
against him at the moment. During the early days of 
Craven's trial, Dahlgren received a very unexpected visit 
from his brother Charles. Now almost penniless, the former 
Mississippi cotton planter and Confederate general had come 
to Washington to enlist his older brother's help to secure a 
presidential pardon. "[Rlather hard," Dahlgren wrote in his 
Journal, "after all I have done & suffered for four years in 
putting down the Rebellion; one affliction after another." 
Despite these feelings, Dahlgren demonstrated loyalty to his 
brother and immediately sought the support of his many 
political contacts. When he spoke to the secretary of 
state, Dahlgren was relieved when Seward "said promptly he 
would have the Pardon paper for my brother— Very Kind."19
Dahlgren's status as one of the navy's highest ranking 
officers resulted In his being named to a succession of 
highly visible positions. In February 1866, Dahlgren was 
appointed to the Commission on Harbor Defenses. Following
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this post he was named president of the Naval Academy's 
Board of Visitors. As these Jobs kept Dahlgren only 
moderately busy, he found plenty of time to re-establish 
himself in Washington's highest social circles. The list of 
people who attended the various dinners and parties that 
Dahlgren went to, or those who came to his home, reads like 
a veritable who's who of Washington's elite. Then, when the 
weather began to grow warm, Dahlgren moved his family to 
Newport, Rhode Island "for the season."2°
The comfortable existence that Dahlgren had enjoyed 
since his return to Washington came to a sudden end in the 
autumn of 1866. On September 28 the Navy Department Issued 
orders for him to take command of the South Pacific 
Squadron. "It would not be easy to say how I received an 
order so unjust in its nature, so rude in its manner," 
Dahlgren noted upon receipt of the directive. "And yet 
there is no appeal from the pleasure of this poor old 
imbecile CWellesl; who so soon is capable of forgetting 
service rendered to the public cause."21
Dahlgren proved a poor choice for this command. The 
United States was then working to increase its influence in 
the region. In doing so, the United States offered to 
mediate a dispute between the Allied Republics, which 
Included Peru, Chile, Bolivia and Equador, and Spain. 
Unfortunately, Dahlgren's actions while in command may have
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been the reason behind the Allied Republics rejection of the 
United States offer.22
Just prior to Dahlgren's appointment, what appeared to 
be a serious Incident occurred between an officer of the 
South Pacific Squadron and an officer of the Peruvian navy. 
Captain Fablus Stanly, in command of the USS Tuscarora. 
reported that when he visited with Admiral John Randolph 
Tucker, the highest ranking officer in the Peruvian navy, 
that Tucker failed to show him proper professional courtesy. 
Stanly's report, unfortunately, failed to explain a number 
of important details. First of all, at the time that the 
incident took place, Tucker, who was an American, was 
dealing with the mutiny of forty-eight Peruvian officers who 
refused to serve under him. But even more important, Stanly 
failed to note that when the incident occurred, Tucker had 
not yet been commissioned and was still officially a 
civilian, was in civilian clothes, and was not even on a 
Peruvian vessel, but rather was a passenger on an English 
mall steamer.23
When Dahlgren was appointed to the South Pacific 
Squadron few of the important details of the Incident were 
known in Washington. What was known, was that Tucker was a 
former Confederate navy officer who had been, of all things, 
in command of the Confederate navy forces at Charleston.
Just before leaving for his new command, Dahlgren went to 
the Navy Department to inquire how he should deal with
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Tucker. According to Dahlgren, Welles called Tucker "an 
unpardoned rebel who was liable to be hanged If he appeared 
at Fort Monroe." Furthermore, Dahlgren recalled in his 
journal, Welles did not "wish me or any officer to be 
disgraced by compulsion to offer him clvi1ities.
By the time that Dahlgren reached his new command, the 
facts of the incident were clear. Because the Incident had 
taken place before Tucker had any official standing, the 
diplomats on hand quite logically decided to treat the 
entire episode as a personal one between Stanly and Tucker 
and considered the case closed. Dahlgren refused to accept 
this decision. He argued that Tucker's status at the time 
of the incident had no bearing on the issue. Since the 
Peruvian government had not yet offered an official apology, 
which the United States had requested before the full 
specifics were known, Dahlgren ordered the suspension of 
courtesies "to the officers in the Peruvian service who 
still remain excluded as citizens of the U.S. from the 
amnesty of the President." After doing so, Dahlgren noted 
in his Journal with more than a hint of satisfaction, "so 
the ball is opened."25
Dahlgren's actions escalated the incident far beyond 
the scope of the original one. The United States minister 
to Chile told Dahlgren "that unless this difficulty can be 
speedily and amicably arranged our influence on this coast 
will be lost." Furthermore, he told Dahlgren, "I believe
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the Allies were inclined to accept our offer Cto mediate], 
but under the present circumstances of course cannot do so." 
Dahlgren showed that he realized the seriousness of the 
proceedings. In a dispatch to Washington he noted that "the 
Peruvian Government is very sore on the subject, and takes 
It seriously enough." But he did not want to back down. "I 
really cannot perceive," he told his superiors in 
Washington, "that the United States is called on to back out 
entirely."26
In Washington an entirely different decision was made. 
It was time to end this entire affair because it was 
interfering with much more important matters. Seward wrote 
that while the "sentiments of Admiral Dahlgren in regard to 
the character of ... Admiral [Tucker] ... are approved and 
commended," he ordered that henceforth all courtesies, which 
primarily involved ceremonial gun salutes, would be 
exchanged with the Peruvian navy. Ironically, by the time 
that Seward's directive arrived, the situation had largely 
resolved itself. In mid-March 1867, Tucker resigned his 
commission over an entirely different issue. Receiving 
Seward's order shortly afterward, Dahlgren reacted angrily:
Seward's letter is highly complimentary to my 
sentiments but says Tucker must be looked on as a 
Peruvian Officer— A shameful 8. outrageous 
backdown— needless too, for Tucker backed out 
first. There must have been a stir among the dry 
bones in the N.Cavy] Deptarlttment].... all I
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wanted [was] that they should hold the ground in 
Wash.[Ington], but the imbeciles would not.^7
For the time being, the Allied Republics refused the 
American offer to act as mediator; and while no concrete 
evidence exists to Indicate that Dahlgren's actions played 
any role in this decision, the controversy caused by 
Dahlgren's order to withhold salutes to Tucker could not 
have benefited America's diplomatic efforts. Dahlgren 
remained in charge of the South Pacific Squadron until July 
1868; and following the resolution of the Tucker incident 
the last year or so of his command was relatively uneventful 
in comparison.28
Upon his return to the United States in July 1868, 
Dahlgren was again named chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.
He accepted the assignment, but he was not at all happy. He 
complained that "retrenchment being the order of the day" 
meant that his Job entailed little more than filling routine 
requests for ordnance supplies. Almost immediately, he 
requested a transfer back to his old post at the Washington 
Navy Yard. Welles refused, telling Dahlgren that he was in 
the correct pi ace.
Not everyone agreed with Welles. Many people opposed 
Dahlgren's appointment, arguing that he would hinder any 
advancement in the navy's ordnance. Dahlgren felt that many 
If not all of the attacks on him stemmed from the efforts of 
greedy inventors whose Inventions he had rejected. He
_ * 
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believed that his critics were simply trying to steal from 
the government's coffers. There was some evidence to 
support this notion. Since late in the Civil War, various 
Congressional committees had conducted investigations on the 
status of the army's and navy's ordnance. Many of these 
investigations had indeed originated with an inventor 
seeking economic redress for the damages reputedly inflicted 
on him because of the decision of either the army's or 
navy's Ordnance Bureau. But while the claims of individual 
inventors may have initiated the many of the Congressional 
investigations, they also dealt with a more fundamental, and 
a more Important question; what was the future of America's 
military ordnance?30
Throughout the Civil War, Dahlgren had argued that his 
smoothbore, muzz 1e-1oading cannon were the best large guns 
in the world. Events during the war, he argued, had done 
nothing to change his opinion. Dahlgren repeatedly stated 
that he did not believe that heavy rifled guns would ever 
replace smoothbores. The issue finally came to a head in 
early 1869. In testimony before another Congressional 
committee, Dahlgren stated, "My own experience, from 
repeated action, Induces me to give preference to heavy 
smooth-bore guns. I always thought that they hurt our 
ironclads more in battle than the rifles did, and I am 
inclined to believe that the same opinion prevails largely 
in the navy.”31
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Dahlgren had good reason to be proud of his distinctive 
guns. As Henry Wise, then chief of the navy's Ordnance 
Bureau, reported to Congress In November 1865, “'Not a 
single gun of the Dahlgren system burst prematurely,'" which 
was rather remarkable considering that by the end of the 
Civil War more than 1,800 Dahlgren smoothbores of various 
sizes had been cast. The same could not be said of the 
Parrott rifled 100-pounder, which was the main rifled gun 
used by the navy during the Civil War. Of some three 
hundred of these guns, nineteen burst in service. Still, 
the era of the low velocity smoothbore had passed away at 
the same exact time that wooden ships became obsolete. 
Dahlgren refused to acknowledge this. While ordnance 
specialists throughout the world were working to perfect 
rifled, breech-loading guns, he continued to hold onto the 
past.32
Dahlgren sent off what turned out to be his final 
ordnance report to a Congressional committee on February 11, 
1869. It took only four days for the committee to respond. 
After reading their recommendations, he noted tersely in his 
Journal, “both my guns 8. Rodman's are condemned."3®
Dahlgren was devastated. He asked to resign from the 
Ordnance Bureau and to be assigned command of the Washington 
Navy Yard. His request was refused. But Dahlgren did not 
relent until the Navy Department finally honored both his
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resignation from the Ordnance Bureau and his request to take 
command of the Washington Navy Yard.34
Dahlgren returned to his old and familiar post in 
August 1869. There, on November 13, he celebrated his 
sixtieth birthday. "I complete sixty years to-day," he 
noted on the occasion. "Grateful to say, in good health and 
only the worse in point of time." But Dahlgren's diagnosis 
of his physical condition was overly optimistic. Having 
long suffered from various ailments, the following summer he 
began to experience chest pains. And on the morning of July 
12, 1870, Dahlgren died rather suddenly.35
Dahlgren died an angry and bitter man. His superiors 
in the Navy Department had become nothing but "imbeciles," 
who invariably made decisions that ran counter to all good 
sense, at least as far as Dahlgren was concerned. His 
children from his first marriage had also become a major 
disappointment. At one point he called them his "greatest 
affliction." One of his children was an exception, his son 
Ulric, But even a greater source of grief for Dahlgren, his 
favorite child had died in a controversial cavalry raid on 
Richmond in March 1864. While Union authorities claimed 
that the raid was designed to free Union prisoners held in 
Richmond, Confederate authorities claimed that the orders 
found on Ulric Dahlgren's body also called for an attempt to 
assassinate President Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet, and 
to burn Richmond. Dahlgren claimed that the orders were a
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forgery. He would devote a great deal of time trying to 
exonerate his son's reputation. He eventually completed a 
biography of his young son, but tragically for Dahlgren, a 
publisher could not be found who would agree to publish the 
work until 1872, two years after Dahlgren's death. Of 
course, there was also the controversy surrounding 
Dahlgren's ordnance career, which ended with his resignation 
from the Ordnance Bureau in 1869, and for all intents and 
purposes his complete withdrawal from the profession which 
had been the main source of his fame and reputation."^®
As distressing as all of the things may have been, 
Dahlgren's greatest source of anger and bitterness was his 
command of the naval forces off Charleston. From the
failure of the boat assault on Fort Sumter on September 8,
1863, onward, Dahlgren became the target of severe 
criticism. It turned out that much of this criticism 
originated with his army counterpart, General Quincy 
Gillmore. The general strongly questioned Dahlgren's 
decision not to make an all out effort to reach Charleston's 
inner harbor immediately following the close of the first 
bombardment of Fort Sumter, on August 23, 1863. According 
to Gillmore, "These were the decisive days." At first, 
Gillmore used both friendly newsmen and political contacts 
to wage an all out effort to get Dahlgren removed from
command. But, as noted earlier, because of Dahlgren's role
in the Navy Department's fight with both DuPont and its
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Congressional enemies, Dahlgren remained in command until 
the end of the war. Failing to get Dahlgren removed, 
Gillmore did the next best thing, he wrote a book 
exonerating his actions at Charleston while placing the 
entire blame for the Union's failure to take Charleston 
squarely on Dahlgren's shoulders.37
From the time that Dahlgren read Gillmore's book in 
February 1865, he vowed to refute Gillmore. And in the last 
five years of his life Dahlgren repeatedly explained why 
Charleston had not fallen until February 1865. As far as he 
was concerned, there were numerous reasons to explain this. 
First, he asserted, the army's campaign to take Fort Wagner 
and Morris Island took longer than planned; thus the 
monitors were worn out before he could make an attempt 
against Charleston itself. Next, the officers he had 
appointed to lead the boat assault on Fort Sumter had been 
guilty of "mismanagement." Furthermore, the South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron never received the additional monitors 
that Dahlgren had requested and that the Navy Department had 
promised, therefore, Dahlgren argued to his dying day, he 
never had enough vessels to take Charleston. Finally, and 
perhaps most important in his defense, Fort Sumter had never 
been completely destroyed; and as long as Sumter remained in 
Confederate hands, the obstructions could not be removed.38
Many of Dahlgren's arguments had merit. If his 
historical reputation is used as the yardstick, his efforts
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at personal vindication were successful. But no matter how 
well he may have defended himself against the criticism, 
Dahlgren had failed in at least one important way. More 
than anything in the world, Dahlgren desired fame and glory 
as a naval hero. Unfortunately for Dahlgren, no explanation 
or rationalization could ever secure him what he coveted 
above all else.
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